

CHINA RESISTS

(ABRIDGED FROM EDGAR SNOW'S *SCORCHED EARTH*)

EDGAR SNOW

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PUBLISHER'S NOTE

EDGAR SNOW needs no introduction to Indian readers, for he has been a consistent supporter of all progressive and democratic movements in Asia, particularly in China and India. He was the first newspaperman to break the Kuomintang blockade against Red China in 1936, and he was the first to tell the world about the magnificent epic of unflinching patriotism of the Chinese Communists who withstood all attempts of the reactionary Kuomintang to exterminate them. The reader will find that story told with remarkable vividness in Snow's world-famous book, RED STAR OVER CHINA.

The present volume is an abridged edition of Edger Snow's later book, SCORCHED EARTH (published in U.S.A. under the title of BATTLE FOR ASIA). This book gives a detailed picture of Chinese Resistance against Fascism, and brings out very clearly the role of the United National Front in the war against Japan. Particularly significant is the contrast, clearly and faithfully drawn, between the policy and activities of the Kuomintang and those of the Chinese Communist Party in this respect.

Though written four years back, this is the only book which provides the key to the understanding of the latest events in China.

OCTOBER TENTH

CHINESE NATIONAL DAY 1944

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THE INVADING ARMY

*War is the father of all creation and
the mother of civilization.*

JAPANESE WAR DEPARTMENT.

THIS was a war between a nation that had never been defeated and a nation which had never won military victory in modern times.

History's only large-scale invasion of Japan, an armada launched by the mighty Kublai Khan, was repulsed by a typhoon and Japanese prayers, and no attempt had been made since then to land foreign troops on Japanese soil. The Japanese army had won every war in which it engaged a foreign Power and the people believed themselves invincible. The Chinese army had been repeatedly humiliated, ever since the Opium Wars in the middle of the nineteenth century, and the psychology of defeat was difficult to overcome.

Yet the modern Japanese army was less than 70 years old. Before 1870 the Japanese had little influence on the continent, while the Chinese had shaped Asiatic history for 2,500 years. Though bearish on the outcome of any single battle, it is a Chinese credo that China must always win in the long run. Hence Japanese confidence of today is exceeded only by the serenity of China's certainty of victory tomorrow.

As recently as 1893, a year before Japan's first war against China, the Japanese annual military budget amounted to only 12 million yen ; she now spends about that much every day. Japan won her first victory with imported rifles and cannon. A decade later she was making her own small arms, but she defeated Russia in imported warships, which old Togo brilliantly manoeuvred to outwit the Czarist fleet. By the time of World War I, Japan had developed a considerable munitions industry, founded on her two great military successes. Victory over the Germans at Tsingtao gave her a third consecutive win.

Before the Meiji Restoration, and the abolition of the feudal caste system, only the samurai, the warrior knights, could bear arms. The reformation abolished the caste system, and the army, becoming a national institution, drew upon the whole people for its recruits. Conscription was introduced ; military training became universal. The army retained, as we shall see further on, many of its feudal characteristics, and indeed proudly glorified them as part of the samurai tradition ; but technically it imported the best it could get from abroad. Influenced by Moltke and the German army's great victory at Sedan, the Japanese invited German militarists to come to Tokyo and teach them all they knew about the training of conscripts, the weapons of war, and strategy and tactics. Since then Prussian

militarism has been the ideal of Japanese officers and the textbook of the army—down to the latest Nazi exploits it can copy.

But the Japanese army enjoyed from the first an independent authority which the old Prussian army, and especially the Reichswehr under Hitler, might well envy. Abolition of the feudal clans left the army and navy to be shaped under the Choshu and Satsuma samurai, and responsible to no one but the Emperor. In practice, often, the two branches of national defence were accountable only to themselves; in both theory and practice the Emperor alone could give them orders. Through victories in three wars crowded into twenty-three years the army and navy contributed to the development of modern Japan an accumulation of capital and industrial wealth, an empire, and the status of a world power. Then followed the only period in which the supremacy of the military authority in this samurai state can be said to have been seriously challenged by the Constitutional power of popular political parties.

Struggle between the enfranchised people and the military forces became acute after Japan's adherence to the Washington Nine-Power Treaty in 1922, which gave the Empire naval predominance in the Far East, and guaranteed security. Strong popular pressure soon forced drastic retrenchments in defence expenditure, a disarmament programme for the army, and the consequent curtailment of the political influence of the services and its aristocratic allies in the bureaucracy. Defence costs were slashed to less than 200 million yen annually; the standing army was reduced to about 250,000 men. Thousands of disgusted officers were retired. The conscription system was greatly modified and the training period reduced to less than two years.

Among the Japanese masses demands for internal reforms were linked with anti-militarist, anti-imperialist movements, which challenged the sacredness of the army, and wanted it subordinated to Constitutional authority. Significant of the new trend, a Japanese Cabinet in 1930 negotiated the London Naval Treaty against the strong opposition of the fighting forces. Still worse, a Japanese civilian diplomat daringly put his signature to the Treaty, in proxy for the Emperor. The army and navy were outraged. Japan seemed near a revolution in which all the old feudal privileges might be swept away, and a democratic state emerge.

This era abruptly ended in 1931. Rising resentment among military and naval officers plus a complex of socio-economic factors resulted in the Mukden Incident. Plotted by radical younger officers in the army, encouraged by their dissatisfied allies in the bureaucracy, the invasion of Manchuria was undertaken to recover military control of Japan as much as to check Chinese nationalism. A "bloodless victory" (almost), it proved a great success, and army prestige rose once more. Having launched the nation in war, in defiance of Japan's international obligations, the army rapidly consolidated power at home. Destroying bit by bit the remaining bases of previous policy, it embarked the Japanese people on its own programme of "continuous expansion". In theory "above politics",

like the Emperor, the army became in fact Japan's supreme political party, its generals the nation's political bosses.

Army politics are a mirror of socio-economic contradictions within Japanese society. A monolithic organization headed by the Emperor, theoretically no "opposition" can exist within it. Actually it is honeycombed with cliques each having its own military, political and economic ambitions, its own liaison with social movements, capital and industry, and its own "national programme". Sometimes rivalries between groups break out in open revolt, as in the mutiny of February 1936, when army cadets murdered three members of the Japanese Cabinet and forced a Government reorganization. Usually they are solved by compromise and a reshuffle of political office and rich spoils that go with it in Japan. Because the War Minister must always be a general in active service, the intrigue begins at the top and permeates the whole service.

Working closely with the army, yet in rivalry with it also, Japan's leading finance and monopoly capitalists are deeply involved in army politics. In no country has the development of capitalism been more intimately linked with war. Japanese industry had its beginnings in the first war with China, and subsequent spurts of development in each case coincided with imperialist expansion. The victory over Russia was followed by rapid growth of armament industry, ship-building, communications, mining and transport. In World War I Japan made enormous profits and in relation to China became a creditor nation. Because Japan had never known military defeat, war and prosperity were more of an equation in Japanese thinking than among disillusioned capitalists elsewhere.

In Manchuria the army went into business on a huge scale. It took over direct management of many industries and state enterprises. Officers detailed to such positions often became wealthy almost overnight. A post in the Gendarmery or the Special Service Section, which control most army business, was considered by the Japanese a guaranty of financial success. Although the annual salary of a Japanese general is less than U. S. \$2,000, rare is one who retires from the Gendarmery or the Special Service Section with a fortune computable in less than five figures.

Kwantung Army men like Umedzu, Koiso, Okamura, Itagaki and Doihara, who, when I first met them during or a little after the Manchurian campaign, were considered poor and impeccably honest fellows idealistically devoted to the national cause, are today rich generals with extensive financial interests. Scores of young officers, who a few years ago were engaged in dutifully clicking their heels in the Kwantung Army or the North China Command, suddenly blossomed out as financial experts, economic experts, mining experts, political experts or just China experts. Nobody would have thought of seeking their advice formerly, but now it is amazing how many banks, industries and various enterprises cannot get along without their valuable intellects on their boards of directors.

At the same time, after the Manchurian occupation, a strong demand for army "reform" arose among discontented lower officers

encouraged by army groups with political ends of their own. The reform movement found one logical expression in the Anti-Comintern Pact, a useful ideological instrument with which to purge Japan of its "dangerous thoughts". In its endless chain of pamphlets the army instructed the nation on a wide variety of topics: economics, politics, art, science, philosophy, even family life. The trend was towards fascism of a type made especially complex because of the army's unique tie-up with monopoly, finance and state capitalism.

Army literature, required reading for every soldier, now attacked corrupt politicians, capitalism, parliamentary government, foreign imperialism, Chinese nationalism and—international Jewry.¹ It advocated military totalitarianism under euphemisms such as "army socialism", "state-ism", "state socialism", and so on. But to three-yen-a-month Japanese conscripts, the rebellious but politically naïve peasant boys, such army demagoguery had a distinct, if befuddling appeal, especially when idealized as part of Japan's divine—peaceful—civilizing—mission in East Asia.

Increase followed increase in military forays on the budget. By 1936, when, in preparation for the China Incident, the army "replenishment programme" was sanctioned by a submissive Diet, defence expenditures alone amounted to more than the entire state revenues. Most of this money went into enlargement of the munitions and war industry, in an attempt to put the Japanese army on a par with the new mechanized forces of Europe. By the middle of 1937 Japan had not, however, achieved even as much self-sufficiency as Italy. For example, her factories could then make only 3,000 tanks and 4,000 motor-cars a year, and that seemed to the Japanese a miracle. But Japan was still largely dependent on America and Europe for transport, and for many finished war weapons, particularly airplanes. The speediest planes Japan had were German, French and American makes. No all-Japan-made bomber appeared until June, 1937, when Japan had less than 2,000 war-planes, all told.

But in the course of four years of war the Japanese were to reorganize their economy completely and to mobilize the entire resources of the nation and its colonies to build a powerful modern armament industry. For this purpose they needed, and received, the technical assistance of Europe and America. They needed particularly American engineering and mechanical skill and American plans, and they needed our fine steels and alloys and the secrets of the processes by which to make them. Most experts agree that had this assistance, and the raw materials of war, particularly iron and steel scrap and aviation gasoline (of which we supplied Japan about 90 per cent. of her imports), been denied the aggressor in the early months, or even in the second year of the war, and had the British and French likewise withheld what war-making aid they

¹ The army's anti-Semitism seems absurd because Japan had no Jews. But it was useful in Manchuria, where an army pogrom against White Russian Jews succeeded, by one device or another, in depriving them of most of their wealth and property.

had for export, Japan's machine would by now be very gravely crippled if not completely immobilized.

The Japanese army at the start of the war had, of course, considerable reserves to draw upon, and it enjoyed wide superiority over the Chinese. By July, 1937, the General Staff had at its disposal a standing army increased to about 750,000 men, with trained reserves of nearly 2 million. Total man-power of military age in Japan was approximately 11 million. It had to be reckoned that if the powers continued to reinforce Japan's war economy, the high command would eventually be able, by the substitution of female labour in some munitions industries and the mobilization of Chinese and Koreans for "rice labour" and police duties, to put as many as 6 or possibly 7 million men under arms in a supreme emergency.

In equipment the original invading forces were overwhelmingly superior to even Chiang Kai-shek's first-line divisions. Divisional armament consisted of 615 machine-guns and the following artillery: twenty-four each of 37-mm. guns, 70-mm. howitzers, 70-mm. field-guns, and anti-tank guns; twelve 105-mm. howitzers, and four anti-aircraft guns. Twenty-five divisions were already so armed at the outbreak of war. And by the end of 1937 over half of them were in China. Each division had, of course, its own tank detachments and motorization, but no real "armoured" division appeared.

The army's supreme confidence in this improved equipment and its psychology of "invincibility" explained its wide-front offensives and indeed determined the whole strategic pattern of the war. Japanese generals depended on an initial massive demonstration of material to break the heart of China's resistance at the outset. In the main their strategy followed that of the Germans at Sedan. They dreamed of a Cannae or a "three-months" war. Their concept was of a quick decision won by rapid encirclement of China's main forces in a "conclusive battle" in the East.

Aside from the remote possibility of foreign intervention, Japan had but one serious risk to take in pursuing this strategy. If a deep headlong penetration succeeded only in dispersal, but not in conquest of the main Chinese forces, Japan might win the great fixed battles, but fail to secure a political decision, the final judgment in all wars. The danger can be stated in this way: undue prolongation of the hostilities might enable China to learn to utilize her only two strategic assets—superior numbers and extensive space—in such a manner as to deny to the invading forces the economic and political exploitation of their military victory, and even to immobilize Japan as a serious contender for world power.

I do not think the Japanese altogether ignored that possibility,¹ but they heavily discounted Chinese capacity to organize their numbers and space in an effective military way.

Was this over-confidence, or realistic estimate of China's weakness?

¹ General Hayashi, for example, warned the nation of this danger, and openly expressed doubt of a "quick victory". *King*, Tokyo, July, 1938.

NOTES ON THE DEFENCE

Look at the map and note the smallness of Japan compared to China. Can anyone doubt that we shall triumph?

CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

THE above remark, which the Generalissimo made to me not long after the war began, embodied a principle of faith which became the basis of his conduct of resistance. General Chen Cheng later described it to me as a "strategy of trading space for time". Typically Chinese in its ambiguity, it might better be called a theory rather than a strategy: the theory of the limitless rear.

Though no match for the military strength of Japan in 1937, the Chinese army was the largest and most powerful that country had ever possessed. Japan's army of 1895 would have had small chance against it. Probably it would have been able to defeat the army with which Japan won her victory over the Russians. Considering its brief history, this was no inconsiderable achievement.

China did not get started as a modern power until forty years after Japan. The ultra-conservative and degenerate Manchu Dynasty was overthrown only in 1911, and the Republic inherited from it little of military value. In its last years the Dynasty did open a few military schools, however, staffed chiefly by Japanese officers, and in these the older generation of Chinese military leaders got their early training. In those days Japanese policy was to train young Chinese to help build up a Pan-Asiatic empire. To-day, nearly all their students are fighting the Imperial Army. One of them is Chiang Kai-shek. The only formal military training he received was from Japanese in the Manchu military schools, and later on in the Tokyo war college.

For a decade after the collapse of the Dynasty, China's armed forces remained divided between semi-feudal war-lords, who hired soldiers to be loyal not to the country as a whole but to themselves as individuals. It was not till Sun Yat-sen founded the Whampoa Academy at Canton, in 1924, that a basis was laid for a real national army. At Whampoa both Kuomintang and Communist youths were trained as officers of the Nationalist Army, which eventually overthrew most of the old war-lords. Chiang Kai-shek was its first president. For advisers he had Soviet Russians headed by General Bluecher. These officers, loaned to China as a result of Sun Yat-sen's *entente* with Moscow, created for the first time an army indoctrinated by a political faith—the Nationalist Revolution. After the Communist-Kuomintang split in 1927, and the founding of the anti-Communist Government, the Generalissimo established, as successor to Whampoa,

the Nanking Military Academy. And the Communists, in their little Soviet Republic, operated their own Red Army Military Academy in rivalry to it. These two institutions, and provincial military schools here and there, turned out the officers who led Chinese troops at the outbreak of the present war.

The influence of German military genius was on the Chinese, as well as the Japanese, side of the line. The Generalissimo first hired a German adviser, Colonel Bauer, and he was followed by a number of others. By 1937 the German military mission, headed by General Alexander von Falkenhausen, numbered over 100 officers. It was under their tutelage that most of the younger officers of the most modern section of Chiang Kai-shek's army were trained. In addition to the Nanking Military Academy, the Government established schools for specialists in artillery, tank and chemical warfare. The pattern of training laid down was, from a technical standpoint, considered quite good. It had been in use less than a decade, however, when war came.

China had a standing army of 1,800,000 men to meet Japan, but they were troops of widely varying training and equipment. Chiang Kai-shek's "own", the German-trained troops led by Whampoa or Nanking cadets, numbered only 300,000. These were the nucleus around which Chiang grouped about eighty divisions, of miscellaneous training and equipment, which he called the Central Army. Then there were the Kwangsi troops, under Generals Pai Tsung-hsi and Li Tsung-jen, who, since 1927, had run their own little political and military show in the South-east. They numbered about 300,000 men and were considered as good as Chiang's model divisions. Finally, the Communist troops in the North-west had excellent fighting morale and skilled tactical leadership, but their equipment was poorer than even many provincial armies. The remainder of China's forces were regional troops never fully assimilated under the central command, with training and equipment ranging from the mediocre to the extremely poor. Though without exception every army in the country now recognized Chiang Kai-shek as commander-in-chief, regional characteristics persisted, and in many cases there was no staff liaison to implement co-operation.

The Chinese were armed with heavy and light machine-guns, automatic rifles and trench mortars. Chiang Kai-shek's German-trained divisions had light and heavy artillery and howitzers in proportions of about one to four, and machine-guns in a ratio of one to three, against Japanese divisions. The Central Army as a whole had only meagre artillery, and most of the provincial troops had only light howitzers and trench mortars. The average Chinese division probably had no more than 100 machine-guns. There were a few anti-tank guns in the well-equipped First Army. Other units had neither anti-tank nor anti-aircraft guns. Tanks themselves numbered less than fifty, and their crews were poorly trained.

China's facilities for replenishment of war materials were very limited. All arsenals combined, for example, could produce only 200 machine-guns a month and about 3,000 rifles, so that even most

small arms were imported. China could not make satisfactory artillery munitions or air-bombs. Trench mortars were turned out in large numbers, and this was one of the few modern weapons in the use of which most Chinese divisions were fairly proficient. In rifle ammunition, as well as trench-mortar munitions, the country was approaching self-sufficiency for its standing army.

Lack of standardized purchasing in other respects resulted in enormously complicating problems of supply. Automatic rifles, machine-guns and artillery were of every known make, and ammunition produced or imported for one weapon would not fit another. New guns often became useless when the source of their ammunition was cut off. The same was true of airplanes. Student pilots were shifted from plane to plane and from one set of instructors to another in a wasteful and unsystematic way. Every time a high Government official went abroad he brought back a new batch of airplanes. Purchases were made here, there and everywhere, like shipping for new bonnets. Many defective ships were accumulated, China being especially badly stung by the Italians. The result was that when war came the Generalissimo discovered that his air fleet, which had boasted of close to a thousand battle planes, actually had less than 150 ready for action. The worst feature of this international flying circus was that China had no servicing industry which could maintain it. Many planes became useless after only minor mishaps because of poor facilities for repair.

Lack of centralized organization, scanty equipment, inadequate war bases and severe technical inferiority, necessitated the practice of the utmost economy in the use of war material. This dictated that whenever possible China should avoid pitched battles and positional warfare requiring heavy expenditure of munitions. It was clear that the Chinese command could not hope to outmatch Japan in any supreme struggle of arms for vital points and lines. Somewhere it had to find a strategic asset to reinforce the main effort of the regular troops. This asset could only lie, as already remarked, among the millions of people and the physical scape which they inhabited. Numbers and space alone could not win; but if integrated in national mobilization they could deny the enemy effective control of the state.

So China's most realistic war aim should have been not to win formal military victory, but to render useless the enemy's sacrifices in attaining his own victory. This required a strategy envisaging: (1) utmost prolongation of the war, by preserving the main forces and their equipment, and drawing the enemy inland; (2) rapid development of mobile, manœuvring and guerrilla warfare on the enemy flanks and rear, while fighting delaying actions on the main front; (3) denial to the enemy of economically self-sustaining bases in the occupied areas, by the revolutionary political and military organization of total mass resistance.

"Mass mobilization", a phrase which must occur often in any book discussing the war in China, was the basic imperative necessity, in order to realize those aims. China had 400 million people,

but at the outbreak of the war not 1 per cent of them could be mobilized because, during the previous decade, the Government had failed to organize, train and lead the rural masses. Though smaller in total numbers than the Chinese, a far greater percentage of the Japanese were mobilized in the war effort. *Contrary to popular belief, therefore, the advantage of numbers was at the beginning of the war on the side of Japan.* If Japan pacified the big areas invaded she would soon have on her side the asset of China's space as well.

In the Northern provinces the Japanese troops concentrated, as could have been foreseen, at key points, cities, railways and roads, and expanded their garrison zones only very slowly into the interior. Beyond their bayonets were thousands of villages where dwelt the great bulk of the population, which Japan could not attempt to subjugate until the great offensives were concluded. Here in these "islands" or "gaps" the rural millions could be organized, trained and armed, to provide powerful allies for the main Chinese forces. Here was the home of guerrilla and mobile warfare, where Japanese victory or defeat would be finally decided.

"In effect", as Nathaniel Peffer shrewdly observed, "the question on the Chinese side can be reduced to this: How effectively can all of China's military forces employ the method of fighting used by the Chinese Communists between 1930 and 1936?"

Everything pointed to the necessity for a strategy envisaging the rapid transformation of the mercenary army into a revolutionary people's army, the widest use of mobile offensive tactics co-ordinated with a shallow and inexpensive positional defence, and the development of maximum civilian co-operation with the military organizations. But the high command was not to recognize this until painfully late in the war. Instead it continued to participate in a hopelessly uneven contest of fire-power in the defence of points, and to regard mobile warfare, which developed largely under the leadership of the Communists, as a kind of necessary evil.

The prolonged sacrifices at Shanghai, involving a frightful waste of trained men and munitions, almost wrecked China's organized resistance at the outset. But it perhaps had certain political justifications. It had some psychological value; it helped to strengthen national self-confidence. It may have been reasonable also to hope, as the Generalissimo probably did, that by keeping the struggle on the doorstep of Shanghai's International Settlement, some incident might entangle Japan in a serious complication with the foreign Powers and perhaps lead to intervention. If, in addition, the time gained had been used to move irreplaceable industrial plant and skilled workers to interior points, to hasten mass mobilization in the villages of the interior, and otherwise to prepare hinterland bases for the mobile forces on which the main burden of defence of the eastern provinces clearly would soon descend, the battle might have been worth its heavy costs.

But such was not the case, as we shall see farther on.

GREATER THAN GOD

*I cannot but feel that some power
even greater than God has inspired
our men.*

GENERAL, SUGIYAMA.

It was probably a major tactical error to invest so much of China's scant reserves in an initial positional battle where there existed no possibility of attaining a parity of fire-power with the enemy. Instead, the Chinese could easily have drawn a then highly over-confident enemy inland, before it was properly reinforced, and in the favourable terrain west of Shanghai could have massed their forces for a surprise flank attack and a possible important victory.

The German advisers did urge the use of some such tactics. They wanted to take a principal stand along and beyond the Soochow-Hangchow line. In this way contact could have been maintained at a modest cost in trained men and material, without exhausting the Chinese reserves and throwing away the possibilities of counter-attack and manoeuvre.

The Chinese staff no doubt had reasons for ignoring that counsel, but one of them was its own over-confidence. Having had some successes against the Chinese Red Army in positional warfare, many high officers at that time really imagined themselves capable of repulsing heavy blows on a fixed front from an army like Japan's. The Nanking disaster profoundly shook these illusions, but it was not until after the loss of Hankow that the bitter truth was borne home to many. This was simply that China as a whole was now in a military position approximately the same as the Chinese Reds had faced against the Kuomintang, and much perforce adopt many of their military, economic and political principles to maintain the struggle.

Once the Japanese broke through the Chinese right flank their advance never halted till they reached Nanking. The Chinese had failed to prepare strong positions to absorb their retreat from Shanghai; transport became hopelessly clogged, staff work broke down, and command over a unified army was temporarily lost. Had the Chinese even then understood the new situation, abandoned the capital and withdrawn to prepared lines in the north and the west, the losses need not have been so appalling. But even Chiang Kai-shek seems to have had some childish faith in the efficiency of the ancient walls of Nanking, and he waited until too late to order the evacuation of the city.

Little preparation had been made for demolition work, although there was ample time to have destroyed buildings and plant of any

military or economic value to Japan. The "scorched-earth" policy was credited to General Pai Tsung-hsi, the ablest strategist on Chiang's staff, but he was not one of the bright boys of the inner circle, and his advice was ignored along with that of the Germans. In the end the Ministry of Communications was the *only* important Government building blown up before the retreat. The Japanese took over the arsenal almost intact, important factories, the power-plant, railways and rolling stock, ferries, Government hospitals, all the administrative buildings, an enormous amount of munitions and transport and the Nanking Military Academy, with all its equipment. Japan acquired enough material here to equip a puppet army, and a city so rich in loot that it was still being carted off three months later.

Although the war was five months old by the time Nanking was lost, little had been done to organize the people even inside the capital. Half a million or more did somehow evacuate, but not in accordance with any Government plan. No people's organization existed to co-operate with the soldiery. When, exhausted from their long retreat, the half-starved troops passed through the city, there were no welcoming committees to greet and comfort them even with water and bread. And yet the troops for the most part kept their discipline. Except for an occasional soldier grabbing hot rolls or other small articles from open shops passed on the streets, they left all the looting to the victorious Japanese. Lacking any organization for disposing of the population, the Government could do nothing better than accept the offer of a few foreigners to set up the so-called International Safety Zone for refugees inside the city.

The Japanese entered Nanking on December 12th, as Chinese troops and civilians were still trying to withdraw to the north bank of the Yangtze River, debouching through the one remaining gate. Scenes of utmost confusion ensued. Hundreds of people were machine-gunned by Japanese planes or drowned while trying to cross the river; hundreds more were caught in the bottleneck which developed at Hsiakuan gate, where bodies piled up four feet high. The disintegration of authority during these last hours was inexcusable, and left many people ready to accept the Japanese occupation as a welcome "restoration of law and order".

What a disillusionment awaited them!

The sordid story of the Nanking massacres is now pretty familiar to the world. According to an estimate given to me by members of the Nanking International Relief Committee—which was, incidentally, headed by a German business man, Mr. John H. D. Rabe, who wore Hitler's highest Nazi decoration—the Japanese murdered no less than 42,000 people in Nanking alone, a large percentage of them women and children. It is estimated that 300,000 civilians were murdered by the Japanese in their march between Shanghai and Nanking, a number roughly equal to the casualties suffered by the Chinese armed forces.

Anything female between the ages of 10 and 70 was raped. Discards were often bayoneted by drunken soldiers. Frequently mothers had to watch their babies beheaded, and then submit to

raping. One mother told of being raped by a soldier who, becoming annoyed at the cries of her baby, put a quilt over its head, and smothered it to death, finishing his performance in peace. Some officers, who led these forays, turned their quarters into harems and fell into bed each night with a new captive. Open-air copulation was not uncommon. Some 50,000 troops in the city were let loose for over a month in an orgy of rape, murder, looting and general debauchery which has nowhere been equalled in modern times.

Twelve thousand stores and houses were stripped of all their stocks and furnishings, and then set ablaze. Civilians were relieved of all personal belongings, and individual Japanese soldiers and officers stole motor-cars and rickshaws and other conveyances in which to haul their loot to Shanghai. The homes of foreign diplomats were entered and their servants murdered. Privates did as they pleased; officers either participated themselves or excused the conduct of their men by explaining that as a conquered people the Chinese had no right to expect "special consideration". It must be remembered, as General Sugiyama remarked, that "some force even greater than God has inspired our men". The truth was that commanders, engaged in major looting themselves, had to permit common soldiers the same privilege. Japanese Embassy officials, aghast at the spectacle, were powerless to do anything about it. They could not even get a motor-car from the Japanese army for their personal use and had to appeal to the International Committee for transportation.

"Practically every building in the city", wrote one of the foreign observers, "has been robbed repeatedly by soldiers, including the American, British and German Embassies or Ambassadors' residences, and a high percentage of all foreign property. Vehicles of all sorts, food, clothing, bedding, money, watches, some rugs and pictures, miscellaneous valuables, are the main things sought. . . . Most of the shops, after free-for-all breaking and pilfering, were systematically stripped by gangs of soldiers working with trucks, often under the observed direction of officers."

Crowded with 250,000 terror-stricken refugees, the International "Safety Zone" became in reality a danger zone for non-combatants and a boomerang for its well-meaning organizers. The latter naïvely assumed that the Japanese would respect their haven, in deference to the foreign opinion. The Japanese command never officially recognized the sanctum, but many Chinese stayed behind, convinced that they would be safe under the omnipotent Stars and Stripes, Union Jacks and Swastikas. Actually the place proved a convenient concentration camp from which the Japanese dragged thousands of men and women to horrible deaths. . . .

Day after day Japanese entered the zone to seize women for the pacification of the lusty heroes. Young girls were dragged from American and British missionary schools, installed in brothels for the troops, and heard from no more. One day in a letter written by one of the missionaries in the Zone I read about a strange act of patriotism, concerning a number of singing-girls who had sought refuge with their virtuous sisters. Knowing of their presence in

the camp, and urged on by some of the matrons, the missionary asked them if any would volunteer to serve the Japanese, so that non-professional women might be spared. They despised the enemy as much as the rest; but after some deliberation nearly all of them stepped forth. Surely they must have redeemed whatever virtue such women may be held to have lost, and some of them gave their lives in this way, but as far as I know they never received posthumous recognition or even the Order of the Brilliant Jade.

Thousands of men were led out of the Zone, ostensibly for labour battalions, and lined up and machine-gunned. Sometimes groups were used for bayonet exercises. When the victors grew bored with such mild sport they tied their victims, poured kerosene over their heads, and cremated them alive. Others were taken out to empty trenches, and told to simulate Chinese soldiers. Japanese officers then led their men in assaults to capture these "enemy positions" and bayoneted the unarmed defenders. Amazing cases crawled into missionary hospitals: men with their eyes, ears and noses burned away, or with their necks half severed, but somehow still alive.

American property, mostly hospitals, schools and religious buildings, was repeatedly invaded and ransacked, and Americans were frequently bullied, insulted and struck while trying to feed and house the refugees whose homes were being burned by the conquerors. The American consul, John Allison, who speaks fluent Japanese, was hit in the face, with no provocation, by a Japanese officer. In the meantime, a few miles up the Yangtze River, Japanese planes had bombed, sunk and machine-gunned the American gunboat *Panay*, attacked two other American vessels clearly identified with large flags painted on their decks, and killed or wounded a number of those on board. Elsewhere in Central and North China hundreds of protests against destruction of American property and attacks on or interference with Americans and their legitimate interests were accumulating, to be lodged with the State Department. But Americans continued selling Japan, at a good profit, all the war-making materials she needed.

Damage caused by military operations, contrasted with damage resulting from the prolonged "victory celebration" at Nanking, is quite interesting. Of the total losses inflicted on buildings and their contents, estimated at Ch \$246,000,000 by the International Relief Committee,¹ less than 1 per cent was due to military operations, the rest being traceable primarily to looting and fire. Over \$143,000,000 worth of movable property (exclusive of Government property confiscated, of course) was stolen.

Rural districts lying in the path of the army were at the same time suffering equally severely, as can be surmised from the results of survey conducted by the International Committee early in 1938. Their study² covered only four and one half *hsien*, with a total popu-

¹ *War Damage in the Nanking Area*, Dr. Lewis S. C. Smythe, for the Nanking International Relief Committee, Nanking, June, 1938, p. 14.

² *Ibid.*, p. 18 *et seq.*

lation of 1,080,000 people, in the environs of Nanking. Losses in buildings, labour animals, major farm implements, stored grain and destroyed crops totalled approximately \$41,000,000. Two-fifths of all farm buildings in the area were destroyed by fire, 123,000 buffaloes, oxen and donkeys were butchered or stolen, and 661,000 farm implements were destroyed. Thousands of hoes and rakes and water-wheels were broken up and burned, their metal parts collected for scrap and shipped to Japan. Incomplete data, gathered in house-to-house questioning by relief workers, revealed that 22,490 male farmers and 4,380 females had been killed by the Japanese. Of the females killed 83 per cent were above 45 years of age. If these conditions are typical—and the survey is the most detailed yet attempted in any district affected—the extent of the total catastrophe in the villages can be imagined, by multiplying these results by the several hundreds of *hsien* invaded elsewhere. The survey quoted, incidentally, covered only 100 days in the four and a half *hsien* studied.

In Japan the controlled press carried the usual farcical accounts of the hearty welcome given Japanese troops everywhere, as benefactors and deliverers of the Chinese from oppression, and published posed pictures of soldiers feeding candy to Chinese boys and girls. But the army could not suppress the truth from the world nor hide it from its own countrymen in China. In Shanghai a few Japanese deeply felt the shame and the humiliation. I remember, for example, talking one evening to a Japanese friend, a liberal-minded newspaper man who survived by keeping his views to himself, and whose name I withhold for his own protection.

"Yes, they are all true," he unexpectedly admitted when I asked him about some atrocity reports, "only the facts are actually worse than any story yet published." There were tears in his eyes and I took his sorrow to be genuine.

But even while Tokyo extras were announcing the "end of the war", many sober-minded Japanese began to realize that, with the sack of Nanking, hostilities had been indefinitely prolonged. By her punitive murders and plunder in the lower Yangtze region Japan may have won a military victory, but not a political objective. All those regional antagonisms which Japan thought would automatically bring early internal break-up in China were greatly minimized by the savagery of her campaign. In China's capital-accumulating classes it destroyed many illusions in which they had fondly imagined the possibility of co-existence with Japan. Most serious of all, it diffused the political and economic forces which, concentrated in this region, had dominated a policing power over the country absolutely indispensable to Japan for enforcing the terms of a political peace with the Central Government.

Here the Japanese revealed a political ineptitude which amounts to positive genius, and which we shall see, in a later analysis, formed the main weakness in her stragey of conquest.

When the army failed to impose a negotiated settlement following the seizure of Nanking, it had no alternative but to expand the scope of its invasion to include all China. What started as a mere

"colonial campaign" to annex the Northern provinces now enlarged as a life-and-death struggle for mastery of a continent. Deferred, therefore, were the plans of the army group which had originally demanded the colonial campaign in order to secure North China and Inner Mongolia as flank bases for an attack on Soviet Russia. Deferred was the navy's scheme of "southward expansion", and the annexation of Europe's Far Eastern possessions to coincide with the coming European war.

But for some weeks the army really tried to believe its own words, that it had "broken the spirit of Chinese resistance" at Nanking. "End-of-the-war" celebrations and military activity continued for weeks, when vigorous pursuit might have brought a decisive disaster to retreating Chinese forces. In the breathing spell thus granted, the Chinese were able to reorganize the army, and form new lines in the West. At the new bases in the interior began a programme of expanded military training and enlistment.

Five months later morale had recovered to such a degree, and tactics had been so improved, that China was able to win her first important victory of the war, in the now famous battle of Taierh-chuang—an event which decisively ended the myth of Japanese invincibility.

IV

EDUCATION FOR HOMICIDE

*The only principle guiding Japan is
the Way of Heaven.*

BARON KITCHIRO HIRANUMA.

WHILE recognizing that "peaceful society has its atrocities no less renowned than war", as Thurman Arnold says, that none of us is innocent of tolerating a hundred different forms of atrocity in everyday life, and that any race is capable of reversion to savagery in war, it nevertheless cannot be denied that nowhere in the present world has the deliberate degradation of man been quite so thoroughly systematized as by the Japanese army. Animals in the jungle usually kill only when hungry or if attacked; they evidently derive little pleasure from mere mutilation. The lust for sadism is something which must be cultivated even in human beings. Its extensive manifestation among the gods in uniform can only be understood as a reflection of the society which trains them.

An Anglo-Saxon baby left with a tribe of cannibals probably would, if he were not eaten, grow up to eat people himself. Reverse the process, and the cannibal child, given a decent education, would munch his carrots as delightedly as George Bernard Shaw. One of the most estimable gentlemen I ever met was the Papuan major domo in a Dutch house where I once lived in Bali. He was the son of a Papuan cannibal, taken from the jungle as a babe. He still had a huge ring in his nose, but he spoke fluent Dutch, Malay, French and English, was efficient manager of the estate, and preferred a vegetable diet. In the wilds of Northern Luzon I met an Igorot physician who, as a child, had been exhibited in America with the Wild Man from Borneo. A missionary had rescued and educated him. His father had been one of the best head-hunters in his tribe, whose naked young braves even today collect skulls on the sly. But the doctor said he would rather cure a man of a stiff neck any day than cut it off.

The thing which makes the Japanese army so puzzling to Westerners is that the physician and the head-hunter still exist side by side, as with the Igorots to whom the Japanese are racially related. But the Igorots have no bombing planes. The army retains the traditions of head-hunting days, while mastering the technique of modern medicine and the "science" of war. This is true more or less of all Japanese society: the hands work on modern machines while the mind lives in an absurd feudal world of tribal gods, superstitions, taboos and fetishes. But the partition between the two worlds daily grows weaker, and when it collapses must provide Japan's severest earthquake.

Some people imagine that the Meiji Reformation abolished feudalism in Japan in 1868. Actually it only ended certain political and economic forms of feudalism while it retained others necessary to the development of Japanese monopoly capitalism and militarism. There was no real revolution, but a revolution forestalled. There was a restoration of the theocratic state, which enabled the clan power to survive in the army and navy, and protected the landed aristocracy, the autocratic nobility and the new plutocracy, in seizing control of a new economy of production.

Much of the old feudal ritualism and superstition was preserved, indeed resurrected and refurbished, to exist incongruously beside such imported truths as man has discovered in science. Today the masses are taught that the Emperor is literally God, and millions would kill men with other gods to prove it. The nobility shares in this divinity. So do the police, the army, the navy and all the Emperor's agents, whether living or dead, who must be held in reverence and fear. The Imperial Will is infallible.

For the common man this teaching is made palatable by the fact that he, too, is a god, superior by a mere fact of birth to Jesus, Mahomet, Darwin, Newton, Einstein or President Roosevelt. The claim is given reality in his own household, at least, where he is worshipped by his women, the lowest creatures in the Japanese social ladder, whom the master of the house can barter commercially whenever he wishes. Moreover, he becomes a national god-hero if he dies for the Emperor, and automatically enters the Shinto pantheon, besides the warrior gods of the past. Teach this to a child from the time he understands words, and you get the modern Japanese soldier, just as the Papuans get a first-class cannibal by glorifying cannibalism, and the Nazis get "pure Aryans" out of a cocktail of chromosomes.

Spiritual training in the Japanese army is based on the feudal code of bushido, as practised by the samurai in days of the Shoguns. It teaches rigid loyalty and self-sacrifice. It also teaches chivalry between equals. But the Japanese soldier has no equal, even if it were possible to combine chivalry with a machine-gun. Bushido as it exists today is often merely a sanction for fanatical butchery. Less than a hundred years ago any samurai (an ordinary mercenary of a daimyo or feudal chieftain) could test his sword whenever the urge moved him, by cutting off the head of the first commoner unlucky enough to meet him. He could be embarrassed only if he failed to remove the offending object with one blow. It is not hard to see where the Japanese soldier finds traditional sanction for the same practice in China to-day.

Other brutalities are equally glorified. For example, one of the exploits with which school-children are convinced of the Imperial army's invincibility describes Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea. The victorious troops brought back with them, on that occasion, 30,000 pickled ears and noses,¹ which edified the Court at Kyoto. Horror

¹ James B. Scherer, *Japan Defies the World*, N.Y., 1938.

at the sight of mutilation and human blood is supposed to indicate cowardice, and every young lad is anxious to demonstrate his bravery. During the massacre of 6,000 Koreans in Japan, led by the army and the police, at the time of the earthquake in 1923, some of the murder and torture was done by women, and by youngsters in their teens.

Nelson Johnson, the American ambassador in China, once remarked to me that the thing which amazed him was not that atrocity occurred ; he recognized that any army might be guilty occasionally ; but that the Japanese could foster the habit of atrocity without its having any visible effect on discipline. The answer is that sadism is itself part of the discipline imposed on the soldier. The Japanese officer seems never satisfied, when given a new batch of recruits, until he has "tested" the tenderfeet in some foul act of villainy. Correspondents who were in Shanghai in the war of '32 will confirm me in the statement that at the Kiangwan Race Course some Japanese officers lined up a number of captured Chinese civilians, including women and children, and ordered their newly arrived troops to use them for bayonet practice. When a soldier made a clumsy thrust he had to repeat the performance until he had perfected his technique or overcome his timidity. There are foreign eye-witnesses of similar practices in many places since 1937.

Rapine is in the same way encouraged from above. Japanese women are chattel, and millions on the market are worth less than their weight in beef. The sale of virgin Japanese girls to rich landlords or merchants may be considered a form of legalized rape. Continence is a recognized virtue in Japanese ascetics, but no moral stigma is attached to adultery. For the impoverished peasant there is, however, a financial barrier.

Officers sometimes encourage the peasant boy to regard war as a means of demonstrating his manhood as well as his courage. Poor Japanese women must sacrifice their chastity at the demand of the male. What consideration should be given the wretched Chinese? Really, a great honour is conferred upon them. Women are a commodity in Japan ; their sale and distribution is one of the nation's big industries. In 1931, when the Japanese army began to build a paradise in Eastern Asia, official Government statistics¹ showed that Japanese hospitals were admitting for treatment *every day* an average of 1,023,914 licensed prostitutes. But the Japanese army showed no interest in correcting this atrocity at home. It was too busy shouting to the world about the crimes of Chang Hsuehliang in Manchuria. By 1937 it had so far deepened the poverty of its farmers that licensed brokers in prostitutes had attained a new high, numbering 5,630 in Tokyo alone.

Japanese seize other Chinese commodities and industry without payment. Why should an exception be made in the case of women? Rape ends only for the same reason that looting ends ; when it be-

¹ *Japan-Manchukuo Year Book, 1932.*

comes necessary for property value to be re-established in order to make profits for the new Japanese monopolies.

A more recondite reason for Japanese behaviour and the whole god business is the pronounced inferiority complex from which the race constantly suffers. Part of this has a valid historical explanation, comparable to causes of a similar complex in the Nazis. But subconsciously, also, the individual Japanese is aware of his unfortunate intellectual and physical inferiority to individual Koreans and Chinese, the two peoples subject to his god-Emperor. He is forever seeking ways of compensation. Nothing gives some Japanese greater satisfaction, therefore, than to force a towering Chinese peasant to his knees at the point of a bayonet—unless it is to pull the pants off an Englishman. At home the ordinary Japanese lives in a world of suppressed fear—fear of his police and those above him. In China also he lives in a world of fear—fear of his officials and the hostile people beneath him. His bullying acts serve temporarily to reassure him and remove those fears.

Finally, the Japanese are physiologically a very nervous and jittery people. They have been living under a depressive strain ever since Meiji times, as contradictions in their society have grown more and more acute. Feudal credos have been preserved in an industrialized society at the expense of intellectual and physical freedom. One can appreciate how deep must be this psychological burden only by contrasting Japanese conduct in China with the outward kindness, beauty, calm and charming civility of Japanese life at home. The burden has vastly increased since 1937. The average Japanese is now a bundle of carefully suppressed emotions. Rarely does the individual overthrow the restraints without group support of some kind, and then it is always with astonishing results.

A Japanese mob is really something fearful to contemplate. I have seen Japanese ronin without any apparent provocation go up to women in the streets of Shanghai and kick them in the stomach. Malcolm Rosholt, of the *China Press*, told me of an incident he saw in Hongkew, when a group of Japanese stormed a Settlement police station, attempting to seize a man who had been in a fracas with one of them. Rosholt watched a big English policeman trying to protect the intended victim. Suddenly, to his utter amazement, one of the Nipponese jumped three feet from the ground, landed on the policeman's back, and dug his teeth into the man's neck, clinging on while his companions applauded.

Remove the normal heavy restraints, remove the sense of personal responsibility, add the sublime ignorance of the peasant conscript who reads nothing that is not first approved by the army at home, add a credo that glorifies brutality, and you get the Japanese terror in China. You would get an American terror or a French terror if the same conditions and beliefs could be imposed on those peoples. But Japan's rulers are not unaware of the havoc which this tempest of suppressed emotion can wreak, if it is ever turned against them. When the fear of authority, based on belief in its invincibility, breaks down in Japan, the world may see the bloodiest

and most barbaric civil war in history. Once he has lost "authority" with his men a Japanese officer can only commit *hara-kiri*. Once the Japanese army and navy suffer a major defeat, and the myth of invincibility is shattered, they must also, together with the ruling class and the whole tradition of divinity, commit *hara-kiri*.

I have discussed this with Japanese radicals, revolutionaries and a few liberal aristocrats. They hold it to be a fact. Among them I have met some fine human beings. Knowing them has kept alive my affection for the Japanese people, in the midst of rather discouraging experiences. Presently I shall introduce two of these Japanese dissenters, Kaji and Yuki, and tell why they are convinced that a day of reckoning is nearer than most people think.

V

HOW TO WIN FRIENDS

Japan is firmly determined to eradicate the Communistic influence behind the Chiang Kai-shek regime.

PREMIER PRINCE KONOYE.

JAPAN repeatedly proclaimed to the world that the object of her campaign in China was to establish Sino-Japanese friendship, and I sometimes felt that Japanese who said this to me were in their own peculiar way quite in earnest. The hospitality of the Japanese cranium to self-deception and inverted thinking is something which passes all understanding.

I remember talking to Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, then commander of the American Asiatic Fleet, when he commented in his mild, faintly sardonic manner upon the extraordinary furnishing of the Japanese mind. He had been visiting a few days before with General Iwane Matsui, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces in South China.

"General Matsui seemed such a nice old gentleman," the Admiral said, "that it occurred to me to ask him what his hobby was. I knew he had been brought back into service from the retired list and I could not help thinking that he might be a lot happier painting scrolls or growing chrysanthemums or training pigeons. Do you know what he replied to my question? He drew himself up to his full five feet of dignity and said without batting an eye, 'My hobby for many years, Admiral, has been to promote sincere friendship between Japan and China.'"

Japan was raping and killing in a spirit of ardent brotherhood. The few examples I have cited of characteristic behaviour of Japanese troops, however, are but minor outrages compared to the major catastrophe which Japanese occupation brought to the livelihood of millions of people. Matsui's curious semantics could be appreciated from a little room on the top floor of a mid-town building in Shanghai, where I had an office.

There I could look out to the north and to the south, and eastward across the leaden Whangpoo River, and in every direction see the skeletal remains of the greatest port in Asia. Hongkew and Chapei, Kiangwan, Woosung, Nantao, Pootung and other districts where a few months before over two million people had lived and laboured, lay in eloquent ruins. Only the French Concession and part of the International Settlement—which are all the passing tourist sees to-day—were intact. Around these tiny foreign-ruled oases stretched a man-made desert of desolation.

In a quite literal sense Japan's destruction of the lower Yangtze

was the culmination of a long tradition of piracy, for many times in the past Japanese buccaneers debarked on the China coast to ravage and plunder the seaports. But this piracy was organized as big business. It was the most systematic piratical raid ever attempted anywhere in history. And it could not, considering the peculiarities of the stage from which the invaders operated, be anything else. That is a singularly tragic fact: for it means that all the waste and agony inflicted by Japanese militarism is utterly futile and retrogressive.

Certain European imperialisms, pushing into backward regions of the world, such as Africa, perforce brought with them new science, techniques and social concepts higher than those regions had known before. These provided the cultural power of the force of conquest. Japanese imperialism could offer no such compensations to China. In some ways it resembled Spanish imperialism, but even Spain usually introduced a higher culture than she destroyed. Japan attempted to colonize not a semi-civilized people but a nation in many respects more advanced than herself. Her army itself could not, therefore, open any new frontiers. It could only temporarily close old ones.

Rooted in medievalism and remnants of feudalism darker than anything in China, Japanese militarism represented certain social forces more backward than those it tried to supplant. It could succeed in its mission, it could "promote sincere friendship with China", only by exterminating the developing creative genius of the Chinese people. It must perforce obliterate the dynamics which symbolized China's greatest advancement, its highest hopes. To do otherwise, to permit any progressive economic, political or social movements in China the right to independent co-existence, would not only render conquest itself quite impossible, but doom the semi-feudal ruling class to extinction within Japan itself.

Fundamentally the Japanese war-lords could bring to China nothing but degradation—narcotics, slavery, exploitation and death. Capital? Japan lacked enough to develop her own country; she could not give capital to, but could only loot capital and labour from the continent. Raw materials? Woefully deficient, she had none for export. Manufactures? Japan could produce nothing that China was not already making, or capable of producing for herself. In the realm of science and technique Japan had little to offer that she had not taken from abroad, and China preferred to tap such knowledge at its source. Culture? In many respects Japan was purely imitative of China or the West, while her indigenous gods could in no case become the possession of inferior tribes.

Two jealous passions dominated the Japanese imperialists: the necessity to destroy every aspect of resistance on the mainland, and the desire of Japan's ruling class to control the resources and labour power of China. Only when those obsessions are fully understood as sources of action do her methods of brotherhood become comprehensible.

The looting process itself divided into two stages, over two time

periods. First came the plunder of real property, the fresh spoils of war seized in the field, a few crumbs of which fell even to the common soldier: money, metals, transport, livestock, governmental assets, private wealth and portable goods such as looters can easily lay hands upon. Long after the battle-front moved to the west the Japanese were still busily hauling this primary booty out of Shanghai. Remaining Chinese homes, stores, godowns and factories were quickly stripped of all their treasure, merchandise, equipment and materials.

Shanghai symbolized for the Japanese everything that was "outrageous" in competitive China. It was the centre of the nation's manufacturing, banking, shipping and trade. Three-fourths of China's industry was located in the city and its environs, 60 per cent. of her foreign trade passed up and down the Whangpoo, and 3,500,000 people lived within these limits. The actual damage resulting from three months of shelling and bombardment was severe enough. The deliberate murder of the city took place only later.

The second stage of the looting process, what the Japanese propagandists call "reconstruction", is more thoroughgoing than the first. It does not restore any of the plunder, but seeks to make plunder into a permanent system. Industry is now absorbed by the army and the monopolists under the label "Sino-Japanese economic co-operation". Rich Chinese who fail to reach the sanctum of the foreign settlements are quickly located, their wealth indirectly confiscated or stolen outright. Gradually all upper-class Chinese within Japanese power, all the educated except a handful of puppets essential to the army's purposes, are depressed to the level of the pauperized masses.

China's resources—labour power, the machines and tools of production, natural resources, raw materials, public utilities—become Japanese owned and operated. Under the initiative of the fighting forces, Japanese totalitarian imperialism becomes in effect one vast holding company, as in Manchukuo, for an amazing variety of enterprises, monopolies and rackets, including everything from ownership of industry and taxing power over the peasants down to narcotics, prostitution, gambling and night-soil collection. The system elevates gangsterism to the dignity of public administration, and is finely calculated to squeeze the last copper of loot from all inhabitants.

The essence of the scheme is simplicity itself. Japan merely aims to capture all China and hold it for ransom, making it work for the Empire, and the Empire alone. With its perfection the Japanese expect Chinese friendship to break into full flower. They are always genuinely outraged when it breaks out in bombs and treachery instead.

The army's destruction and seizure of China's industrial bases, its monopolization of trade and economy along the sea-coast, had three strategic purposes. The first was purely military: the immobilization of enemy economy, especially industrial economy, a "legitimate" objective in winning the war. Second, to provide a lien against the

price of conquest: total war demands not only that the victim pay for his defeat, but shall redeem again and again the cost of his subjugation. The third aim was political: to assure to the Japanese army as a super-state corporation not only dictatorship over the livelihood of the Chinese but a continental base powerful enough to entrench its dictatorship over the masses of Japan, and to complete the expulsion of the white men from the seas that wash Asia.

These purposes were contradictory, as the Japanese were after a couple of years to begin to realize. They were limited by space-time measurements, for one thing, on which the army had not calculated. The latter was to discover that you cannot condemn a people to slavery without destroying its buying power. It was to discover that you cannot make a whole people pay for the wrongs you commit against it, as long as a big part of that people possesses arms and the will to resist. The Arakis and Matsuis and Doiharas and Itagakis were to learn quite a lot about total war which had not been revealed in the German textbooks, and about finance, money, credit, trade and the subtle relations between production and consumption. But I shall leave further analysis of the nature of Japanese imperialism for a later chapter.

But meanwhile they would inflict enormous losses, distress and death among a quarter of the earth's population. None of this should have surprised the Chinese, or even the foreign business men or the foreign Powers, who were also heavy losers. Years of Manchukuo and Japanese attrition in North China had provided ample warning of things to come. Yet many Old China Hands were bewildered by what now began to occur to the interests they and their predecessors had built up during a century of trading. They seemed never to have related the past to the present or to the future. Some of them were actually under the impression that Japan was really doing yeomanry for them by "putting the Chinese in their place", and that the generals really wanted to "improve business conditions for the foreigner".

I found that true among many European business men with whom I came in contact and among many Americans. Conversations with them frequently left me with the strange feeling that I was moving in a country of the blind. Not until I was in Hankow, some months later, was I really convinced of it. One day a friend asked me to speak about the Japanese occupation and its effects on foreign interests in Shanghai before a business men's luncheon club in the great Yangtze metropolis. I suppose someone had at the last minute been obliged to decline, but although I hate speaking I decided to accept, for reasons of my own.

An interesting ritual went on before I spoke. I remember among other things that each "fellow" was responsible for reciting a joke. One man said that a drunkard was seen staggering on the street by his parson, who upbraided him, "Brother Jones, don't you know that liquor is your worst enemy?" Jones answered, "But Reverend, haven't you always taught that we should love our enemies?" (Laughter.) It struck me as rather odd doings, when the Japanese

were daily bombing the city and scattering corpses about, with their gunboats but a few miles from the borders, but I concluded it was probably a way of breaking tension for the tired bystander.

I told what I knew of Japanese plans and of their necessity to destroy competition, and their intention to monopolize all China's resources and trade. I described the development of Japan's economic programme as I had seen it, during seven years from Harbin to Shanghai. I was full of figures and instances, then; the whole thing was on the tip of my tongue. When I had finished I asked the chairman, who sat next to me, what he thought would happen to foreign business when the Japanese took Hankow. He was a European who had been doing a prosperous brokerage business in the Yangtze Valley for over 20 years, dealing in vegetable oil and eggs and such things, which it was quite certain Japan would monopolize. But he had lived through the days of so-called "Red Hankow" in 1927, when China almost recovered her sovereignty, and to him there were no devils but red devils and all Chinese were red devils. He accepted literally the Japanese contention (at that time) that they were engaged only in "eradicating the Communistic influence"; he quite agreed with Prince Konoye that Chiang Kai-shek was a bolshevik, and he looked forward to a restoration of pre-Nationalistic China when, under Japanese police protection, the foreign business man would have everything his own way.

Still I was amazed by his reply, to which he somehow gave the finality of a sunset. It was obvious he did not believe a word I had said. "There will be a big boom after the Japanese get here", he said. "It may be hard on the Chinese for a while, but it will be good for them. It will be a great thing for foreign business, of course. The Japanese will open up the river, they understand business, and we can deal with them. The best thing is that law and order will be restored again. They will put an end to the red business once and for all."

This good soul got his boom, but it was in the form of a Japanese blockade which closed the river to foreign trade from Shanghai clear to Hankow. I believe he is still up there enjoying Japanese law and order. But he is not getting any eggs or vegetable oil. The Japanese have established trade monopolies over both items.

I saw many examples of this kind of low-voltage thinking among foreign capitalists and traders all through the war. Some of them for a while really did make quick and easy profits by supplying the Japanese army with oil, iron and steel and other materials which the invader needed to complete the process of destroying foreign interests. They were of course the last people to desire an embargo against Japan. Jardine Matheson and Company, for example, the great British firm that worked so hard and so effectively in London to promote appeasement of Japan, got a huge contract for railway and construction materials from the Japanese at Nanking, and its optimism rose despite the fact that the Japanese were daily immobilizing its shipping and other interests. Reluctantly I came to

realize that it is quite impossible for such gentlemen—always with a few exceptions—to see beyond last month's profit and loss account or next month's prospects, and I lost all confidence in their judgment. Yet individually they were not to blame; they were caught in the mesh of the whole complex macrocosm which was inexorably leading men everywhere to a new disaster.

EXCURSION IN POLITICS

*Heaven sees as the people see;
heaven hears as the people hear.*

MENCIOUS. .

WUHAN, as the twin-city metropolis of Wuchang and Hankow is called, lies 600 miles up the Yangtze River from Shanghai. This second war-time capital of China, the scene of the break-up of the Great Revolution in 1927, was no Madrid.

When I arrived, three months before Wuhan's fall, every candid political speculation began with the assumption that the place was already lost. "If only", Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr said to me one day, "we could get these people to begin saying 'if Hankow falls' instead of 'when Hankow falls' it would be a big help. What is needed here is a little of the spirit of 'no pasaran'!"

By a great stroke of luck I got the use of the little flat of the secretary of the Navy Y.M.C.A., which had become headquarters for most of the foreign newspaper-men in Hankow. Soon afterwards Rewi Alley arrived, at the invitation of the Generalissimo, to start picking up the pieces and building a new industry. He got himself off to rather a bad start by moving in with me. Every morning a little after dawn we were awakened by the high piercing voice of a newsboy shouting at the top of his lungs:

"Wu-han-nnnnn Jih Bao! Wu-han Jih Bao!"

We grew very fond of that lad despite the ghastly hour of his call. There was a fine brave challenge in his clear soprano voice which seemed to summon every one in the old city to wake up before it was too late. Alley said it was like a bell "ringing in" the New Year and each day it renewed his hope.

But then a few hours later Wuhan Jih Bao was always followed by the half-dead drone of another vendor whose voice seemed a lot nearer the truth about official Hankow. We never could make out what he really said, but it sounded for all the world like "I've lost my ma-ma and pa-pa! I've lost my ma-ma and pa-pa!" Twenty centuries of fatalism and inertia were clearly implicit in his beggarly bleat.

"It's no use, it's no use," he seemed to say.

And that was Wuhan, where youth and vigour and courage and self-reliance were continually suppressed by the fears and inner disbeliefs of a ruling class still desperately looking for a prop of compromise to lean upon.

There never was a war so full of absurd contradictions as this struggle in Eastern Asia. As a semi-colonial country fighting for its independence, China provided a mirror for all the greed, hypocrisy

and international anarchy inherent in conflicting foreign policies. And as a semi-feudal country aspiring to modern statehood, it was constantly denying its own internal objectives.

Take the China policy of Germany, for example. In 1937 German influence dominated the Chinese army, and was becoming pronounced in industry, trade, politics and culture. German trade with China surpassed that of every country but the United States and the combined British Empire, and it was larger and more profitable than the Reich's trade with Japan. In the reconstruction programme which China began only in 1937, Germany's share was larger than that of any foreign country. Among Chinese army officers Hitler's methods had made a big impression, and some of its internal organizations were modelled on Nazi lines. The Generalissimo had a strong personal admiration for the Fuehrer, which appeared to be reciprocal. Yet it was the assurance of Hitler's signature on the Anti-Comintern Pact—as a threat against Soviet intervention—which encouraged Japan to extend her colonial campaign into a conquest of China.

In a few weeks the war wiped out most of the gains which German merchants had carefully recovered during the previous two decades. They lost millions in contracts with the Government, after Japan established her policy of monopolization of trade and resources. Ninety per cent of the German business men were naturally hostile to Hitler's Far Eastern policy.

But one kind of trade continued on an increased scale. The Chinese bought over half their imported munitions from Germany. There was also the matter of the German military advisers. Even after Hitler's open insults to the Chinese, the Generalissimo kept on his Prussians, and among some of his own officers Nazi-worship persisted. Pressed by his Japanese Anti-Comintern allies, Hitler finally ordered the whole German military mission home, during the critical period of Japan's drive on Hankow. And despite their contracts with the Generalissimo, all but seven of the Germans deserted him in June, 1938. They included, an ironical point, one Jewish officer. Hitler promptly rewarded his loyalty by putting him in a concentration camp upon his return.

British policy was quite as inconsistent. Officially, London adhered to the Stimson doctrine of non-recognition of changes brought about by Japanese force, and subscribed to the League of Nations' resolution, promising to refrain from action which might weaken China or increase her difficulties, and to extend concrete aid to China. British investment in China amounted to U. S. \$1,250,000,000, and in the course of invasion this dwindled to half its value. Yet British merchants continued to import millions of pounds' worth of Japanese goods annually, giving the Nipponese the foreign exchange with which to buy more war materials, destroy more lives and property, seize more British trade, insult more British nationals in China, and attack the Chinese currency which British loans were backing through the Stabilization Fund.

And the United States? New Deal officials and Congressmen

at times spoke harshly of Japan, nearly every American hoped China would win, and the Press joined in condemning the wicked Japanese. But Japan got from the United States over 90 per cent of her aviation gasoline imports, copper, scrap iron and steel, and 82 per cent of her imports of ferro-alloys. In 1938 she got 76 per cent of her aircraft and parts from America, and "we" also sold to her blueprints and plans of the latest war machines and sent along skilled technicians with machine tools to show the Japanese how to build plants to make them. Our merchants sent her whole airplane and automobile plants intact. Meanwhile, we remained Japan's best customer, giving her the foreign exchange necessary for greater armament.

Piously dénoncing Japan as a bandit, big-hearted non-materialistic America would continue to arm the bandit for over two years, until war in Europe cut down competition so that American merchants could supply her with nearly 80 per cent of all her war materials imports.¹ Early in the conflict a foolish law was enforced which forbade American ships to carry armament goods to the war zone. Belligerents had to come and get their own. Japan possessing a capacious merchant fleet and having by that time not only seized all of China's shipping but blockaded the whole China coastline, this arrangement for some time had the effect of denying China access to what little armament she could buy from us. Moreover, most of our merchants in China itself were, after the occupation of the coastal areas, merely helping the economy actually controlled by the Japanese. Our economic support for the invaders—whom we so virtually denounced as treaty-breakers—amounted to from 15 to 20 times our "aid" to China.

Some of our muddled isolationist Congressmen, if one believed their speeches, seemed actually under the impression that this co-operation with the Japanese war effort was in some mysterious way identified with "neutrality". They were the gentlemen who raised the "dragging us into war" cries whenever anyone suggested that we should stop arming the aggressors—or more sensibly, both belligerents. Of course, if we had banned those exports, so vital to conquest, a handful of American merchants might have lost 30 or 40 million dollars annually in profits. That is, roughly, a third of the cost of one of the super-battleships we are now building—to fight Japan after we have armed her sufficiently to make it interesting?

Italy furnished the comic relief. The Italians had little to lose except China's goodwill, and they got a fairly good price for that from Japan, in exchange for the dubious diplomatic assistance and special consideration accorded them as Japan's Anti-Comintern allies. Actually they were of far less help to Japan than either Britain or America. "Italy, Japan, good friends", a somewhat inebriated Japanese officer remarked to an Italian officer as they were leaving

¹ Our total exports to Japan, 1937-39, inclusive, were U. S. \$759,000,000. Our imports, including purchases of U. S. \$604,000,000 in gold and silver, totalled over a billion dollars, giving Japan a favourable balance of payments of U. S. \$327,000,000.

a banquet together in Shanghai. "Italians last foreigners Japan kick out of China." Though the story may be apocryphal, it is essentially true, and nobody knew it better than the Italians. Consequently they made money by betraying both sides as fast as possible.

Using their privileged position under the Japanese, they took over Chinese property and ran up Italian flags over it and then collected half its value from the Chinese for "saving" it. They took over Chinese steamers the same way and ran defective guns and munitions past the blockades along the coast into the Chinese "Communists" (Chiang Kai-shek's followers), against whom Il Duce was supposed to be leading a crusade. Then sometimes they righted matters by selling out Chungking's agents in Shanghai to the Japanese—and collecting a reward. Of course not all Italians. I only report what a well-known Blackshirt told me himself, while regrettably somewhat in his cups. His card, incidentally, identified him as an affiliate of the legal firm of a highly respected American who was then Chairman of the Shanghai Settlement Municipal Council.

It must be admitted that the only great Power which could claim to be carrying out a consistent policy was Soviet Russia. In 1930 Japan purchased from Russia over 40,000,000 yen worth of goods, which according the economist Guenther Stein¹ then equalled Japan's total imports from Siam, French Indo-China, British Borneo and the Philippines. But the trade abruptly ceased in 1932, after Japan's seizure of Manchuria, was never resumed, and throughout the present war amounted to less than one-thousandth of American trade.² Japan got from Russia nothing to help her aggression against China except a little oil from Sakhalin, access to which was guaranteed her as a result of her victory over Czarism.

At the same time Russia appeared to be the only one of the Powers which took seriously the League's decision that members should individually aid China, after the League Assembly had condemned Japan as a Covenant-breaker in 1937. Russia sent planes, pilots and munitions to Hankow in considerable quantities, against commodity credits. Russia also signed a non-aggression pact with China which, had the move been emulated by the other Powers, might have yet laid the basis for an anti-aggression front in the East centring round the preservation of Chinese independence.

Internally, the Chinese were locked in contradictions of their own which seemed soluble only through the continued hammerings of the dynamic of Japanese invasion. The Government wavered between wanting to be known as a democracy and wanting to be a dictatorship, which made it quite difficult to frame a literate foreign policy. Among some very high Government leaders the attitude was that China had somehow been tricked into fighting, single-handed, the battle of America, France, Britain and Soviet Russia—the "democracies". The Premier himself told me that

¹ *China Air Mail*, No. 19, Hongkong.

² In 1939 it was less than U. S. \$200,000. *China Air Mail*, No. 19, Hongkong.

Mussolini was right when he had warned the weak countries to beware of the democracies, who, after leading them to expect help, would in the end fold their arms and do nothing. "We realize that perhaps we are fools," said the Premier. But the rulers tended to think of themselves as a democracy in dealing with the Powers, while the internal administration remained a dictatorship.

Everybody felt the vast gulf between the officials, the armed forces and the people. Little or nothing was done to train and mobilize the millions of farmers and workers in this economic heart of the nation. Always in the background one felt the memory of 1937 haunting the Kuomintang, and the trepidation that history might repeat itself if the people were democratically organised.

Workers inside the cities, like farmers beyond, were denied the right of organization and many were ignorant of the nature of the war. Villages remained immobilized and relations between the people and the soldiers were often very bad. Too little was done to evacuate skilled workers and tools and some 400,000 tons of machinery were left behind in the lower Yangtze Valley. At the great iron centre of Tayeh, to give but one example, half a million tons of pig iron lay piled up for six months while nothing was done to move it into the interior where it would later be so badly needed. Through mobilization of local labour power it could have been saved or at the worst dumped into the river. As it was the Japanese took it over intact.

Thousands of lightly wounded men died trying to struggle back to medical aid or were massacred by the Japanese when they fell behind the retreating armies. Organization and training of the peasants as stretcher-bearers and in first-aid groups and relief units might have saved many lives. The building up of democratic self-defence corps in the villages would also have enormously complicated the Japanese tasks of consolidation and should not have been difficult for a Government which was necessarily fighting a revolutionary war.

Loose talk of a "Red Hankow" was of course completely silly, but it was possible to discern a deep undercurrent demand for change. An occasional ripple of it reached the surface. There was little freedom of action, but there was more freedom of speech than formerly. Intellectuals were permitted to sound off to each other. As long as they did not attempt to organize anybody but themselves they could criticize quite freely.

The Government itself remained under one-party rule, with the Generalissimo manipulating the balance inside the party and between it and other groups in the national life which formed the coalition of anti-Japanese forces. Curiously, the Kuomintang was still the only legal political party, though in practice the existence of the Communists now had to be recognized. But no Communist had any important post in the Government, and to counteract Communist influence among the people the Kuomintang encouraged certain political factions, long since suppressed, to appear again and take part in the pamphleteering. Thus were resurrected the Social

Democratic, Young China and National Socialist parties, as a prelude to the convocation of the People's Political Council—warring China's "first step" towards democracy.

A paragraph or two about those parties. Their combined membership probably does not exceed a couple of thousand, though their leaders' claims run far higher. In programme they differ but slightly. All advocate a *post-war* "equalization of land ownership", political democracy and "eventual socialism". In conversation their aims sound similar to those of the Communists, but in practice they are not "fighting" parties and have little living connection with the people. Since they have no armed forces they can live only on the sufferance of the dictatorship which has.

There was also the Third Party which traced its origin back to 1927 and the first Kuomintang-Communist split. As its name implies, the Third Party began with a compromise programme, by advocating the elevation of national interest above class and party politics. It made the preservation of the united front a permanent principle. But its able and brilliant leader, young Teng Yen-ta, a Whampoa graduate and former chief of the political department of the army (the position held in Hankow by General Chen Cheng), was killed by Chiang Kai-shek's henchmen. After that it was in eclipse, except for a brief period when it supplied the ideological background of the Fukien Rebellion, until the Kuomintang called it back to Hankow.

All four of these groups may be regarded as minority factions within the Kuomintang itself or "splinter parties", as the Chinese call them. Each has its own clique purposes, but lacks a strong popular basis. Though in Hankow, as remarked, these "parties" had no legal status, they were permitted to air their views through their delegates in the People's Political Council.

Various other political groups, including the National Salvationists and the Manchurians, were admitted to the P.P.C., but most of the delegates were chosen on a regional basis. The Communists were permitted seven delegates, or about the same number given each of the splinter parties. All the 200 delegates were hand-picked by the Kuomintang, which took the added precaution of appointing 70 members of its own central executive committee. Neither the working class, the peasantry, the soldiers nor the students had any elected or even nominal representation. As there was thus little possibility that the Council would adopt any measure not approved in advance by the Kuomintang, nobody took it very seriously as a democratic body, with the possible exception of the Communists, who did their best to make it a sounding-board of public opinion. Unfortunately, it had no authority over either the Government or the bureaucracy, so that the effects of all the oratory were felt chiefly by the delegates themselves.

Still, though it was only a caricature, it was the nearest thing to a representative assembly yet granted, and many people believed that "something might come out of it". Something did, rather unexpectedly, in the person of its chairman, Mr. Wang Ching-wei.

But the Council should not be held responsible for Mr. Wang. He was imposed on it by the Kuomintang, after the latter had elected him Deputy Tsung-tsai (Director General) of the party—Chiang Kai-shek being Tsung-tsai. In the Council meeting Wang made an eloquent declaration of his determination to resist to the bitter end and vigorously denounced the puppets helping Japan—of whom he was presently to become No. 1.

Here in this Council, I think, was to be found one of the causes for his desertion. He expected the Council to back his own demand for the removal of the premier and finance minister, Dr. H. H. Kung, the Generalissimo's brother-in-law, whose job as premier Wang coveted for himself. Wang's followers got over 100 signatures to a petition against Dr. Kung. It was to have been presented to the Council, and Wang expected the support of the "C.C." clique, which bosses the Kuomintang party apparatus, and the Cheng Hsueh Hsi, or "Political Science Group", who controlled most of the delegates. Of these two organizations and their deep influence on the bureaucracy of Chiang's Government, I shall have something to say farther on.

Wang's plans did not work out, however. The Generalissimo himself was able to quash the movement with a well-timed warning, and the issue never came to a vote. It was one of the last of a series of political defeats which caused the "poet revolutionary" soon afterwards to clear off for Indo-China. Wang Chiang-wei had been in daily wireless contact with the Japanese, through the courtesy of the Italian Consulate. He and his followers believed that if he could get control of the Cabinet he would be able to bring off a brilliant settlement and get rid of Chiang and the revolutionary armies and the Communists. But his rebuff in the Council showed Wang that he would have to get his Japanese support more openly, and must have helped to decide him to accept the Japanese offer for the puppet premiership at Nanking.

I recall all this because it is quite interesting to see how, in a government in which the political will of the people is denied representation, it is possible for the most sinister figures of a republic to manoeuvre quite openly and actively for the betrayal of a whole nation, to satisfy their own petty vanity and selfish interests. Wang Chiang-wei came closer to success, and had a wider following inside the ruling circle—where all his connections with the enemy were fully known—than has ever been admitted. At the same time this ripening crisis fully demonstrated the value of an active organized opposition to the ruling political party during a national catastrophe, even though it is denied participation in the governing councils themselves. In Hankow it was the threat from the Left of extinction for the Kuomintang if it followed Wang Chiang-wei which forcibly kept open the road of reconciliation between conflicting class interests, and resulted in the defeat of Wang's proposals for surrender.

For of course beneath the hokus-pokus of the impotent People's Political Council the fundamental dialectic of the country remained: the rivalry for leadership between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. The united front clearly was a friable arrangement which could not hold the country together if its basis, the armed struggle against conquest, were once broken. The Communists were not recognized as political equals, their few delegates were spied upon and not permitted to hold mass meetings or to organize any section of the people, and they endured various kinds of oppression. But all this did not obscure the fact that the process of the war was rapidly changing the balance of the armed political forces inside the country in such a way as to make the Communists the true heirs of national leadership if the Kuomintang as a whole were to yield to Japan.

The cleavage between the two parties was still very wide. For one thing, the Kuomintang was determined that the land policy and the one-party dictatorship should not undergo any alteration, but should be strengthened in the war. The Communists, on the contrary, believed the war could be won only by combining the anti-Japanese struggle with the democratic economic and political reforms of an agrarian revolution. In districts they occupied in North China they carried out many changes which shocked the Kuomintang.

Though the Communists had abandoned the practice of land expropriation as a condition of the united front, they now helped organize local governments which sanctioned the temporary redistribution, among landless peasants, of the estates of traitors and absentee landlords, and made wide use of any fallow or waste land. Rich peasants were not molested but were taxed proportionately higher than poor ones. In general the poor and middle peasants benefited wherever the Red troops penetrated, at the expense of the landlords and gentry, but the majority of the population consequently strongly supported the war effort. On the basis of such economic changes, of which we shall learn more in the North-west, the Communists were organizing the people militarily and politically in a new and mildly revolutionary way for mass resistance.

Not unnaturally the Kuomintang resented these developments, which were confined chiefly to the hinterland back of the Japanese lines, where its authority had largely collapsed. Representing gentry and landlord interests, the Kuomintang regarded any change in the land system as illegal and would make no similar concessions in other areas. Party chiefs resented the activity of Communist troops even though they were leading resistance against the enemy, and they gave the guerrilla areas very little support. Eventually the Kuomintang itself was to work out a scheme of "recovering" the lost territory from the Communists, that is, recovering the districts already recovered by the Communists from the Japanese. And its execution was to pose very sharply the danger of renewed civil war.

In this situation the role of the personality of a single man assumed an enormous importance. I refer, of course, to Chiang

Kai-shek, who had charged himself with the task of maintaining the internal balance of power. It may clarify some of the complexities of war politics, therefore, if we pause briefly to identify Chiang a little more clearly against this background.

VII

THE GENERALISSIMO

*Until the final defeat of the invader
is accomplished, resistance can never
cease.*

CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

I SUPPOSE we should all be re-examined after each sabbatical year, for it is said that the cells in the human body undergo a complete change every seven years. I have not seen any discussion of whether the physical shock and mental torment of war accelerate the process; but men sometimes change more after a single bombing attack than in a lifetime before it. Somewhere Marx says that in cataclysmic moments "there may come days which are the concentrated essence of 20 years", and it is in such days that many of us now live. It would be unimaginable that the years and the bombs have not altered Chiang Kai-shek.

There are many dubious characters around the Generalissimo, but he is very fortunate to have the services of such an astute and devoted vice-minister of war publicity as Hollington K. Tong, who has made most of his contacts with the foreign press. I could not help thinking this as I ferried across the river with "Holly" to interview Chiang in Wuchang, and later on in Chungking I was impressed still more by his quiet competence. An old newspaper man himself, trained in Missouri, Holly had a healthy respect for the latter's show me slogan. He did not expect you to take canned goods for news, and he was always ready to help you get the facts behind even unfavourable situations, if he could. I am sure I express the feeling of many colleagues when I say that his tactful efficiency did more to win a new respect for official China in foreign eyes than is generally appreciated. And I have no doubt he could have done far better if he had been given material of uniform excellence to work with.

We had already had an odd and illuminating interview with Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, which she asked me not to report and which naturally I never did. But the Generalissimo made no such request. He gave his usual grunt when he shook hands, and I thought I saw a trace of a smile on his thin lips, but it quickly disappeared. Many people say Chiang had aged much since the war. To me he seems much the same alert slender figure, with his sharp eyes looking out from the same austere mask. But I thought he was less tense and he seemed to enjoy an inner repose and greater self-confidence. His messiah complex or egotism, or whatever it is that makes men say such things, had apparently deepened, for

this was his answer when I asked him a question about the future, if Hankow fell:

"Wherever I go there is the Government, the Cabinet and the centre of resistance. The outcome of the war will be determined not by the loss of a few cities but by how the *Leader* directs the people in resistance."

He was not being immodest; he was simply stating his evangel. He seemed really convinced that no matter how much the Japanese overran China, they could not conquer it unless they captured Chiang Kai-shek, spiritually, bodily or politically.

The Generalissimo selected the Cabinet, was commander-in-chief of the army, the air force, and what remained of the navy, head of the National Military Council, and chief of the Kuomintang. No single Japanese had anything like such broad powers of command and administration. When later he took over the premiership from Dr. H. H. Kung, replaced Wang Chiang-wei as chairman of the People's Political Council, and assumed the presidency of the combined Government banks and the governorship of Szechuan, it became a nice task to try to separate Chiang the soldier from Chiang the banker, the politician, the governor, the statesman and the bureaucrat. One might think that anyone who would appoint himself to so many posts, in a nation of 400,000,000 people, must be either a genius or a megalomaniac. Chiang is a little of both; like China, he is a series of contradictions—many of which may be resolved in the war. Neither can be understood except in a full historical setting.

Indications of Chiang's personality and leadership are to be found in his possession of these qualities: tenacity, decision, ruthlessness, energy, ambition, initiative, and a deep love of power. He has more of them than the average man of any race. He is not an intellectual, but a man of action; while others are still theorizing, Chiang consults his instincts and *moves*. He admits he is an empiricist.

"Without action", he wrote, "one cannot attain to knowledge"; and again, "*The only failure is in failing to act.*" That is perhaps the most revolutionary idea in Chiang's whole approach to politics, and accounts for nearly all of his successes. Nine times out of ten any kind of decision, good or bad, will win in China if it is carried out in prompt action.

An important key to his character is Chiang's worship of classical heroes. He is more concerned with spiritual values than his average fellow-countrymen; his reforms nearly always emphasize altering people's morals rather than their material conditions. Thus, his New Life Movement for years attempted to reform the Red peasants he captured not by improving the basic conditions of their livelihood but by teaching them the old Confucian ethics; *li yi, lien, ch'ih*—etiquette, propriety, righteousness and integrity. If Chiang himself had observed them he would probably not be where he is to-day, but that does not affect his moralizing.

"What really matters", he quoted Confucius, "is the degradation

of personality but not dying in hunger." Chiang said it perfectly illustrated his idea of—righteousness. Another thing that really mattered was that "those of the lower rank should not enjoy the same thing" as those of the higher. This was *yi*, or common propriety.¹

Moral strength, Chiang believed, could conquer any obstacle. During his captivity in Sian he was "determined to fight them (the rebels who were discussing putting him on public trial) with moral character and spiritual strength and with the principles of righteousness". He went on, in a most revealing passage in his diary, which may actually have been written after his release but is still significant, to speak of the inspiration of the feudal heroes of the classics, the courageous life of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the martyrdom of Jesus, and the teachings of his mother. "Being a great admirer of these heroes", he said, "I prefer to follow in their footsteps."

The same faith in righteousness apparently consoles this moral knight in his reverses on the battlefield. "Japan", he assured me with unruffled complacency, when I asked him for some fundamental reasons why he thought China would win the war, "has already suffered a spiritual defeat. Without the necessary spiritual foundations, military operations cannot succeed. Because her spiritual concepts are incorrect, Japan cannot win." Imagine those words in the mouth of any European dictator!

But the Generalissimo likes to be sole arbiter of what is right and what is wrong, and he himself is always on the side of "good", the other fellow on the side of "evil". Complete reconciliation can be effected with Chiang only after the offender's "confession and repentance". Chang Hsueh-liang has never "confessed", and he is still a prisoner. Chiang tends to think of anyone who disagrees with him not as mere political opposition but as a traitor, disloyal to the State. This is in fact one of his gravest weaknesses, and is exploited to the utmost by some of his sycophants.

It is the traditional failing of all but the great historical leaders of China, as elsewhere, that after a time they listen only to the *shih-shih* (the "yes-yes") men around them, and if Chiang is ever caught off guard it will probably be because of a surrender to this flattery that destroys all Caesars. Some of the "palace satellites" who now surround him are just as expert in the art as any eunuch in days of the Dynasty. For example: one of their favourite devices is to learn what book Chiang has been reading with approval (usually some ancient classic) and then cram it quickly, and come out with ideas paraphrased from it in their next interview with him.

It is important for Chiang always to be in touch with the realities of his true strength because, despite his high-sounding titles, he rules less by a simple command than by a delicate process of balance and manoeuvre. He has an almost psychic feeling for political situations, and in his own historical setting he is a top-flight politician. With all his moral pronouncements, he holds power by

¹ Chiang Kai-shek, Hollington K. Tong, Shanghai, 1937, p. 637.

focussing in himself a combination of loyalties from disparate political groups. He has his full quota of that peculiar Chinese genius of working off one's enemies against each other.

Chiang is not a dictator in the European sense. He does not have as much real power of enforcement of decision as some democratically elected leaders—President Roosevelt, for example, or the British Prime Minister. Much of the greatness attributed to him is merely symbolic of a synthesis of forces which would not basically change if he were to die. People who speak of Chiang as the "unifier of China" oversimplify an enormously complex situation by identifying the group impulse with the personality of one man. But we all live by symbols in times of stress, and the personification of leadership is one of the bases of politics as well as religion.

That observation can in no way minimize the significance of Chiang Kai-shek's personal influence nor of his dominating position, but rather explains some of his limitations. It does not alter the size of his achievements and his stubborn defence of China's national integrity. Chiang is the Leader by common consent only as long as he continues to symbolize the united national struggle, and he would lose his prestige overnight if he were to betray that trust. But it must be recognized that events have made of him such a key factor that perhaps he is the one individual who alone could break that unity in a disastrous way. His steadfastness under this test has helped to stamp China's fight for independence with the dignity of one of the heroic causes of our time.

We cannot know how history will measure any of our contemporaries. We cannot know how it will reconcile the contradictions in Chiang Kai-shek's role as the leader of a struggle for liberation. A man can only be judged against the milieu of his own country as a whole, and, with all his faults, Chiang seems incomparably more able and competent in that environment than his immediate predecessors in power. Perhaps no leader can be greater than the totality of his time; heroes are not born but made by the most profound and subtle combinations of history. There may be in China better thinkers, organizers and soldiers than Chiang, but if they are ahead of the synthesis of the society in which they live who will understand their true genius? And yet the milieu is still changing.

Examining Chiang a little more closely now, we can perhaps find in him a barometer of the political climate of China at war.

VIII

DISPUTED LEGACY

*What is the Principle of Livelihood?
It is Communism and it is Socialism
... But in China class war and
the dictatorship of the proletariat
are unnecessary.*

SUN YAT-SEN.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK's childhood was quite different from that of the late Sun Yat-sen, his mentor and the father of the Republic. Sun was a very poor Cantonese boy who never owned a pair of shoes till he was sixteen. Chiang was the son of a middle-class merchant and landlord and he grew up near Ningpo, the oldest treaty port in China, in the small village of Chikou, where he was born in 1887.

Chiang's father died when he was nine, and he was trained by his mother, a devout Buddhist, an ancestor-worshipper and stern disciplinarian. He greatly admired her and frequently expressed his indebtedness to her. Although he became a Methodist after his marriage to Soong Mei-ling, the sister of Mme. Sun, his ethics remain semi-feudal and Confucianist.

Apparently Chiang made up his mind early to be a soldier, but he did not enter Paoting Military Academy until he was twenty. He studied there only a few months; then he entered Shinbo Gokyo, a military school in Japan, where he graduated in 1909. Later he served in the Japanese 13th Field Artillery. Altogether his formal military training lasted only about three years. In Japan he met Sun Yat-sen and joined the Kuomintang, and he returned to China in time to see the capitulation of the Manchu Dynesty. Thereafter he worked with Sun Yat-sen in futile attempts to intrigue among and overthrow one provincial warlord or another. Apparently disgusted at repeated failures, he withdrew from politics in 1917 and went into business in Shanghai. He emerged to join Sun Yat-sen's entourage once more when the Kuomintang found a powerful ally in Soviet Russia.

Reference has already been made to Chiang's appointment to the presidency of the Whampoa Military Academy. He got this post after Sun had sent him to Russia, where he met Trotsky but not Stalin and made a favourable impression on General Bluecher, who later became chief Soviet military adviser to the Kuomintang. Upon his return to Canton he was the only Kuomintang military man who had seen the Red Army and made a brief study of its organization. It was natural that Borodin should select him to head Whampoa, which was supposed to be modelled after the Red Army Academy. Until then obscure, Chiang now began, at the age of thirty-five, to rise rapidly in the party. He became com-

mandar-in-chief of the Nationalist Army, which finally established control over most of South China. Then, in 1927, occurred the "party split". Many books have been written to explain the causes of the subsequent ten years of class war. At this point a few paragraphs must suffice to explain Chiang Kai-shek's role in it.

Social and economic facts were the fundamental cause of the conflict, of course, but these found expression in two interpretations of one set of principles, each competing for leadership of the revolution. It was easy for this to happen, because of the ambiguous legacy of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Sun's doctrine consisted of the *San Min Chu I*, or "Three Principles of the People", which were: (1) Nationalism; (2) Democracy; and (3) Livelihood. Nationalism meant the full recovery of China's sovereign rights—the abolition of the unequal treaties which gave foreigners extraterritoriality and special political, economic and territorial concessions. Democracy meant rule by an enfranchised people electing their own Government. In the Principle of Livelihood Sun envisaged state with equal opportunity for all and the elimination of exploitation through the "equalization of the land" and social ownership of the means of industrial production.

However, in his *San Min Chu I* Dr. Sun seemed to contradict himself about methods by which these goals were to be attained. In places he asserted that Communism and his Three Principles were one and the same; elsewhere he seemed to repudiate Marxism. But all the inner conflicts going on in the Kuomintang conditioned his seemingly capricious changes of emphasis. The truth was that the lectures in his *San Min* were delivered extemporaneously, and often to reconcile antagonisms inside his own following, rather than to lay down rigid formulae for the future. As head of a party containing both poor and rich he was often primarily concerned with maintaining inner harmony, the disruption of which had already repeatedly frustrated his plans. He also had sincere changes of mind.

Sun never compromised his own fundamental sympathies, he never forgot his own identity with the oppressed lower classes, and he saw the revolution primarily as a movement to free them. "Everything he planned", says Mme. Sun Yat-sen, the integrity of whose interpretation will be questioned by no one who knows the deep reverence in which she holds Sun's memory, "he saw as a means for betterment of the life of the masses. The emancipated workers and peasants were the pillars on which he meant to build a new and free China. He clearly recognized that these two classes were our basis of strength in our gigantic struggle to overthrow imperialism and effectively to unify our country."¹

The deepest change in Sun's conception of the revolution took

¹ Soong Ching-ling, *China Unconquerable*, Shanghai, 1937. Incidentally, Mme. Sun refutes the claims made by the American-naturalized Russian, Maurice William, that Dr. Sun ever became "anti-Communist". He regarded the Communists as his truest followers until the day of his death, according to Madame Sun, in conversation with the present writer.

place not long before he died. In his middle years he still believed that China could get the help of Britain and America, through an international plan, to capitalize and develop China as an external market. He was quite ready to trust the Powers to help China through this transitional stage during which the Kuomintang would control the country under a kind of "tutelage" by the great democracies and remain semi-colonial to Western capital. Repeatedly he appealed for help within this framework from America, Britain, France and Germany, in the pre-World War days. Finally he made a detailed proposal to the Versailles Conference calling for the international development of China as the basis of stabilizing Far Eastern peace and to develop a great market in which all nations might share.

It seems probable that Sun was at this time impressed with the possibilities discussed by the famous English economist, J. A. Hobson, who wrote that "if capitalists in the several western powers were capable of intelligent co-operation instead of wrangling among themselves for separate national areas of exploitation, they would have combined for a joint international enterprise in Asia, a project which might have given the whole of western capitalism another generation of active profitable survival".²

None of the great statesmen of Europe appeared to share Hobson's idea, however, and it is possible that most of them had never heard of it. Sun Yat-sen received nothing but rebuffs to his proposals for international co-operation in the development of China. At Versailles the great peace-makers would not read his plan and it seemed agreed among the silk hats that Sun was a harmless fanatic. The Powers were not interested in a democratic modern China. They went ahead unperturbed to re-carve the earth in such a manner as to make the present World Incident, as the Japanese might call it, inevitable.

It was only then that Sun realized that China must rely upon her own resources to win her freedom and equality among nations. It was then that he discarded the idea of "tutelage" under the West and accepted the radical view that China could develop only when feudalism had been overthrown internally and full national sovereignty had been recovered. Soviet Russia alone at that time was prepared to help realize such a plan, and it is not surprising that Sun accepted her offer.

But Sun Yat-sen knew that his own Kuomintang contained elements which still opposed the agrarian revolution and also wished to continue the unequal relationship with foreign capital. He knew that his Right Wing would be shocked by an alliance with bolshevism. Eventually he asked Adolf Joffe, the Russian representative, to sign with him a document calculated to allay their fears. This Sun-Joffe agreement of January, 1923, stated that both men recognized that "conditions for successful Communism or Sovietism" were not then present in China, and that the immediate task was to achieve full unity and national independence.

² *Imperialism*, J. A. Hobson, p xx.

At the same time Sun accepted the Communist view that the National Revolution could not be finally victorious except in combination with a democratic agrarian revolution, the redistribution of the land,¹ and the guaranty of democratic rights to the workers and farmers. Knowing that, Sun invited the Chinese Communists to enter his own party. This blood transfusion resuscitated the Kuomintang and provided the young and enthusiastic leadership which accounted for the early success of the Nationalist Revolution.

Now of course the difference between Right and Left over the land question and the political status of the working class was more than theoretical. It represented a fundamental struggle between classes for hegemony of the National Revolution. The Right Wing wanted only mild and gradual reforms in the landlord-merchant-usurer semi-feudal economy in the interior, during a period of "tutelage", still dreamed of getting the co-operation of the capitalist powers in developing China, and hence was willing to act as a keeper of peace for imperialist interests. The Left Wing's programme was, as we have seen, for a deep swift revolutionary change from a backward semi-colonial country to a modern independent state. Disputes centred on conflicting interpretations of Sun's Democracy and Livelihood principles. When he died in 1925 there were enough contradictions in his teachings in different periods to support both conservatives and radicals. An early break was inevitable.

Chiang Kai-shek, anxious to win the favour of the Soviet Russian advisers, used to shout slogans about the world revolution, and openly declare that "the realization of the Three People's principles means the realization of Communism".¹ He won Borodin's confidence sufficiently to continue to get Russian arms and funds, after Sun's death. But he belonged to the Right Wing, he was a conservative and believed in "tutelage". There is evidence that from early days in Canton he plotted to throw out the Communists as soon as he felt strong enough. This he did, in April, 1927, when the mass movement began to carry out a redistribution of the land. Having led the victorious Nationalist Army as far as Shanghai, Chiang overthrew the two-party alliance and Government, and set up his own regime at Nanking. He got the support of the banking, industrial and land-holding families in the lower Yangtze, the powerful gangs of Shanghai, and of course the sanction of the Foreign Powers.

Chiang's Nanking Government made it a crime punishable by death to be a Communist or a member of any organization or union considered as such by the "purified Kuomintang". Thousands of radical leaders, students, officers, soldiers, and members of workers' and farmers' unions were killed. Surviving Communists organized the little Red Army which clung tenaciously to the mountains of South China,

¹ Sun had adopted land redistribution as a fundamental plank as early as 1905, when it was written into the pledge signed by members of the T'ungmenghui, forerunner of the Kuomintang.

¹ *Canton Year Book*, Canton, December, 1925.

and civil war spread over many provinces. The Communists went about redistributing the land and organizing local workers' and peasants' governments, while Chiang Kai-shek went after them, bringing back the landlord system, restoring boundary stones and executing the rebels and smashing their unions. A decade of this waste took a terrific toll in lives of educated youths with rare qualities of leadership which China could little afford to lose.

Chiang's administration failed to offer any fundamental solution to the land question, and it was the widespread demand for land which lay at the bottom of nearly all peasant discontent and provided the ineradicable bases of the Red Army. Redistribution of the big estates might have affected 10 per cent of the population to benefit about 250,000,000 peasants. If the reform had been carried out by Government purchase it would have cost far less than the civil war.

Two other reforms, the removal of taxing power from the hands of the corrupt gentry and the establishment of democratic government in the *hsien*, might have won for Chiang the love and enthusiastic support of a big new class of free farmers—the necessary foundation of a modern state. Had both a land change and a rural political reform been enforced, together with a State programme of co-operative industry, Chiang might have stolen the basic thunder of any opposition. Real unification of the country might have quickly followed, and the power of the millions been demonstrated.

How great a difference it might have made if, at the outbreak of this war, Chiang Kai-shek had been able to call upon the loyalty of a democratic nation of organized emancipated farmers and workers, conscious of newly won rights to defend, instead of a population still divided between landlords and oppressed peasants! As it was, the country had to wait for the costly and painful process of the national war itself to bring about social and political reforms necessary to reconcile class differences and unite the people in a common cause. The extent to which the Government would now slowly be compelled to sanction many methods similar to those worked out under the old fighting Soviets, ironically suggested the futility of the military campaigns to destroy the basic historical validity behind them.

But of course if Chiang Kai-shek had then represented interests reconcilable to such reforms there might have been no need for a split at all. Chiang, as already observed, was no social revolutionary. He represented a very weak compradore class in coalition with landlord interests. His won strong sense of property and innate conservatism prevented him from seeing the necessity of revolutionary changes as the basis of a unification for which, in his way, he was genuinely striving. His own class background and training told him simply that it was morally wrong to alter the land system. Boundary stones, like classes, were immutable. "Lower rank should not enjoy the same thing as higher rank."

New dynamics in Chinese society, culminating in the Sian Inci-

dent, finally forced Chiang Kai-shek to stop the civil war and consider a *rapprochement* with the Communists. After the Sian Incident he realized that he could not fight internal and external enemies at the same time. Was it a fundamental reconciliation? It remains to be seen. The Communists never "confessed" and "repented" and did not abandon their right to an independent political existence. Though they acknowledged Chiang as commander-in-chief of the National Army against Japan, they retained their own leadership and their own programme, and they continued to represent the demand for a thoroughgoing national democratic revolution.

The Communists recognized Chiang's position as pivotal. They believed that the altered conditions of the country at war, the changing class basis of the Government and the armed forces, the necessity to preserve a unity based on the revolutionary mobilization of the masses, and the relationship of China's struggle to the world situation, were all bound to bring a new significance to Chiang's role in the political life of the nation as a whole. The broader the mobilization the deeper would become the revolutionary mission of the war—and the more revolutionary a leader Chiang himself would be forced to become, if he wished to hold his place at "the centre of resistance" They believed that as the war lengthened he would be compelled to depend more and more upon mass support.

To "push Chiang forward" therefore became their slogan. At Hankow, as I have said, they were denied the possibility of organizing a political influence in Free China and they seemed far more pushed about than pushing. But as the enemy moved farther inland they concentrated on mobilizing the people left in the byways of the main Chinese retreat and creating a pattern of society in which they demonstrated their own conception of leadership. And it is towards a clearer understanding of the differences between the Kuomintang and the Communist interpretation of Sun Yat-sen's legacy that I offer the story of the New Fourth Army in the pages that follow.

IX

THE "LOST" RED ARMY

Politics are the life blood of a revolutionary army, without which it cannot grow, develop, or even exist.

HAN YING.

WHAT happened to the Chinese Communist troops that stayed in Soviet Kiangsi to cover the retreat of the main forces of China's former Red Army, on its epical Long March¹ to the North-west? The real fate of this Red rear-guard, isolated, blockaded, pursued continuously for over two years, and finally declared totally annihilated, remained a mystery until the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, when its remnant suddenly emerged to become the ingot of China's expanding guerrilla forces operating behind Japanese lines in the lower Yangtze Valley. And the story of human faith and tortitude behind the amazing "resurrection" was still unknown when, in August, 1938, I heard it from the leader of this strange band himself. I mean many-lived Han Ying, who "returned from the grave", the peasants say, to become field commander of the New Fourth Army.

For people seeking an answer to the riddle of the present "unorthodox" war, and as documentary background on the tenacious fight of the Chinese guerrillas against Japan, it seems to me worth including here a brief summary of Han Ying's account of the last stand of the Southern Soviets.

When the old Red Army withdrew from Kiangsi to the North-west in 1934, it did not wish to sacrifice in the rear-guard any more first-line troops than the minimum necessary. Already surrounded on all sides, those who stayed faced total extermination. Only 3,000 Red regulars, therefore, were reserved as the basic strength of the "last ditchers". There were also 7,000 Red Guards, or local militia, and some 20,000 partisan irregulars. These 30,000 men and youths faced enveloping armies some ten times their strength in numbers, with twenty to thirty times their rifle-power, for altogether the Reds could muster only about 10,000 rifles. They had also a few dozen machine-guns and trench mortars, and some antiquated field-pieces. For the rest they were armed with hand grenades, bayonets, swords and spears. Several thousand mere children, Young Vanguarders from eleven to fifteen, also took part in this last stand of the Soviets; many actually participated in bayonet charges.

¹ Described in *Red Star Over China*, Gollancz, London, 1938.

In Han Ying, as leader of this death legion, upon whose courage and loyalty to a major extent depended the fate of the whole Red Army, the Communists chose one of the few real proletarians who ever actually attained high military and political rank in the "proletarian" revolution. Han Ying in fact looks the part of a "typical coolie". His lips and nose are broad and thick; his teeth, some of which are missing, jut out irregularly and give him a coolie grin, his big broad feet are most comfortable in peasant straw sandals. Everything about this small, wiry, muscular figure implies primitive strength and a life of toil and sweat.

Han Ying was born in Hupeh in 1899. He became an orphan at the age of ten, and went to work, as an apprentice in a textile factory, to support his destitute mother and a younger sister. At sixteen he was made a full journeyman. Something he read—he had had four years of schooling—about the Russian revolution gave him the idea of organizing his fellow-workers to fight against the incredibly bad treatment they were receiving. His action soon afterwards brought him to the attention of the newly-formed Communist Party, and from its radical intellectuals he learned the history and slogans of revolution. Under this guidance, he organized the first union of railway workers in China, the first steel workers' union, and many others.

To tens of thousands of workers Han Ying soon became a symbol of hope and a means of improving their miserable livelihood. To the then out-of-office Kuomintang he became a symbol of power. In 1924, after the first Kuomintang-Communist entente, Han was elected to membership in the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. By 1925, as organizing secretary of trades unions which suddenly appeared everywhere, he had 500,000 machine and handicraft workers under his command, and they played a vital part in Chiang Kai-shek's seizure of Hankow from the Northern war-lords. After the counter-revolution in 1927 he continued to lead underground unions in Hankow and Shanghai, until the execution of radical workers so demoralized labour that organization became possible only under the "workers and peasants" army in Kiangsi.

It was not till 1930 that Han Ying entered the Kiangsi Soviet Republic, and became a student in the Red Academy. Subsequently he was elected chairman of the workers' and peasants' revolutionary committee, and soon held various "portfolios" in the "Red Cabinet"—of land, labour and investigation. Like many of the Chinese Reds' ablest leaders, he got his training almost entirely empirically. Everything he knows of politics and soldiering he learned in eighteen years of fighting and organizing under the tutelage of the Red Army.

This training enabled him to perform his primary task in 1934 with success. As the main Red forces concentrated near Juichin, in preparation for the Long March, they were replaced at vital points by members of the rear-guard, which continued to oppose the enemy's advance. Surprise, secrecy and a protected rear, essential to the Communists' plan for breaking through the encirclement, were thus

guaranteed. For nearly a month after Nanking's discovery of the exodus of the principal Red armies, this frail band held at bay the heavy Government forces bearing down from the north. Enabled to mass their strength on the weakest points of the enemy fortifications, the main Red forces broke into Hunan, and got well under way on their westward march, which Kuomintang generals were never afterwards able to halt.

Thousands of Nanking troops poured into devastated Kiangsi, forcing the remaining Reds farther and farther to the east, towards the borders of Fukien, Chekiang and Kwangtung. Their radio units were captured, destroyed or abandoned. They lost all contact with their own western columns. They became a blind army. Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, when I questioned them while I was with the Communists in the North-west in 1936, confessed their ignorance of the true fate of the rear-guard. Many Reds plainly looked upon them as completely lost.

But what happened?

Following the evacuation of Juichin, Han Ying reorganized his forces into the 7th, 10th and 22nd "Anti-Japanese Vanguard Red Armies", and the 24th Independent Brigade. He himself took command of the 24th, which contained the best-equipped and best-trained cadres, and set out towards the Kiangsi-Fukien border. Late in 1935 the major portion of the 10th and the 7th Armies was at last trapped near Yiyang, in North-eastern Kiangsi, and forced to fight a pitched battle in which it was practically annihilated. Hsiang Huai-chou, commander of the 10th Army, was killed, and Fang Chih-min, leader of the 7th, was captured and beheaded.

Now, it was after the first Japanese invasion of Shanghai, in 1932, that the Chinese Communists' anti-imperialist slogan was particularized into an anti-Japanese nationalist slogan. By 1934 it had become the central phrase of Communist propaganda, both among their troops and among the people. Communist leaders were correct in thus estimating the main political demand of the nation's armies. Chiang Kai-shek himself was obliged secretly to adopt that same anti-Japanese national liberation slogan to bolster up the morale of his own officers fighting the Reds.

Lectures delivered by the Generalissimo at his officers' training-camps in 1934 no longer relied solely on anti-bolshevist texts for ideological support, but now explained the "anti-bandit" campaign as preparation to fight Japan. Every road, trench, block-house, fort or bridge he built in the fifth extermination campaign was justified by Chiang as the erection of defence against the Japanese. Every man killed, every battle fought, every dollar spent, was no longer a mere sacrifice on the altar of Kuomintang dictatorship versus the Soviets, but of "anti-Japanism".

Thus, from 1934 to 1937 both sides refurbished their morale by representing their immediate enemy to be, by proxy, Japanese imperialism! With Chiang, the slogan was used covertly to inject spirit and discipline into the pick of his army—which took extraordinary precautions to prevent any Communist anti-Japanese

propaganda from reaching the rank and file of Nanking troops. For the Chinese Reds, anti-Japanism was the loudly proclaimed faith which sustained them throughout three years of hardship. If, as they marched to the west—directly away from Japan—the Reds did not seriously doubt that their objective was to "launch an attack on Japanese imperialism", it is no more remarkable than the quixotic logic with which the Kuomintang officers, who were attacking them, persuaded themselves that this was part of the "preparation to fight Japan."

Even Han Ying, as he fell back on the Wu Ling mountains with his own forces and the remnants of the 7th and 10th Armies, called his troops the South-eastern Anti-Japanese Vanguard Red Army. This nomenclature, however, failed to soften the severity of the campaigns launched against him. Surrounded by from 150,000 to 300 000 troops during 1935 and 1936, the South-eastern army held together a force of from 10,000 to 15,000 men. Manœuvring in hide-and-seek warfare, they managed to balance losses with new recruits, and capture enough rifles, ammunition and stores to keep themselves supplied. But by the middle of 1936 their main Soviet base in Western Fukien was destroyed, and an effective blockade forced them to adopt new tactics for survival.

"Considering our position," Han Ying told me, "we decided to decentralize our remaining forces, breaking them up into small partisan bands of several hundred men each, scattered over an extensive territory. In these new formations we gave up all attempts to defend a base. We confined our operations to swift attacks on small enemy detachments, which we could take by surprise. By these methods we were able to maintain ourselves, though with the complete lack of any fixed base of operations our material condition became very serious.

"By the end of 1936 our forces were confronted with desperate odds. The enemy gave us no rest. We had some kind of skirmish at least once a week. New tactics deprived us of fighting with advantage or even on equal terms. At times we believed our western armies had entirely perished. At night we dared not sleep in towns or villages for fear of surprise attack. We had to make our beds in the forests of the mountains. For nearly two years I never undressed at night, but slept with even my shoes on. So did most of our men. In that time I wore the same cotton uniform, which became ragged and faded and patched.

"We never had enough to eat. Had it not been for the help of the people we would have starved. Many of our smaller units, cut off by Nanking troops, were saved by the farmers, who hid their rifles. The farmers gladly shared with us what rice they had. Our farmers unions continued to function secretly, bringing us news of enemy movements and offering us refuge. The farmers hated the thought of the landlords returning and to them our defeat meant return of the landlord system. Soon the enemy began wholesale arrests of our peasants and burned and destroyed our friendly villages.

"We lost all contact with the outside. We were like wild men, living and fighting by instinct. Many of our best commanders were killed, or died of disease. We had no medicines and no hospitals. Our ammunition ran very low. Many of our guns became useless; we had no arsenal and could not repair them. We could not even make bullets, and practised extreme economy with those we had. Sometimes the farmers would smuggle in a little ammunition for us. But the blockade made this more and more difficult.

"At times we retired into the uninhabited forests. We learned the trails of Fukien and Kiangsi foot by foot. We knew every corner of the mountains. We learned to fast with nothing to eat for four or five days. And yet we became strong and agile as savages. Some of our lookouts practically lived in trees. Our young men could go up and down mountains with incredible speed. Many times the encirclement brought the Nanking troops within a few miles of our forces. But our knowledge of the country, and the peasants' help, always enabled us to attack and break through at the correct point, or to elude the enemy entirely.

"We did not even hear news of the Sian Incident of December, 1936, until weeks after it happened. It did not alter our conditions in the least. After Sian, Nanking was able to turn some of its best forces to the task of destroying us. We felt only a brief interruption in the attacks from the end of 1936 until April, 1937. That spring Nanking mobilized over thirty divisions for a final annihilation of all traces of the Red Army in South-east China. In this last offensive over 25,000 men surrounded the Wu Ling Mountains, in a circle with a diameter of two to three hundred li.

"The anti-Red forces narrowed the circle around us. The enemy built many new roads, blockhouses and fortifications. They depopulated many villages, burned them, and carried off all stocks of grain. They burned down thousands of trees on the mountains, and tried to trap us. Many of our scouts and couriers were captured. These measures frightened some of our local partisans, who tried to escape. Some were captured and beheaded.

"Late in 1937," Han Ying went on, "we still had no direct instructions from the main Red Army, and no information of Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung. One of our couriers finally returned, however, with the full report of the Sian Incident, and of the end of civil war in the North-west. We promptly issued a manifesto addressed to the Government and the attacking armies, reiterated our support for the united front, and demanded a cessation of war. We affirmed our willingness to subscribe to the Communist declaration issued in Yen-an on March 15th. This had no effect whatever.

"Even after July, and the Japanese attack on Lukouchiao, the pressure against us did not diminish. We issued another appeal for unity, and asked to be sent to the front to fight Japan. There was no response. In August we were still under attack. The war in Shanghai grew big, but only after it was lost did the Kuomintang negotiate. Troops were being mobilized in Kwangtung and Kiangsi

for dispatch to the Yangtze front. Nanking was afraid we would take advantage of this and make an incursion back into Kiangsi.

"Before reconciling himself to our continued existence, General Hsiung Shih-hui, commander of the anti-Red forces, made a last attempt to break us up. His delegates offered some of our commanders heavy bribes to lead our men out of Fukien, for reorganization allegedly to take part in the Yangtze war. These efforts failed. Our forces were reduced to less than 5,000 men, and our rifles to about 3,000. But those men who remained were seasoned veterans of scores of battles. They were hardened warriors but they were disciplined and iron-willed revolutionaries. Our ordeals had cleaned out the faint-hearted and the traitors. Nearly every man was capable of leading others in battle.

"Failing to destroy us by various methods, General Hsiung Shih-hui eventually sent a message asking me to interview him. In this conference we reached an agreement with General Hsiung and General Ho Ying-chin, the War Minister. After that the negotiations for our reorganization as a new army under Government command were conducted by the Communist representatives at Nanking. I myself went to North Shensi, where I studied for several months, and received new instructions before returning to assume field command of the New Fourth Army."

Han Ying, who grasps life with practical hands, ended with a note of faith which for him obviously was pragmatic truth. "Everybody in Yen-an", he said, "looked upon me as somebody risen from the dead, but nobody was surprised. We revolutionaries have a habit of coming back to life. Look at Chu Teh, Mao Tse-tung, Peng Teh-huai! They have been 'killed' a dozen times! Well, as individuals we are nothing, but as part of the revolution we are invincible! No matter how many times it 'dies', the Chinese revolution will always come back to life. It will not perish unless China herself can be destroyed."

X

A PEOPLE'S ARMY

Only an armed people can be a real stronghold of national freedom.

LENIN.

IN January, 1938, following the Japanese sack of Nanking, the Generalissimo finally authorized the Kiangsi-Fukien Communists to reorganize as the New Fourth Army, and engage in limited guerrilla activity on the north and south banks of the lower Yangtze River. General Yeh Ting was given chief command of the army and Han Ying became field commander.

It was an odd fate that put Yeh Ting back in collaboration with Han Ying. Eleven years earlier Yeh had commanded the 24th Division of the old Fourth Route Army, known during the Nationalist Revolution as the "Ironsides." It had contained the most daring, and also the most radical, of the Whampoa cadets, and was the vanguard of the Nationalist advance. While stationed at Wuhan, Yeh Ting gave Han Ying's workers the 1,000 rifles with which they policed that city before the collapse of the Kuomintang-Communist entente. Some of those rifles later armed the first Red partisans of China. Yeh Ting led his own division to participate, with the forces of Chu Teh, Ho Lung and other Communists, in the historic Nanchang uprising, which began the Red Army. Later he reappeared at the head of the ill-starred Canton Commune.

Following the Canton debacle, Yeh went into retirement, and took no more part in civil war. Because of this, perhaps, his appointment in 1938 to command the New Fourth Army, so named in honour of the memorable "Ironsides", may have been in the nature of a face-saving arrangement for the Generalissimo. He thereby avoided completely sanctioning Han Ying. But as a graduate of Whampoa and a famous revolutionary officer, Yeh was quite acceptable to the Communists—though he was not himself a party member.

Word passed quickly through the former Soviet districts that Han Ying and Yeh Ting were building a new anti-Japanese army, and hundreds of peasants began trekking in over great distances from Kiangsi, Chekiang, Anhui, Hunan, Fukien and Hupeh. Many brought their own rifles, buried since civil war days. A few who had money and food brought that, as an "anti-Japanese offering". Hundreds of "Red-bandits", but recently released from prisons and reform schools, returned to their old leaders. Young Vanguard emerged and old Peasant Guards arrived carrying rusty spears, hand grenades and axes! From the occupied cities came students, factory-workers and mechanics, who remembered Han Ying as a leader of

labour. It was like a gathering of the men of the marshes and rivers, in *All Men are Brothers*, at a summons from the mountain lair of Sung Chiang.

But with this strange band of volunteers Yeh and Han and their surviving comrades had to achieve a belated mobilization of a badly demoralized people, and an army capable of inflicting physical injury on an enemy vastly superior in equipment. After only a few weeks' training and reorganization, the New Fourth concentrated in the area assigned to it, in April, 1938, rich in human faith and spirit, but abysmally poor in money and arms. The peasants had brought altogether 3,000 rifles. A few more were purchased from the army's scant resources, and from public contributions. But in all, including the rifles of the old Red Army, they had arms for only half of their 20,000 recruits. The Generalissimo could not be induced to increase their fire-power. He was, quite understandably, not interested in assisting at the re-birth of an army which he had vainly endeavoured to annihilate, and he would give them no rifles.

The New Fourth reoccupied about one-third of the two provinces of Kiangsu and Anhui, or an area with a normal population of 19 million people, now increased by refugees. From most of this territory the Kuomintang troops retreated as the enemy advanced on Hankow. Japanese held the cities, roads and railways; the New Fourth took back the hinterland. It was a formidable task to win public confidence. Thousands of bandits and pirates preyed upon the people, some in Japanese pay, some forced to predatory activity to keep alive. The New Fourth had to disarm or politically re-educate these "false guerrillas". It had to pacify an enemy "conquest" which it now made its own. Certain gentry had, with the help of the Japanese, set up their own local governments and refused aid, entry or co-operation to the Chinese troops. These puppet regimes had to be destroyed. There were no arsenals, military stores or hospitals to provide adequate support for guerrilla war and economic bankruptcy in the villages was often extremely acute.

Dr. Fei Hsiao-tung gives in his recent book¹ a dependable description of the degradation of agrarian economy in the lower Yangtze Valley, where the New Fourth is now operating, which indicates the difficulties that army faced upon its mobilization there. Distress had already become acute before the devastation wrought by Japanese vandalism such as I have reported in the *hsien* immediately around Nanking. Heavy rents, numerous taxes, dislocated agricultural prices, usury and mounting debt had forced abandonment of some of the best land. The decline in the price of silk, by over 60 per cent, had wiped out the farmers' important marginal reserve, and compelled an increasing resort to money-lenders by both landowners and tenant peasants.

Throughout this region the landlord-gentry were as a rule

¹ *Peasant Life in China: A Field Study of Country Life in the Yangtze Valley*, London, 1939.

themselves the tax-collectors, according to Dr. Fei, being appointed by the Government (much as were the *zemindars* in India) and held accountable for stipulated sums demanded by the local yamen. This meant that in practice the tenant peasant (kept in ignorance of the assessment actually due) was often obliged to pay not only rent, and not only taxes which the owner himself should have paid, but also an extra tribute to the landlord as tax-collector.

Such tax-collectors had police powers and could imprison any peasant for failing to pay taxes and rent. The tenant who did not wish to go to jail during the winter had to borrow from the usurer—not infrequently incarnated in the selfsame landlord and tax-collector. Principal and interest on such loans sometimes compounded at repayment at as high as 400 per cent in six months, or 700 per cent for a year. The “proletarianizing” of millions of once-free farmers all through this region was also directly traceable to the increasingly heavy tribute demanded by the gentry-landlord-tax-collector system.

The New Fourth first set out to prove the “revolutionary discipline” of its troops to the peasants. “The discipline of an army”, said Han Ying, “is the foundation of the work of mass organization. Speedy development of the mass movement is closely related to victory in battle. Without discipline the real friendship of the people cannot be won. Without the people’s friendship the army cannot draw out local leaders. And without local leadership the mass movement cannot succeed.”

In its revolutionary inheritance lay perhaps the greatest asset the New Fourth Army had: its method of organization, its invincible spirit and its tactics of battle.

“The superiority of a revolutionary army over a mercenary army”, Han Ying explained to his men, “lies in the fact that it is fighting for social principles, not for money, loot or official position. In our case we are fighting for social and national freedom. Therefore we practice equality between officers and soldiers. Why should it be otherwise? We are all fighting for the same cause. Only men with no differences in aim can call each other comrades. In this comradeship there is unity and in unity there is force. War is simply a contest between two such forces. Our force is superior to the enemy’s because our comradeship is deeper and the aims which unite us are greater.

“In our army there is a division of labour but no division of classes or ranks. We are all equal in livelihood and have the same rights. Officers wear no distinguishing bars or ribbons. Neither officers nor men receive any wages but get only their food and a small living allowance. In times of extreme hardship we all understand that the allowance may be withdrawn and used for the common good. In our army it is not possible for officers to be corrupt. There are no secrets between officers and men.”

The strength of the New Fourth Army lies in its system of political indoctrination. “War”, says Han Ying, “is a continuation of politics. The army is an organization for armed political struggle.

and for the attainment of political objectives. Political leadership guarantees the spirit of a revolutionary army, its thought, its life and its action." Side by side with every military officer was a political officer of the same rank, and every section, from the company up, had a political department in charge of educational work among the troops and propaganda work among civilians. Military and political decisions were discussed among the men and their approval and understanding sought for every important decision or reform. Political officers taught their men how to read, analyzed political problems with them and co-ordinated their general education with various other departmental activities, such as propaganda, military hygiene, mass organization and recreation. Soldiers' clubs were put under their supervision, offering a lively new kind of group life, through sports, games, study and political debate, unique among military organizations in China.

But the revolutionary army cannot succeed, according to Han Ying, unless it becomes an organic part of the life of the people. "The army is the weapon of the people. Therefore the army and people are members of the same family, sharing the same joys and misfortunes." This may seem a platitude in nations long unified as modern states; in China it is a thing to be repeated over and over again, in teaching and in practice, before the people will believe it. The national army and the people's army are new phrases; even the combination of words is still new. The Communists were, I believe, the first to use the phrase *Fenming Chün*, or People's Army.

In organizing the masses for war the New Fourth faced greater difficulties than their comrades in the North. Here in the South no war-time political administration, comparable to the Border Government of Shansi, Hopei and Chahar, could be created. Jealous of its former power in the Yangtze delta, the Kuomintang forbade the New Fourth to establish institutions to carry out necessary economic and political reforms. If the army reoccupied a county city the Kuomintang restored the old type of *tangpu* administration; no people's councils or representative government here. And the army was permitted no organized base in the rear, such as the Eighth Route had at Yen-an in the North-west. Even its schools, hospitals and industries had to be built in the villages and attached for protection to the army itself. Literally, then, the reservoir of the people's patriotism became its only base.

Despite these handicaps the New Fourth organized a widespread network of village self-defence corps. Wherever a detachment was stationed its political and propaganda corps went to work to convince the local inhabitants that defence was their task as well as the army's. Mobile theatrical troupes usually introduced, in easily understood dramatic form, the main themes of the propaganda. Village mobilization, on a united-front basis, came next. Local leaders were developed, capable of commanding self-defence corps, which the New Fourth undertook to train and arm. Bravest of the youths became Dare-to-Dies, to conduct small-scale partisan warfare on the fringes of the ever-moving front. And from the

Dare-to-Dies came new recruits for the main forces of the army itself. Local leaders, student and worker volunteers entering the area from Shanghai, and old Red veterans, provided candidates for the New Fourth Army Military and Political Academy. Here hundreds of cadets received a brief but intensive practical training in the science of organizing and commanding revolutionary mass warfare.

Of what value is a "mobilized village"? It means that when the army fights, the people fight with it. It means that when a victory is won the whole community rejoices because the whole community helped to win it. It means that a soldier can enter battle knowing that, if wounded, he will not be left on the battlefield to die, but will be picked up by volunteer carriers and taken to a hospital or be hidden by local villagers until the enemy moves back to its blockhouses. Families are no longer ashamed of their soldier sons as "bad iron", because the prestige of the warrior has been raised from the level of a mercenary to that of a volunteer, a free farmer fighting for the good earth of his clan, his village and his nation.

The aim of rural mobilization is to see that every man, woman and child is given a role in local defence. Young women are recruited to become propagandists, organizers, teachers and nurses. Old women are banded together to make shoes, uniforms and comforts for "their boys" at the front. Old men are taught how to use hand-grenades against isolated Japanese venturing too near the village. Young boys are organized in tilling brigades to help peasants with sons at the front, or trained to do espionage work, and to perform auxiliary tasks with the army. Through the self-defence committee the villagers learn of an approaching near-by battle; and because they are organized to meet such contingencies they can quickly collect daughters, valuables, cows, chickens and pigs and retire to prearranged places of refuge, where the army can protect them.

Nowhere is the New Fourth's organic connection with the people better illustrated than in its justly famous medical service. In 1938, when the Southern Reds reorganized to fight Japan, they had no medical service at all, most of their doctors and nurses having been killed off during civil war. A year later, when Dr. Robert Lim, head of the Chinese Red Cross Medical Relief Corps, visited them, he said that "judged by cleanliness, orderliness, and medical care of the patients" the New Fourth hospital service was better than any in the entire Third War Zone. In 1940 the New Fourth had, unit for unit, what was probably the best army medical organization in China. It operated two medical training-schools, ten hospitals, eight detachment hospitals, twenty regimental receiving stations, 200 battalion medical teams, and 300 company first-aid groups.¹ How had it been accomplished?

¹ *A Brief Report of the New Fourth Army Medical Service*, Hongkong, 1940.

It seems that this medical service grew for the most part out of the same soil that produced the rice and silk and self-defence forces in these valleys.

Of course it is no exalted boast to claim the best army medical service in China. The Chinese Army Medical Service as a whole was, at the outbreak of war, perhaps the worst in the world. From top to bottom it was polluted with graft, inefficiency, incompetence and criminal indifference. In general its "system" was simply to pay over a lump sum to divisional commanders who were supposed to organize medical departments. This led to untold corruption and little comfort for the wounded. It appears the General Staff relied largely on foreign missionary hospitals to look after their wounded, as during civil wars; and it was only after the ghastly Japanese murders of wounded men left behind, during early battles, that the absurdity of this notion was revealed. Much improvement has since occurred, especially under the genius of Dr. Robert Lim and the guidance of his model Red Cross Medical Relief Corps. But perhaps the Communists, never having been able to rely upon missionary hospitalization during the civil war, had the benefit over other armies of a more realistic outlook.

First of all, the doctors and nurses who organized the New Fourth Army Medical Service were all volunteers, like the rank and file of the army. Secondly, they had from the beginning the complete support of General Yeh Ting, who placed great emphasis on medical work, and selected Dr. C. C. Sheng to head the service not only because of his scientific qualifications but because he was of the few modern doctors in China with the revolutionary courage and enthusiasm necessary to carry out the difficult task. Third, the young men and women attached to the service by the revolutionary history of this army were likewise animated by a common patriotism, the desire to serve the defenders of the nation, and a zealous determination to set an example for other medical services and individual doctors and nurses throughout the country. They took a common oath to endure the same dangers and hardships that the army and the people suffered. They agreed to accept the same equality of livelihood. Finally, the rapid growth of the service was due to its co-operation with the civilian population, its ability to train medical workers and assistants from the local people, and the ingenuity of its improvisations from facilities available.

Dr. Sheng began work with a staff of five doctors and one male nurse. Presently they enlisted a woman doctor from the Nanking Hospital and six graduates from the Nanking Nursing School. Two Manchurian doctors were the next volunteers, followed by a good laboratory technician and five trained nurses. Gradually new arrivals increased, until in June, 1938, when the army fought its first battles, the medical staff numbered sixty persons, including orderlies. The first base hospital was established in a stronghold deep in the mountains, which could be reached only by foot. To this location were carried X-ray apparatus and equipment for a laboratory and operating theatre. Simultaneously the first mobile

hospital, with a capacity of seventy beds, was organized near headquarters, for the treatment of lighter cases. Both the idea of a base hospital close to the fighting front and of a mobile hospital actually under army protection in the enemy's rear were something entirely new in Chinese army medical services. Elsewhere hospitals were many miles behind the front, and generally the patient had to crawl there as best he could.

Dr. Robert Lim told me that of the 10,000 registered doctors in China only 2,000 are qualified men. Even if all 2,000 joined the army there would be but one doctor for 1,000 soldiers. Recognizing this fact, the New Fourth made the best of it by establishing medical training-schools of its own. Here student volunteers were equipped to become medical assistants, capable of treating light wounds and injuries and preparing seriously wounded men for transportation to hospitals, with doctors and nurses in attendance. Every six months the New Fourth graduated about 100 medical assistants. Besides their medical bags they carried guns, and sometimes fought side by side with the soldiers. They were on the spot to give first-aid treatment and see that fallen warriors were quickly carried to safety. This battlefield service, too, was something new in medical care of Chinese soldiers.

But it was the New Fourth policy of opening its medical facilities to civilians as well as to soldiers that perhaps gave the former their deepest concept of the meaning of a people's army. It was quite without precedent. Nurses, both male and female, not only carried out their regular military duties but also participated in administrative and public health work under the guidance of army doctors. For an army so dependent on the people, their health is of extreme importance. Simple rules of personal and public hygiene and epidemic control must be enforced, and the sick must be cured. Altogether, in the first year of their existence, New Fourth Army hospitals and mobile clinics treated about 53,000 civilian patients, most of them without payment.

"Sick or wounded civilians near the detachments at the front are carried back to one of the two rear hospitals and are admitted without charge. Those near the rear hospitals, who possess some property, and who are admitted for treatment of previously existing internal diseases, growths, or chronic disturbances, are asked to pay twenty cents a day for their food. Those without means are not asked to pay."

One could dwell at length upon the lucid and detailed report from which that paragraph is quoted. Here I can only hint at a story of medical pioneering among an under-nourished and ignorant population, and of the foundation of an army medical tradition of which any nation might be proud. Heroic was the word for the professional men and women risking their health and their very lives to realize this great work, for which their only reward was the gratitude of the farmer and the foot-soldier whom they served. Too

poor to buy new surgical instruments, these people fashioned crude forceps, scissors and scalpels in the army's own workshops. Too poor to erect any modern buildings, they converted temples and dwellings into the wards of hospitals. Cut off from many vital supplies, they worked out substitutes in their own laboratory and organized a drug factory to make them.

The New Fourth did what it could to improve the people's livelihood in its territory. Fallow land was put into production wherever possible, often being tilled by army auxiliaries, so that the troops would impose a minimum burden on local food resources. It was a big task to try to restore to production farms whose tillers had been looted of their agricultural tools and seedgrain, or rendered bankrupt by native tax and usury abuses. There was a grave shortage of simple civilian and military necessities like agricultural implements, handicraft tools, cloth, matches, paper, printing equipment and building materials.

In an attempt to remedy the situation the New Fourth organized its own co-operative workshops. Light machinery and tools were, with great difficulty, smuggled in from the occupied areas. Soon the New Fourth had its own machine shops and mobile arsenals capable of producing land-mines, grenades, bullets, trench mortars, swords and bayonets. A co-operative printing-house was set up. Peasants were taught hand-spinning and weaving, and produced crude cloth from local cotton, ramie and hemp. An appeal was made to Chinese Industrial Co-operatives¹ to enter the region and organize refugee groups for production.

But the final test of an army is in the military results it obtains. An incomplete report on this subject, published in the middle of 1939,² is extraordinarily suggestive of the difference between regular and mobile warfare and of the profound contrast between Europe's quick-decision lightning wars and this slow-firing but long-burning war of the East. The first striking fact is that during thirteen months at the front the New Fourth Army fought a total of 530 engagements. No battle involved more than a few hundred men and no single battle was in itself of much importance. But the fact that attacks were continuous and the results almost always in favour of the guerrilla troops was important. In 1938 the army fought an average of almost one engagement a day. In 1939 it met the enemy, somewhere, twice every day.

Second, enemy casualties were small but unceasing. General Yeh Ting estimated that his followers were killing or wounding an average of about thirty Japanese every day, week after week, and

¹ The Chungking Government refused to finance the C.I.C. in this guerrilla area, but some patriotic overseas Chinese, impressed by the army's work, and helped by sympathetic Americans, started a campaign to build an International Industrial Co-operative Centre for the New Fourth Army. Nym Wales' new book, *China's Guerrilla Industry*, will contain a detailed account of this and other "Indusco" activity in the war areas.

² "Two Years of Resistance", by Hsiao Hsiang-jung, in *The Military and Political Magazine of the Eighth Route Army*, Aug., 1939.

month after month. Third, the damage inflicted on enemy communications was more serious than casualties among enemy troops. Fourth, and most significant, with the help of its mass organizations the New Fourth was able to deny the enemy effective economic and political consolidation of his military victory. Finally, because of the extreme mobility of its main forces, the army obliged the enemy to deploy a maximum number of troops in order to hold all strategic points.

Before the New Fourth entered the region the Japanese found three regiments of troops adequate to control its unorganized and unarmed population. In 1940 the garrison had been increased to three divisions. Before the arrival of the New Fourth many districts were ruled by puppet governments and puppet policemen. In 1940 such regimes could function only under the direct protection of Japanese bayonets. Formerly small bodies of Japanese moved freely over the roads through the countryside. By 1940 heavy escort was required even in the neighbourhood of Nanking, where there were alone 7,000 members of self-defence corps.

It is difficult to avoid the temptation to quote at length from the New Fourth's monthly "Compilation of Victories", for it gives a most vivid picture of these activities. But space limits me to a few selections¹ which must serve as examples of literally hundreds of such items:

(1) A battalion of the XXth brigade, during reconnaissance, attacked the enemy at Tanyang. Twelve of the enemy were killed and six rifles captured.

(2) Part of our XXth branch corps destroyed eight kilometres of highway between Chihsi bridge and Kuling bridge west of Chintan, destroying the two bridges also. Telephone and electric light wire was carried off.

(3) The plainclothes corps of our XXth brigade waylaid and attacked an enemy truck near Tienwang Temple. Truck destroyed, one dozen enemy killed, and a dozen rifles captured.

(4) 150 enemy troops moved on Tachiao, where they were waylaid by a small local force. Fighting lasted four hours, until the arrival of our main force, when the enemy gave up and withdrew. Fifty-five enemy soldiers killed and rifles captured.

But the scope of the armed attack, like all other work of the New Fourth, was definitely limited by the extremely meagre help extended by the Military Council and by obstructions constantly placed in the way of the army's own efforts to build a self-sustaining economic base of its own. Late in 1939 General Yeh Ting told me the New Fourth Army numbered about 40,000 men, with a rifle-power of somewhat less than 20,000. Over half the army was equipped only with hand-grenades and swords, and its duty was chiefly to accompany rifle-carrying men into battle, to see that no guns were lost by men killed or wounded in action. By September, 1940, the New Fourth's strength was put at over 35,000 rifles and 460 machine-guns. Fire-power was increased mainly by seizures from the enemy, a slow and costly method of armament in war-time. Despite its size—roughly the equivalent of five full-strength Chinese

¹ From the *Military and Political Magazine of the Eighth Route Army*, Aug., 1939.

divisions—the Military Council paid the New Fourth a subsidy of but Ch. \$130,000 a month.

The reader can perhaps conceive of the miracles of economy and devotion involved in financing this big body of men, and the activities mentioned, on such a paltry sum, and the tremendous role which popular support obviously played in its existence. Had it not been for the help of non-partisan relief organizations such as the China Defence League and the Chinese Red Cross Medical Relief Corps, which contributed quantities of medical supplies and equipment, and a little technical aid to the New Fourth, its burdens would have been even heavier.

We shall see more about the relative effectiveness of these two kinds of war tactics and strategy farther on, in discussing the record of the Eighth Route Army in the North-west. The point here is that New Fourth did demonstrate the meaning of prolonged resistance based on mass mobilization. Had it been able to draw upon the resources of the main Government bases, had it been permitted to arm and finance the thousands of people it had organized, and to extend to other regions, still more dramatic results might have been obtained.

XI

THE CHINESE MAIN FORCES

My armies will bend but will not break.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

FIRST, let us remember, despite China's weakness in planning, action and command, the most important and astounding fact of all, when passing a judgment on the Chinese Army. It is simply this: Ragged, backward, miserably poor, this China which was "not a State but only a geographical expression", according to Tokyo, this China which Europeans contemptuously predicted could not last six months against the mechanized forces of Japan, was after all still standing up and taking it—long after the Austrians, the Czechs, the Poles, the Danes, the Norwegians, the Dutch, the Belgians, the French and the Rumanians had gone down in speedy defeat.

These wretched Chinamen had quite a few reasons for pride. Against all predictions (including their own) to the contrary, their internal unity had somehow withstood every crisis and shock. In the midst of "ten thousand difficulties" they had set up new bases from which to continue the fight. Despite hundreds of engagements and a dozen great battles in defence of strategic points, Chinese tactical ingenuity had denied the enemy his primary objective: the immobilization of the main Chinese forces. In all their fighting the Chinese armies had not suffered a single disaster comparable to that which overtook and in one week destroyed the mighty army of France. The Dragon went down for the count several times after 1937, but always painfully got to his feet and came back for more. And each licking of his wounds left him feeling more certain that the Nips just didn't have what it takes for the knock-out blow.

Despite its string-and-bamboo industrial framework, China was not beaten in the military field, but showed steady, if slow, progress. In Chungking one of the most competent American military observers, who had followed every phase of Chinese war performance, told me that China's troops were better trained, better armed and better led than at any time since the opening of hostilities. A Soviet Russian observer, just back from a long trip behind half of the front, gave me much the same opinion. Accustomed to war in Western terms of seeking a decision, however, both men confessed an inability to envisage the end of a strategy which, they felt, nowhere indicated a decision in a formal military sense at all.

The fact was, Chinese military leaders apparently divided decision into parts, and in the mere denial of total victory to Japan saw for themselves a limited victory. "Originally", the Generalissimo complacently explained to me, "the Japanese expected to conquer China and beat us to our knees in three months. Japan's objective, the

achievement of quick victory, was frustrated long ago, and this in itself constitutes a partial victory for us." Thus he looked upon every day of prolongation of war as part of an accumulation of frustration, the sum total of which could be converted into eventual Japanese defeat.

Chinese military leaders retained unshaken faith in a main pattern of strategy which, like the ambiguous lines of a Chinese brush painting, was distinguished by omission of detail, a circumstance leading to wide disagreement in interpretation. The theory of this strategy, the "three-stage prolonged war", was originally formulated by Mao Tse-tung, the Communist leader. Briefly, the three periods were: (1) Japanese offensive, Chinese "retreat in space but advance in time"; (2) Japanese offensive attains its climax at the foothills of Western China, Japanese war energy diminishes, China continues to mobilize, stalemate ensues; (3) Japan's internal and international contradictions reach a breaking point, coinciding with China's maximum mobilization, followed by large-scale counter-offensive and victory.

The theory was more specific in terms of space than in time, however, and few agreed concerning the particular stage of the war at a given moment. With the outbreak of European hostilities, many Chinese believed that the period of "large-scale counter-offensive" had arrived, but I happened to be in Yenan then, and the view of Mao Tse-tung was quite different. He considered that the war was just on the threshold of its second stage—"stalemate". In this respect the opinion of the Generalissimo seemed much the same. Both men believed China had a long road to travel before complete mobilization could be attained. This was perfectly evident from a numerical comparison of the Chinese and Japanese forces deployed in campaign.

The numerical preponderance of Chinese troops over Japanese was usually overstated, due not a little to exaggerations by the Chinese themselves. Although China had a standing army of nearly 2 million at the outbreak of war, her trained reserves were quite limited, a weakness especially notable in officer personnel. Compulsory military training had not yet produced a student reserve of any importance. New officers had to be completely trained after war began, and the system of centrally directed conscription and training evolved very slowly. In early practice individual army commanders were left to work out their own method of finding replacements. Often that meant drawing upon the *min-tuan*, or local militia.

China's raw reserves of man-power have now been somewhat reduced by the process of war. Half the population lives in the provinces penetrated by Japan, and can be mobilized only by the guerrillas. Of able-bodied men available in the West, millions are needed in transport, road-building, industry, mining and agricultural production. Chiang Ting-fu, secretary of the Executive Yuan, told me that about 2 million men were serving in the *min-tuan* and the pacification forces in Free China—more than the front-line operatives fighting Japan.

Nobody knows exactly how many Chinese soldiers have been killed since the war began. The Chinese Government, like the Japanese, published no complete casualty list. In February, 1940, the Chinese military headquarters issued a statement estimating China's dead at 362,000 and her wounded at 1,087,000. Yet in the same month it was announced that about 675,000 wounded men had received treatment in 1939 alone. Back in December, 1937, the Generalissimo admitted in a public speech that China had suffered more than 300,000 casualties since the previous July. Probably that was an under-statement; but even if subsequent losses averaged no higher, the total during three years of war might be reckoned at 2,160,000 casualties. Estimates compiled by various foreign military observers in 1940 ranged from 2 to 4 million. It seems certain that losses were at least the equivalent of 100 per cent of the original combat force. Possibly as many as 2 million soldiers had been eliminated by the middle of 1940.

General Chen Cheng, head of the Political Affairs Board of the National Military Council, recently asserted that the present front armies consist of 2,500,000 men. He also claimed that 15 million able-bodied men had received military training. If but half that many were actually available as organized reserves, China would be able to replace her present front-line forces three times. Why not, one might ask, increase at once to a strength of 10 million men? The basic answer, of course, lies in problems of supply, armament and transport. Only a great industrial power can maintain a central army of even 5 million men in modern war, and we have seen the extent of China's industrial humiliation.

In 1939 there were only three important arsenals in the free provinces. The largest—the 21st Arsenal, near Chungking—had a monthly output of 200 machine-guns, 120,000 trench-mortar shells and a small number of automatic and ordinary rifles. It could not make artillery. The two other arsenals had a low production in all categories, while provincial machine-shops here and there made rifle ammunition and small arms. Total output of rifle ammunition probably did not exceed a few million rounds a day. Combined production barely replaced expenditures on a 2,000-mile front. To equip still larger armies China had either quickly to build up numerous decentralized small-arms factories of her own or immensely increase her foreign imports. With a "guerrilla arsenal" system, China might have been able to equip with side arms as many as 5 million fighters in the enemy's rear. But for reasons best known to the National Military Council it was decided to rely mainly on imported supplies.

The immediate result of the European war was to cut off Chungking's most important source of munitions: Germany. Despite their pact with anti-Comintern Japan, the Nazis supplied China with over 60 per cent of her munitions imports as late as July, 1939. A nice point, but no more ironic than the fact that Japan still got more than half her imported war materials from China's traditional best friend, Uncle Sam. Most of the Russian munitions went into China

either through Burma or Indo-China until in June, 1940, Japan compelled the French to close the railway into Yünnan. When the British complied with Japanese demands, and closed the Burma highway, China was left with but one free route of supply—the desert road from Russian Turkistan.

China's most important credits for foreign purchases were with Moscow, which in 1939 increased Chungking's charge account, reportedly, to 750 million roubles (U.S. \$.50 million). Russian aid differed considerably from the loans granted by Washington's Export-Import bank. The latter merely financed shipments of Chinese raw materials to pay for non-military American goods, and there was little trace of Santa Claus about them. The same thing applied to a British credit of £5 million, of which China used but a fraction due to difficult terms. It was not surprising that Chungking preferred the easy-pay plan of Moscow.

But the physical limitations of the Turkistan route remain formidable. It is said that even the long haul from the Black Sea to Burma, and thence overland to Yünnan, is more practicable than the train out of Alma-Ata. About fifteen camels and pack animals were required to haul gasoline to service each Russian truck bringing in supplies to the North-west. And much of the pay load was confined to air bombs and servicing equipment for the Russian air force.

Aviation? The China Aircraft Factory, owned by Curtiss-Wright and the Inter-Continent Corporation, operated a plant in Yünnan, near the Burma border, which in 1940 achieved a production rate of twenty planes a month. It could make everything but engines, flying instruments and wheels, saved the Government 20 per cent on the price of complete planes purchased abroad, and made nice dividends for its American owners. It was temporarily immobilized when Britain slammed China's Open Door in her face. Another assembly plant, Soviet managed, was planned for Sinkiang. One aviation school in Yünnan was instructed by Americans, while several others in the North-west were run by Russians. But Chinese flying personnel, almost wholly depleted by the end of the Hankow battle, remained small and relatively unimportant.

Today most of China's battle-planes are Russian, and Russian pilots are responsible for many of China's air victories. In 1939 about 150 Soviet aviators were billeted near Chengtu, in Western Szechuan, where accommodations were prepared for 600 flyers. Another 150 planes were based near Lanchow, in Western Kansu. It was intended to maintain a strength of about five flights of planes, or enough to keep the Japanese well impressed with Russian "insincerity." Outbreak of European war halted this development somewhat. It seemed likely that help would remain limited until the Eastern struggle reached a more decisive phase.

In addition to the air force, there were about 500 Russians attached to the Chinese Army. Most of them gave purely technical and tactical advice and instruction in various officers' training-schools—which were attended by over 20,000 cadets. Every front

army had its Russian advisers, too. But even the commanding general of the delegation was said to have no influence on the Generalissimo comparable to that which General von Falkenhausem formerly enjoyed. Chiang made it clear he wanted only military instruction, and the Russians had little to say about strategy. Political instruction was, of course, entirely in the hands of Chiang Kai-shek's own political department.

Though important and even vital, Russian military supplies alone were not sufficient to form the basis for a large-scale counter-offensive. The bare prerequisites—provided Russia strengthened the air arm—were adequate reserves of transport and fuel, artillery and artillery munitions, plenty of infantrymen, and abundant rifle power. China might manage without more tanks—or even planes—but she could not move in a big way with her scanty artillery component and her limited transport. Considerable stores of munitions had been accumulated, but these did not begin to correspond to the needs implied by a great and sustained effort to drive the enemy from his conquest.

One heard talk, occasionally, of a reserve "mechanized army" in China. This semi-legend had no basis except in the existence of two light tank divisions (really regiments), which included motor-cycle scouting corps, chemical warfare detachments, motor-drawn artillery and several thousand troops of motorized cavalry. They were organized and trained by the Germans, at a time when optimists still expected large-scale foreign help. It was thought China could build a motor-mechanized army strong enough to act as a breakthrough force in the recovery of strategic points during a counter-offensive. Today the notion seems as quixotic as some of the earlier dreams of a big Chinese air fleet, based on foreign imports. For a long time the Japanese tried to smoke out these mechanized troops from their hiding-place in the South-west. Finally, after the capture of Nanning, in 1939, one of the divisions did lead a counter-attack in the attempt to recover the Kwangsi capital. In the defeat it lost about half its equipment.

An attempt to build a mechanized army in a nation with no motor industry, no oil resources, no heavy armament industry, and no navy to protect its import lanes, would seem patently grandiose. But Chinese generals are like all generals; they seem to learn only from defeat. Some of them now realize it would have been far more useful to have spent the same money (and the precious percentage of limited tonnage) for imports of machine-tools, while they could still be brought through the blockade. With these China could have set up the indispensable basic reproductive industry she now so woefully lacks and built a valuable system of indigenous small-scale war industry.

Of more importance than the adventure in mechanization was the fact that after the loss of Hankow the Generalissimo at last began to realize that he could find his counter-offensive bases only in his superior reserve of man-power and the efficiency with which it was organized. It became perfectly clear that if the Japanese

succeeded in depriving him of this, through a successful pacification of the occupied areas, he might as well settle down indefinitely on the edge of Tibet. So, in 1939, at the famous staff conference at Nanyo, the Generalissimo made known his new plan in what was for him a truly revolutionary declaration.

"The people", he said, "are more important than the army. Guerrilla warfare is more important than positional warfare. The political education of the soldiers is more important than military education. Propaganda is more important than bullets."

Shortly afterwards Chiang set up a guerrilla training-school which adopted some ideas from the Communist Military Academy in Yen-an. Its purpose was to teach regular troops how to conduct mobile warfare. General Yeh Chien-ying, one of the ablest Communist tacticians, and chief of staff of the former Red Army, was for a short time called in as an adviser. In 1940 General Chen Cheng claimed that a total of 1 million troops—in addition to front-line forces—had entered the occupied areas. Yeh Chienying put the number at half a million. He told me most of these troops were concentrated north of the Yangtze River, in Hupeh, Honan, Anhui, Southern Shantung and Hopei.

But the new guerrillas were handicapped by several factors. It must be remembered, for one thing, that no independent military, economic and political bases had been prepared to support mobile war before the main forces retired. Political leadership among the tailor-made guerrillas was inexperienced in the art of creating such bases with the help of the people, and many were quickly exterminated. Brief re-training was insufficient to achieve, overnight, the transformation of old-type officers, unused to co-operation with the peasantry, into democrats capable of winning popular confidence and protection. Another weakness (to which there will be later allusions), was the activity inside the army of political groups much more concerned with "recovering lost territory" from their Communist countrymen rather than from the Japanese.

An army operating on a guerrilla basis must either have the people actively with it or it soon finds itself actively against the people. If it fails to win popular support by intelligent methods of mobilizing local resources, it will inevitably degenerate into a mere brigand organization compelled to secure that support by extortion—in which case it speedily ceases to have any defence value and becomes first an objective and then a subjective ally of the enemy. Wherever the new guerrilla commanders have understood their utter dependence on popular support, they have done very well—usually by copying methods worked out by the Communists. Where they have tried to fight in the old way, without popular mobilization, they have quickly disintegrated.

Many improvements in the character of the new army are traceable to the present Chief of Military Training and Deputy Chief of Staff, General Pai Tsung-hsi—one of the most intelligent and efficient commanders boasted by any army in the world. General Pai, who with General Li Tsung-jen successfully guarded the

autonomy of the tough little province of Kwangsi before the war began, had refused to submit to Nanking's Kuomintang, which after 1927 he considered counter-revolutionary. He was often pilloried by Nanking publicists as a "reactionary war-lord"; but once the test came, and the Generalissimo assumed leadership of the national struggle against Japan, the Kwangsi troops became one of the strongest bulwarks of resistance. Throughout the war they acquitted themselves with valour and distinction, and continued to bear the brunt of Japanese attack in Central China even while their own province was being invaded in the South.

"Pai Tsung-hsi", General von Falkenhausen once exclaimed in dismay, "is the only general in China to whom I can teach anything because he is the only one ready to admit that he does not know everything." Certainly Pai's presence on the General Staff (though in the early days his advice carried little weight) has helped much to improve the competence of the army personnel and has been a good thing for national unity. He opposed the civil war psychology fostered by the anti-Communist Whampoa Cadets, and in the new officers he tried to implant a revolutionary psychology which explained the prowess of his own troops. Pai was a veteran Kuomintang member, but in Kwangsi he had worked out many practices somewhat similar to those used by the Reds. He was one of the few Central Army leaders who understood the value and necessity of revolutionary indoctrination and mass organization in bringing a victory to China's armed struggle. In his criticism of men more interested in fighting the Communists than the Japanese he was fearless and outspoken, and he did not hesitate to express his dissatisfaction to the Generalissimo.

"There is no effective method used by the Communists", Pai maintained, "which could not be used by a revolutionary Kuomintang. The Kuomintang should not worry about the measures the Communists use to win victories but should worry more about how to win them in their own areas. The Communists are fighting the Japanese and fighting very well. As long as that is the case we should not oppose them but help them.

"The Communists are not to be destroyed by suppression. Their influence can be countered by the Kuomintang only if our leadership is stronger and more progressive than theirs. The Kuomintang can survive as a party only if it leads the people along a progressive road. It cannot survive under other circumstances no matter how much it suppresses the Communists. A party must either grow and progress or it must die. The way of progress now is to adopt all necessary measures to win the war, and if the war is won under Kuomintang leadership then the Kuomintang will be stronger than ever."¹

These opinions were bitterly resented by the Old Guard in

¹ I am not sure the statement is exactly quoted. It came to me through a second person to whom Pai made it, after I had, at the General's request, submitted a list of questions which he decided not to answer, giving as reason "I cannot reply frankly now; let us wait till it is possible to do so."

both the party and the army, but they had a wider following than was apparent on the surface of things. Many youths with a revolutionary background were perforce being incorporated into the army, and in the event of renewed civil war they might react in an altogether unexpected manner.

In view of the progress the army has already made in establishing closer relations with the people, it is perhaps not too sanguine to assume that, as it is compelled to rely more and more upon popular support its leadership will come to reflect the will of a true democracy. Whatever its present shortcomings, the National Army (in which are included the Communist troops) is a great achievement and in it reside the main hope and pride of a fifth of mankind. It holds the key to China's political destiny, and probably rightly so. Only men ready to die for their country deserve to rule it.

Another thing: the oppressed millions of China are but one of the races of Asia whose hopes of liberation are based on the triumph of that army. If China were finally destroyed, then the Formosans, the Koreans, the Manchurians and the Mongols, who now regard their subjugation as tentative, might be compelled to admit its permanence. More than that. If China gave up to-morrow, could anything save those other Eastern peoples, now on the threshold of revolutionary liberation from Western imperialism—the Indo-Chinese, the Filipinos, the Malayans, the Javanese, the Siamese, the Burmese, and the Indians—from retrogressive enslavement to the new imperialism of the East?

Not least of all, the Japanese people themselves would fall final victim to their own Frankenstein—as one of them makes clear in the chapter that follows.

CHINA'S JAPANESE ALLIES

The Japanese Revolution will occur after the first severe defeats suffered by the Japanese Army.

MAO TSE-TUNG.

AMONG China's Japanese allies were the gentle and gifted writer, Wataru Kaji, and his pretty wife, Ikeda Yuki, who did everything they could, after 1937, to assure their Emperor's defeat. The Japanese Gendarmerie offered generous rewards for their heads, and they had several narrow escapes from capture and death.

I first met Kaji and Yuki in Hankow, just after the Japanese heavily bombed the buildings which then housed part of the Army Political Department, where they worked in Wuchang. Thousands of cadets fled to a near-by hill and scores were killed. Kaji and Yuki took refuge in a shelter in the side of the same hill and a bomb almost completely buried them. When they were dug out by anxious friends it was found the missile had missed penetrating the roof above their heads by only a couple of inches.

Next day they moved to the most crowded part of the city. Shortly afterwards another Japanese raiding party visited Wuchang. Flying very low, the bombers finally located the block in which Kaji and his wife were living, actually circled their house, and then dropped their loads. Many Chinese were immolated, but the Japanese escaped unhurt. An investigation led to the arrest of a traitor who had signalled the enemy planes with a large mirror. The two conspirators kept their address to themselves and their body-guard after that disconcerting experience. Now and then they emerged to have a chocolate nut sundae with me in the Navy Y.M.C.A., where I was quartered in unheard-of luxury for Hankow.

Kaji was attached to the propaganda section, under Kuo Mo-jo, the left-wing writer and archæologist who had returned from exile in Japan just after the war broke out. His section was staffed with scores of Japanese-educated Chinese, who directed propaganda among soldiers and civilians in China, Manchuria, Korea, and even Japan. Kaji was their "psychological adviser". He had a hand in everything from the manifesto with which Chinese airplanes bombed Tokyo to the leaflets Chinese soldiers scattered on the battle-fields. Like most Japanese working with Chinese armies, he was a Communist, and his story revealed some interesting things about the land that is curing China of Marxism.

Kaji's parents, rich farmers who employed a dozen labourers, were samurai members of the Satsuma clan. In his early youth Kaji wanted to be a naval officer, but while a student at Tokyo Imperial University, from 1923 to 1927, he changed his mind.

Apparently, he first developed an anti-imperialist bias because of his classmate, Prince Yamashina. All the students were obliged to bow to the floor, button their collars and do reverence before this member of the Divine Household, who had an elaborate desk set high above the others. It got under Kaji's skin. He organized a boycott of any class attended by the Prince and it was actually enforced for three years. The university was a liberal institution in those days. It was the atmosphere in which appeared the sensational theory of Dr. Nitobe, who denied the literal divinity of the Emperor. Communism and socialism were even openly debated between professors and students.

After his graduation Kaji worked on a number of liberal magazines and newspapers, and later began to take part in radical political movements. As in China, 1927 was a year of social struggle in Japan. Workers and farmers rose in spontaneous anti-landlord agitations, demanding the redistribution of the feudal estates. Peasant leadership was quite heterogeneous and at one time was largely in the hands of the Christian reformer, Kagawa. Kaji helped form one of the communal schools for poor farmers and their children, which for a while had a rapid growth. Then he joined the Workers and Farmers Party, doing organizational work in Nigata.

Nigata is a stronghold of the great landlords, where tenant conditions are the worst in Japan. Hundreds of thousands of farmers exist in sub-human conditions, famine being an almost annual occurrence. Licensed dealers in women consider the prefecture a prime source of supply and every year secure from destitute families thousands of young girls to become geisha, prostitutes and mill operatives for the Empire's industries. Here, according to Kaji, were the most revolutionary farmers in Japan. They cared little for the Emperor, and the police could not evoke pious obedience in them. Thousands joined the unions. Agitation spread to many provinces.

As reactionary militarism rose more firmly to power following the Manchurian invasion, radicalism among the working class increased. Kaji joined the Anti-Imperialist League and edited a magazine with a circulation of over 30,000 among labour union leaders and intellectuals. Fascist groups, notably the Sakura Kai (Cherry Party), which planned the Mukden Incident, began a terror against labour organizations, with the full support of the army and the police. In 1933 Kaji was arrested for the third time, his card having been found among the effects of the late Kobayashi Takiji, the celebrated Japanese story-writer, who was murdered by the Tokyo police. He was Kaji's best friend.

"In Tokyo", Kaji told me, "there are over eighty police jails, and each one can keep a prisoner without any trial for two months. The police did not charge me with any crime, I was just shifted from one jail to another. The filthy little cells held an average of 20 people. Most of them were sick. I was beaten in every jail. The police would bind me up and lift me from the floor, beat me to unconsciousness, then revive me and beat me again."

Kaji told me of dozens of his friends who had been tortured to death in police jails in 1932 and 1933. The knowledge evidently had little effect on his own convictions. Released once more, when the police tired of beating him, he continued to write and to organize workers. During the next two years wholesale arrests and betrayals seriously weakened the revolutionary movement, even the highest organs of which became infiltrated with police spies, fascists and army gendarmes. Kaji was arrested again and kept in Tokyo jails for six months. Unexpectedly released, he discovered he was being used as a police pigeon to locate his friends. Then for months he lived in isolation and terror of re-arrest. An opportunity of escape came at last when a friend in a travelling drama company got him a job as a samurai actor. In that role he finally got to Shanghai, where he was engaged in revolutionary work when the war broke out. After several hair-raising escapes, including a last-minute evasion of some Japanese agents who tried to kidnap him in Hong-kong, he safely reached the interior.

Kaji's twenty-seven-year-old wife, Yuki, had led an equally harrowing life. While still in college she became active in Kagawa's Christian reform movements. She once worked with the Baroness Ishimoto. For her anti-Emperor activities she was imprisoned more times than Kaji and underwent severe torture. Once her inquisitors broke all the fingers of both her hands. A woman of frail health and delicate beauty, she was for weeks an invalid after each imprisonment. But all the punishment failed to reform her. She continued her underground organization of Japanese women workers, until she was ordered to China, which she reached independently of Kaji.

Another famous Japanese radical I met in China was Katsuo Aoyama, a quite remarkable revolutionary who helped organize some Korean troops now fighting for China. An orphan, he was adopted by a family which put him to work at the age of five, and for some years afterwards hired him out as a servant. When he was sixteen he went to work in a factory. Aoyama looked like a walking caricature of his countrymen. He had large jutting teeth and wore glasses with lenses a quarter of an inch thick. Yet I learned to like him very much and appreciate his rare qualities of character, his courage, his audacity and his profound faith in his people.

When I met him, Aoyama was about forty, and for the first time held a position of leadership in the Japanese revolutionary movement. Before that he had been quite satisfied to work in the "rank and file of the labour movement", he said, for many years. "I was not bright. I could never have become a leader if our best men had not all been killed." Obediently following instructions, he organized many unions and acquired a wide influence among workers in Japanese heavy industries. Sent to Shanghai on a special mission just before the war broke, he soon afterwards attached himself to the Chinese army. First he worked in Nanking with the propaganda department. In Hankow he became a political instructor in the Korean volunteer corps.

Today virtually every Chinese army is benefiting from the help of either Japanese or Koreans. There are Korean Communists in the Eighteenth Group (Eighth Route) Army, teaching in its schools and fighting in the field. One of them was, and may still be, deputy chief-of-staff to General Peng Teh-huai, field commander of the Eighteenth Group Army. Others are advisers in the Reds' "enemy work department". Non-Communist Korean revolutionaries are occupied in a variety of tasks. With the recent amalgamation of all Korean revolutionary parties, and the establishment of a provisional Korean revolutionary Government at Chungking, their activity is more unified than formerly.

In 1938 a Korean Brigade was organized jointly by Koreans and Japanese, under the command of Kim Yak-san. Original cadres of this unique detachment consisted of about seventy volunteers trained under the direction of the Central Military Academy. Some Koreans also joined the Chinese air force. Several aviators and brigade officers received instruction in Russia. Commander Kim Yak-san, a veteran Korean revolutionary, participated in nearly every important anti-Japanese event during the past twenty years. Before the present war he fought for years with anti-Nippon partisan troops in Korea and Manchuria. He was at one time head of the Korean National Revolutionary Party.

Perhaps the Japanese Gendarmery would express first preference, however, for the head of Kim Ku, who is credited with having tossed the famous water-bottle bomb during the Japanese 1932 victory celebration in Shanghai. Posing as a photographer, Kim calmly walked to the edge of the reviewing stand, delivered his bomb, and disappeared. He killed the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, General Yoshinori Shirakawa, seriously wounded Fleet Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, and killed or wounded half a dozen other Japanese luminaries. Kim is now working behind the Chinese lines.

Before they acquired their present unity and discipline, most Korean nationalists favoured the terrorist method to get rid of their enemies, and they were eminently successful in assassinating high Japanese officials. Korean anarchists probably know more about throwing around high explosives at close quarters than anybody but Asturian miners. Koreans also make splendid revolutionary troops; in the hopeful days of 1927, when they expected the Chinese Nationalist Army to end up by liberating their country from Japan, hundreds of them joined in the Northern Expedition and many were killed, first by the Northern war-lords and later by Chiang Kai-shek.

Both Koreans and Japanese assured me that they could easily raise a division or two in China, if permitted to do so by the Chinese Government. They claimed that hundreds of political exiles wanted to fight for China. Hundreds would come down through Manchuria. But Chungking blew now hot, now cold, about these strange allies. Probably the Government was worried about the effect on its own troops of fraternization with an independent revolutionary army. As it was, the Korean Brigade was used largely for propaganda purposes. There were striking demonstrations of

the potentialities of Korean revolutionary agitation among enemy troops, as Korean conscripts mutinied or killed their Japanese officers. The presence of Korean revolutionaries behind Chinese lines now prevents the Japanese from making extensive use of Korean conscripts in their campaigns. Recently, as an "inducement" to win Korean loyalty, which after thirty years remains elusive, the Japanese Government condescended to permit Koreans to adopt Japanese names. To the latter's utter astonishment, not one per cent of the population took advantage of the offer.

Every conceivable precaution is taken by the Japanese army authorities to prevent any weakening in the soldiers' will to fight, which is the main reason why escaped prisoners are not welcomed back. The mere fact that a Japanese can return alive, from a Chinese prison, is considered harmful to morale. Japanese casualty reports never in any case admit the capture of Japanese soldiers. Officially, Japan does not recognize that the Chinese have taken a single Japanese alive during the entire war.

Despite the penalty of death for all anti-war propagandists, Japanese revolutionaries are active in the Japanese army in Manchuria, Mongolia and China, Aoyama claimed. Work on the continent is more effective than work in Japan. Regiments mobilized and trained at home are unrelated to combat formations in China. In organizing overseas divisions the army mixes up men drafted from different localities, so that it is impossible to keep intact any intra-regimental political groups which may be formed during training periods. Moreover, the army is heavily packed with gendarmes, as well as political police, whose duty is to detect subversion in the embryo.

Aoyama claimed a close connection with revolutionaries inside the Japanese army. He said that contrary to general belief, many junior officers, particularly non-coms and reserve officers, were decidedly anti-fascist and against the war, while fascist organization was still semi-secret and embraced but a small fraction of the army. He blamed most of the atrocities on this fascist nucleus, which believes that such outrages are necessary to keep the soldiers "active, excited and happy", in order to prevent boredom from nourishing "dangerous thoughts" in their heads. But he said that officers of the rank of major or higher—particularly in the air corps in Manchuria—included some Communists and anti-fascists. Aoyama admitted they were few, but thought their ultimate influence might affect many thousands.

Perhaps the most valuable service these Japanese allies rendered to China was to teach the army how to treat its captives. Japanese at first resisted capture so stoutly that even when taken badly wounded they would attempt to commit suicide, by jumping from trains or trucks, or hurling themselves from stretchers down the sides of cliffs. Getting hold of surgical instruments, they frequently stabbed doctors, nurses and themselves. Japanese propaganda assures the simple-minded soldiers that the Chinese always roast their captives alive, cut out their hearts, and so on. Kaji tried to con-

vince the Chinese that to counteract this it was necessary to enforce a policy similar to that adopted from the beginning by the Chinese Communist troops, of "educating" the captives, winning their friendship, and sending them back to serve as "testimonials".

Kaji had a difficult time (after Nanking!) proving to the Chinese that his countrymen could be "reformed". In Hankow he spent weeks working on captured aviators, but made little headway. When taken prisoner they became desperately homesick and lonely and only wanted some way to kill themselves. They feared that if they escaped and fell into Japanese hands they would be executed anyway. But with infinite patience Kaji and Yuki slowly changed their ideas of the Chinese and of the war. If he succeeded only in taking their minds off the suicide obsession, Kaji was gratified. He felt he had given them a new hope through a sociological and psychological explanation of their plight.

Nowadays many Chinese soldiers are supplied with small cards printed in Japanese, and certified by Chinese army commanders. These state that China has no quarrel with the Japanese people, whom they regard as brothers, and guarantee to treat well any Japanese who submits. Such "surrender cards" are said to have a pacifying effect on Japanese taken in battle. It is especially true in the case of the Eighth Route Army, which has become noted among the Japanese for its considerate treatment of prisoners.

By the time I saw Kaji again in Chungking he had made considerable progress. About sixty of his converts to anti-imperialism had been made "trustees", and went about the country lecturing to prisoners in concentration camps. He had formed a Japanese Anti-War League which had dramatic troupes touring the cities, giving anti-militarist plays.

All the Japanese considered it a great failure that they had as yet been unable to convince Chiang Kai-shek's Political Department of the wisdom of releasing reformed prisoners, as the Eighth Route Army did. The Communists sent their captives to the rear, where they were given a course of "re-education" for two months, during which they shared the food and the quarters of Chinese students. Then they were given the choice of joining the army or being escorted back to their own detachments. In the latter case they were usually promptly arrested by their own officers and kept under observation; but it was difficult, if there were many such cases, and their stories became known among the troops. Kaji said one reason why Japanese divisions in Shansi were replaced so frequently was because of the effectiveness of Eighth Route Army propaganda through returned prisoners. Officers considered that a detachment lost its fighting spirit when too many of these "re-educated" soldiers had returned intact from Chinese hands.

Both Aoyama and Kaji were quite positive that Japanese morale had steadily declined after the capture of Hankow, and were full of instances to prove it. Japanese soldiers now frequently surrendered, when ambushed, without struggle, whereas in 1938 hardly a single unwounded prisoner was taken. They pointed to numerous

cases of uprisings, insubordination and other lapses of discipline and morale. Collisions of interest between the Manchurian and Mongolian, and the North, Central and South China commands were, they believed, becoming more serious. There were grave schisms between the army and navy as rival political powers. Profound distress and suffering among the population were strengthening anti-war sentiment among civilians in Japan.

Nevertheless, these men agreed, only a severe defeat of the Japanese army in the field, of such magnitude that it could be hidden neither from the expeditionary forces as a whole nor from the people at home, would be able to crack the morale of the main forces and bring about an insurrection and revolution in Japan. The revolution could succeed only if supported by a section of the army itself.

An early attainment of power by Japanese Communists seems conceivable to many people only through the intervention of a series of major miracles. If and when such miracles occur the Japanese Communist Party would, according to its present programme, overthrow the aristocracy and military fascism, end the war in China, and attempt to solve the problems of Japanese economy by socialist transformation and peaceful international co-operation with Soviet Russia and any surviving democratic states. They would, with Soviet help, try to form a socialist federation of Japan, Korea, Manchuria, Mongolia and China.

The Japanese fully understood that China would need a more revolutionary Government itself before any such broad dream of brotherhood could be realized. Yet they never lost patience, and seemed the most optimistic people behind the Chinese lines. There was something early Christian about the sublime faith that inspired these lonely little people to deny everything for which their army was fighting.

Not long ago Aoyama's jutting teeth and thick-lensed spectacles were seen up at the front near Nanning, where he was working with some Kwangsi troops. His voice carried above the thunder of battle through a loud speaker directed at a Japanese attacking force. Gradually the firing stopped on both sides and everybody was quiet as the Japanese boys listened with open mouths to this authentic fellow-countryman, appealing to them to stop killing their brothers, the Chinese, and to turn their guns against the Mitsuis, who had made ten million *yen* out of the war, and other profiteers at home and in China.

Suddenly fresh Japanese troops were rushed up to relieve those who had lost interest in fighting. They made an unexpected sally against the radio unit and captured Aoyama. Baron Mitsui was mercilessly avenged.

To me personally, and I suspect to every Chinese who saw and heard them, the existence of such Japanese as Kaji and Aoyama was symbolically important. It reminded one that Japan was full of decent people like them who, if they had not had their craniums stuffed full of Sun Goddess myths and other imperialist filth, and been forbidden access to dangerous thoughts, and been armed by

American and British hypocrites, could easily live in a civilized co-operative world—if any of us could provide one. The memory of the Kajis and Yukis and Aoyamas will anyway help to heal the wounds in the friendship of two great peoples if the war ever ends.

RIP TIDE IN CHINA

The "unchanging" Chinese are going to win the war because after all they are changing and in a progressive creative direction.

OWEN LATTIMORE.

HOWEVER vehemently the pacifist may deny it, history demonstrates that there really are "progressive" wars and "reactionary" wars, and that the material damage of conflict is sometimes relatively small compared with social headway achieved. Generally speaking, a progressive war is one in which the old order is superseded by a pattern of society clearly more adaptable to new conditions, while in a reactionary war the old tradition simply succeeds once more in beheading the new or engages in rivalry of a futile and inconclusive character with another tradition or society on the same level as itself.

In China the Communists clamoured for resistance against Japan because they claimed it was a progressive war, an extension of the national democratic revolution for which they insist they have been fighting all along, as a phase in the "transition" to socialism. "If China defeats Japan," Mao Tse-tung told me at Pao An back in 1936, "it will mean that the Chinese masses have awakened, have mobilized, and have established their independence. Therefore the main problem of imperialism will have been solved."

Whether the world accepts their logic or not, most of it now agrees (theoretically at least) that China's cause is progressive and worth supporting. Even pure pacifists among missionaries in China are putting all their energy into helping to "win the war", and seem convinced that the aim and the struggle are abundantly worthwhile. Here I want to leave aside the broad fields of politics and economics for a moment, and see whether there is other evidence of change.

Although there has been no revolution, the war has done "revolutionary" things to the social and cultural life of the people which may be the prerequisite of revolution. These are, in the case of the Border Governments, a continuation of mutations begun in the old Soviet days, which often occur as part of a change consciously directed by a new social philosophy. Aside from copying Communist battle tactics and technique of guerrilla training and organization, the Government has certainly made little conscious effort to duplicate Communist methods. But the war itself duplicated many of the conditions under which those Red methods evolved, and the impact on the people sometimes brought comparable results. It is

obvious to anyone who has lived long in this land that few generalizations can be made of the Chinese as a whole of which the contradictions are not also true. Absolutes do not exist; the last word is always a synthesis of opposites which nobody, including the Chinese, ever quite grasps. The whole makes a pattern, but it is so amorphous that it defies accurate confinement to any shape in words. No country in the world is changing as fast as China and no country hangs on more tenaciously to the past. Most of the "new" phenomena, mentioned at random below, were inchoate in Chinese society long ago, began to assume form during the Nationalist Revolution and now once more emerge in bolder relief.

For one thing, possibly this war has more profoundly shaken the Chinese clan-family system than any previous catastrophe. Of course the system is not unique to China but characteristic of many feudal and semi-feudal societies surviving in Asia. It is still vigorous in India and is probably stronger in Japan, with peculiar differences, than in China. Total war imposed on the individual Chinese heavy and complicated problems which the limited resources of familism were no longer able to meet alone. The mass need for security in the face of unprecedented catastrophe results in new forms of social combination and interdependence, and a greater readiness to submit to broad group authority.

Millions of people have been separated from their relatives and even their parents, some by army conscription, some in the confusion of escape from death, but thousands by voluntary desertion of family for country. If a Chinese Gallup could circulate a questionnaire among China's youth today, to ask, "What is your first duty?" the finding might be considered revolutionary. Quite a percentage would answer, "To China" instead of "To my family".

Confucius said *wa wei* meant simply that the highest duty of man is to serve one's parents while they are alive, to bury them with propriety when dead, and to worship them with propriety when buried. "All you need to take with you to govern China," Akira Kazami advised the Japanese Cabinet of which he is chief secretary, "is the Confucian Analects." But in many ways the 2,500 years of Confucian domination of the Chinese intellect is being overthrown. Filial piety is no longer the glorified thing it was once.

Children often exhibit more interest in the boy who rescues a Chinese flag from an enemy trench than the ancient tale of the lad who froze himself in a stream, in order to attract carp to feed his grandmama. Personally, I know dozens of youths who have broken from their families completely in order to work for "national salvation". I know families that have split up because insubordinate sons refused to stay behind in the occupied areas dutifully to serve their parents. A prominent illustration is the daughter of Wang Keh-min, head of Japan's puppet government in Peking, who denounced her father as a traitor and fled to Free China to fight against him. Thousands of youths who sacrificed their virgin lives on the battlefield committed what Mencius held to be the greatest crime against filial piety, "to have no posterity". Can Chen Li-fu,

struggling so hard to revive Confucianism, teach his students that it is more important to propagate than to die for China? What is the value of a life for descendants for which one is not ready to die?

China could have no army at all, and most certainly could never have a revolution, without demolishing the servitudes imposed by filial piety. There may be social revolutionaries who observe all the rites, but among sources I know I have never met a single fighter in the field who has not renounced the traditional obligations to family. Hence I conclude that this action is in the life of a Chinese a decisive step, psychologically necessary before he can accept the idea of a new society. Until he takes it one can never be sure that he will not desert, at the critical moment, or embezzle, or turn traitor, or reactionary, in order to enhance the family fortunes. Orthodox filial piety is a pillar of feudalism. It is irreconcilable with social revolution.

Of course no one with sense imagines that Confucius will not always be a national hero in China and be revered in his proper historic setting, just as nobody who realizes the necessity of phonetics or latinization, in converting the Chinese language into a modern idiom, fancies that this reform can in any way affect the permanent archaeological value of Chinese ideographs.

"In our history books Confucius will live and occupy many important chapters because of his definite role in Chinese civilization," wrote the revered widow of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. But "the structure of our present society is radically changing and it is difficult to solve the many problems that arise from great changes. Confucianism cannot help to solve these problems; it has lost every practical value. . . . Confucian teachings are feudalistic and autocratic from beginning to end. We must realize how deeply Confucian influences have been imbedded in our art, literature, social sciences and morals. We must make great efforts to uproot Confucian ideas out of every nook and corner of our life and thoughts."

Another thing of interest: religion, or at least idolatry, seems in a period of advanced decay. Christianity, where its leaders practise their faith through social and war services, is accepted as a useful institution. But people have little faith left in prayer and appeals for supernatural intervention. Already moribund before the war, the social influence of Chinese Buddhism is now practically nil. Hundreds of Buddhist and Taoist temples have been destroyed during the conflict, and the impotence of the outraged gods has probably deepened traditional Chinese scepticism concerning their celestial influence.

Far up in the interior I saw an ancient temple transformed into a printing shop run by workers who were all atheists. Elsewhere in China the gods are tossed into the rain and temples are converted into hospitals and barracks, with little protest from anyone. I have seen painted gods propping up weaving machines and workers complacently striking matches on their faces. I saw peasant children,

who a few years ago would have trembled before such idols, mischievously adorning them with Hitler moustaches and chalking "Down with Japan!" slogans on their faded robes of clay. Scores of native crafts have been restored by Industrial Co-operatives, but the paper prayers and incense industry, once the most flourishing in every village, is not represented among them.

Some prejudices are breaking down. Thousands of people from the Eastern provinces have inundated even small villages in the West. In restaurants of Szechuan and Shensi you can often hear half a dozen dialects spoken at once. Hundreds of doctors, engineers, nurses, soldiers, and students have migrated to work in alien districts where they cannot speak the local phrases. Overseas Chinese engineers have returned to work in places where prejudice or "wind and water" taboos would have banned them before.

Shanghai women are training Yünnanese and Kansunese to spin and weave. Manchurian refugees can be found making bandages and uniforms for Honanese troops, and Cantonese doctors are operating on soldiers to whom their speech is unintelligible. In Shantung the wheat-eating peasants are being organized by rice-eating Hunanese. Crippled soldiers from Shanghai are marrying widows in Hunan. So much admixture of provincials and dialects is taking place that natives in backwood places who never saw a map of China are discovering with amazement the variety and immensity of their land, and are prepared for a new wonder a day.

Many middle-class families have lost nearly everything they owned and some are now quite proletarianized. Poor material conditions in many places throw scholar, merchant, soldier and worker into the same environment and the same income group. Middle-class people are learning a little of the philosophy that sustains the poor. The economic basis of conservatism and class distinctions has in some cases been destroyed and replaced by a fellowship of war and misfortune and hope. In Chungking some ricksha pullers earn more than merchants, and stonemasons are better paid than some officials. All through Free China the importance of skilled workmanship has a money value and consequently a prestige it never had before. Emphasis on building everywhere calls attention to the man with trained hands. It is these workers—the masons, the carpenters, the ironsmiths, the mechanics, who are really making Free China—on whom the scholar and the politician are wholly dependent, and beside whom they seem utterly futile people who can do nothing but talk. There seems to me a growing consciousness of power among these men with useful hands.

The amount of material destruction caused by the invasion is enormous and incalculable. Yet you hear people say that it has been a big *help* in reconstruction. Except for the loss of life and means of production some of the destruction of cities was not un-mixed tragedy. Roads, factories, schools, hospitals and other institutions are being built in districts where they might not otherwise have appeared for decades. These improvements often become the focus of new activity which really "revolutionizes" the life of

whole communities. Social effects of the changes in modes of production, the superimposition of an advanced part of the population on the backward West, and the conversion of the latter into the Government's main war bases, are obviously too complex to begin to examine here.

There is certainly a growing spirit of self-reliance and self-confidence, born of the realization that somehow China has managed to stand off the mighty war machine of Japan, endure a steady hail of British and American scrap iron, and inflict grave defeats on the enemy with precious little help from anybody. Quite a lot of vanity and conceit have been knocked out of China. A deeper self-respect has replaced them, as the Chinese have watched European peoples, once thought to be made of far sterner stuff than the amiable Chinaman, go down before aggression one after another.

China has produced no traitors worse than Europe's Fifth Columnists, no errors of command more costly than the blunders of the Allies, and no crimes of diplomacy to surpass the miscalculations of Chamberlainism. Defeatism now seems confined largely to bureaucrats and still wealthy people homesick for the comforts and fleshpots of the coast. There is a new kind of pride in race membership. In the army especially you see a coalition of the basic virtues of a philosophical people. The average soldier gives an astounding exhibition of patience, indifference to suffering and pain, cheerfulness, endurance and calm courage in the face of inevitable disaster.

Who knows with what mental activity this ill-clad, ill-fed, ill-equipped warrior rationalizes the probability of his death? Belief in God or in any religious mythology seems to play little role in it. The Japanese goes into battle armoured with Buddhist amulets and thousand-stitch belts supposed to make him invulnerable to bullets, and knowing he will be apotheosized and reborn a higher god. The Christian can die believing in salvation and a hereafter. The Mohammedan confidently looks forward to the Prophet's paradise to come. But the Chinese soldier wears no charms and says no prayers and dies without a confessor. Confucius promises him no heaven and in the depths of his sceptic soul he rarely believes in one. He loves China but he also loves life. What secret cheer prepares his ego for the night?

Everybody is demanding wider education, and because of the war great strides have been made in literacy. The army finds that literate men make better soldiers; uneducated men cannot be taught to use modern weapons. Propaganda goes wasted on an illiterate public; if people do not know what is expected of them they cannot perform it. Adult education has been introduced in many villages and volunteers are teaching in many improvised ways. Together with a broadening popular demand for mass education, there is an atmosphere of intellectual activity and freedom of inquiry which belongs to the dawn of a democratic society, and is a weird paradox in a state where political oppression is still widely practiced. Yet there is often a real enthusiasm for truth, and an ability to "take"

it, apparently based on a spreading conviction that truth is on the side of China.

There is a change in some old attitudes and somewhat less resistance to the introduction of useful knowledge. It is reported that the head of the National Pharmaceutical College was sacked because he refused, in the midst of war, to substitute a certain official's frog-skin remedies for Western medicines; but among the mass of the people modern medicine and science have won a wide acceptance. Every hospital could treat ten times as many patients if it had the staff and equipment. "Science" is a word heard often now among ordinary soldiers. Thousands of farmers have seen airplanes flying overhead and dropping death and realize there is a lot going on in a world Confucius never knew. They are curious and eager to hear explanations, if any are offered, and are often as anxious to have their sons study the answers of science as they once were to have them become Han-lin scholars.

While there is little democracy in political practice, there is a surprising degree of democracy in animated discussion. As a rule a man can feel free to voice his real opinion among his friends. The tea houses buzz with political gossip and scandal. Nobody's name is sacred. "He who is not in office has no concern with plans for the administration of its duties," is now an obsolete Confucian aphorism. Politics is everybody's business and criticism in talk is widespread. When graft is uncovered the guilty are no longer admired as filial sons. They may still escape with their heads, but there is a wide section of opinion which ardently desires their death.

Japanese policy in the occupied areas offers a striking contrast to these tendencies, and clearly establishes the reactionary role of the conquerors in restoring outlived and rejected social practice. Religion is fostered in its most superstitious forms but opposed as any kind of progressive social action. Primary education is retrogressive and and higher education is being extinguished. The study of natural sciences is discouraged and social science and history are offered only in a primitive bowdlerized version. Opium and narcotics have supplanted intellectual freedom. Men are jailed or executed for chance remarks revealing the capacity for political thought. Squeeze, corruption and total lack of social conscience are the best qualifications for puppet office. Devotion to the truth is a grave offence. Orthodox filial piety is, however, rewarded. Classical Confucianism is now Japan's method of "thought control," of combating nationalism and democracy, and of exacting unquestioning obedience to authority. Kazami's advice is being followed. Japan is trying to rule China with the Analects.

Now, the fact that Japan finds Confucianism, in however bastardized a version, useful in controlling her conquest is a matter worthy of deeper analysis than can be offered here. The degree to which ruling intellectuals share this ideology with the invaders is a measure of their failure to represent a "new pattern of society." It is one key to the weakness of Chungking's wartime leadership, and one statement of the surviving feudalism in the Chinese scholar class and

bourgeoisie. Fortunately, despite all attempts to superimpose orthodox Confucianism from above, the basic mass tendencies of Free China seem to be moving in the opposite direction, and in this lies the war's promise of progress to revolutionary Chinese.

Although in many respects Kuomintang policy and the real conditions of Free China provide an alternative to Japan's pattern of rule, the latter's sharpest antithesis seems offered in areas where the Communists are not excluded from organization. The fact that Communists are specifically anti-Confucianist has probably aroused as much antagonism in the nostalgic scholar-bourgeois conservatives of China as their frank advocacy of socialism. Anti-Communist intellectuals attack Marxist philosophy as an "alien" teaching, but I sometimes suspect it is hated more because behind its irreverences for Chinese tradition the Confucianist soul of the literati hears the tinkle of the laughter of Lao Tzū, who has been ridiculing them for two millenniums.

Confucius was perfectionist and stands in the main world current of traditional thinking. Lao Tzū, the founder of China's rival philosophy of Taoism, was one of what William James called the "tough-minded philosophers"—naturalistic, realistic, materialistic. Taoism denies any anthropomorphic god and regards idea and matter as equal in the all-embracing principle of *Tao*, the Way, the totality and spontaneity of things. It chuckles at filial piety: dust is dust and all ancestors are equal in *Tao*. Its anarchist soul revolts at the "300 rules of ceremony and 3,000 rules of behaviour" between superiors and inferiors; in *Tao* the peasant is as good as the prince. Lao Tzū and Chuang Tzū did not believe in fixed morals and institutions, but, like Hegel, recognized the inevitability of change in all things. Confucius would be anomalous in a "withered away" State; *Tao* would be quite at home there. But though Communists may get temporary philosophical support from Taoism in fighting tradition, Lao Tzū, the "Old Boy", will be laughing at them as soon as they set up a new tradition of new morals and institutions of their own.

Nevertheless, Lao Tzū and Chuang Tzū were mighty democrats who believed in the "equality of all things", including the sexes, and in this were more in harmony with social changes in wartime China than Master Kung. For Confucius taught the inequality of all things, and specifically of the sexes. "Women are human," he admitted, "but lower than men. It is the law of nature that woman should not be allowed any will of her own." But in today's changing society Chinese women are, as everyday knows, demanding and getting a new equality of treatment. Their emancipation may be one of the real social gains of the war. Chinese women do everything nowadays that men do, from leading bands of guerrilla snipers to operating factories and managing schools. No force but national defeat is likely to deprive them of a newly won voice in the social and political life.

What would the mandarin's delicate, lily-footed, not-to-be-glimpsed lady of 1911 have thought of a Mme. Chiang Kai-shek in slacks and sandals, going through the stink and blood of hospitals to cheer and comfort the heroic "coolie"? And Mme. Chiang's

energy and many-sided competence is but one example of thousands of women whose character and personality have matured under the hammerings of war. How many an awakened peasant girl, compelled to shoulder the burdens of a family, has discovered the strength to meet it, and how many a craven male has been shamed into action by the courage and indignation of his womenfolk?

Of course "mobilization of women" is still incomplete and millions are innocent of any kind of instruction, just as millions are exceptions to every other tendency of social change I suggested. There are regions where war has brought only death and disease and retrogression, and over great areas all the old evils flourish as before. Still, in other places, often far back in remote villages where you might least expect it, the war has set loose an epidemic of ideas and changes which nothing else than revolutionary struggle could have achieved.

Who would have dreamed a few years ago, for example, that far up in the loess crevices of barren Shensi, where society had been static for 2,000 years, there would today be a great university training hundreds of girls to become nurses, teachers, journalists and warriors of freedom? It is among such young Amazons as these rather than among peasants who can still beat their wives for wanting to learn to read, that Chinese see the hope of the future growing out of the ordeal of the present.

THE BORDER GOVERNMENTS

If there were no Communists, no Eighth Route Army, and no Border Governments, China would be in chaos.

MAO TSE-TUNG.

FROM Paochi I went eastward for 90 miles over one of the few railways remaining in Chinese hands—the Lunghai Line—to Sianfu, the capital of Shensi. Japanese airdromes were but a half hour's flight across the Yellow River, and the city had been bombed repeatedly for over two years. Big areas were burned out. The dining-room and one wing of the famous Guest House had been somewhat demolished, but I was lucky enough to get a room with a spring bed and only a few holes in the walls. I went to sleep at once and heard nothing more till the *chin-pao* sounded at dawn. You got only ten minutes' warning here, hardly enough time to pull on your pants, and we got under the city wall just as another party of enemy hens, as the Chinese call them, arrived to befoul the skies.

Here in the Sian Guest House I first met, in 1936, the Chinese Reds who escorted me through the lines of the anti-Communist troops into the then Soviet Republic. In the same Guest House, a month after my return, virtually the entire General Staff of Chiang Kai-hek's army was made prisoner in Chang Hsueh-liang's coup, when he tried "military persuasion" to convince the Generalissimo that it was no time to begin resisting Japan. Subsequently my wife eluded a police cordon in Sian to make her own trip to the Soviets; and when, in 1937, I came to meet her and escort her through the war zone to the coast, I could not help noticing that our joint adventures had won us the local popularity of a form of plague. I had no particular love for the city myself, but I had to go through it to get to Yen-an.

Sianfu was almost as much an anti-Communist stronghold under the Kuomintang as any place held by the Japanese, but the Eighth Route Army still maintained a liaison depot here, whence occasional trucks, carrying passengers and supplies, were permitted to depart for the guerrilla front. It was thus a kind of jumping-off place for the political patchwork known as the "Border Regions".

Since my last visit to the North-west, Yen-an had become the base of that curious string of guerrilla dependencies, each of which led a more or less autonomous existence. Their territory lay almost entirely behind Japanese lines. One must constantly remember that much of North China is, despite its nominal conquest by Japan in 1937, still under the direct control of Chinese troops. The Border Regions that fill the interstices between Japanese garrison zones are

the scene of the greatest effort at mass mobilization ever made in the history of China. Although the governments which co-ordinate the work of mobilization get most of their leadership from the Communists, they are not (they of course *could* not be) socialist states at all. They are war-time improvisations, founded on a radical-democratic interpretation of the *San Min Chu I*.

The unique system grew logically out of the regional political peculiarities of North China and conditions imposed by the war. It is necessary briefly to recall the position here just prior to July, 1937. The settlement of the Sian Incident left the Communists and their Red Army in control of a region about the size of England. It included Northern Shensi, from the outskirts of Sanyuan, a few miles north of Sianfu, to the Great Wall, and on the west extended to the edge of the Kansu plain, embracing several countries in Kansu province itself, and one or two in the province of Ninghsia. After the abolition of the Soviet Republic in this area, and the changes in Communist policy already mentioned, a special administration was set up, called the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Government. It proclaimed itself a democracy, established on an united-front basis, and actually did extend to the people, without regard to classes, the right to elect officials—the first attempt of this kind ever made in China. When, in September, 1937, the Red Army was incorporated into the national forces under the name of the Eighth Route (now the Eighteenth Group) Army and assigned to war tasks in Shansi, this border regime was given *pro tempore* sanction by the Generalissimo.

Yenan became the capital of the new provisional government, as it had been before of the Soviet Republic. It was rear headquarters for the Eighth Route Army as well, and it remained the political centre of the Communist Party. As the Communist troops marched eastward and northward, behind the Japanese lines, Yen-an's influence extended to wider and wider areas. Today it is a kind of guerrilla headquarters directing much of the anti-Japanese activity from Shensi eastward to the Yellow Sea, and from the Yellow River in Honan and Hopei far into Manchuria and Mongolia in the north.

The border regimes in the guerrilla empire control a total area about twice the size of pre-war Germany. They differ somewhat from their Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia prototype, however, and there are variations in the political pattern of each. All of them owe allegiance to the Central Government, and their defending forces are under the supreme command of the Generalissimo. But their leaders are often politically closer to Yen-an than to Chungking, and the methods of mobilization adopted inherit more from the old Soviets than from the pattern of landlord-gentry-party rule in the Kuomintang districts. Unlike the latter, which rigorously exclude Communists from the army, public office, and participation in general mobilization work, the Border Governments are organized on a united-front basis, do not ban any anti-Japanese party, and permit Communists as well as Kuomintang members to hold office and take part in the activity of the regime.

Shansi means "west of the mountains", and is named in juxta-

position to the province of Shantung, or "east of the mountains", which borders the ocean. Shansi lies across the Yellow River from Shensi province, where the old Soviets had their base. Now, the relative "liberalism" of Shansi and the extraordinary tenacity of its resistance derived from a curious chain of circumstances. This province had for thirty years been the bailiwick of the picturesque old war-lord, General Yen Hsi-shan, whose influence once extended across all North China. At one time people spoke of Shansi as the "model province", but ideas of progress changed, and in later years it was more often called the "backward province". Yen held on to his regional autonomy and his own army, printed his own currency, made his own laws and yielded but little to the central authority of Nanking. The latter made its greatest dent in his autonomy when, in 1935, Yen had to call in the Central Army to repulse the then Red Army, which badly defeated his Shansi forces.

Plenty of people were ready to predict that Yen Hsi-shan would sell out to the Japanese; but many of the "patriots" who used to ridicule Yen have in the meantime turned puppet, while the old war-lord still fights for his sacred hills. It is true his administration was corrupt, feudalistic and incompetent; but Yen was no traitor. In 1935 he seemed to realize something was seriously wrong and began groping for remedies. He drew some progressive young men into his regime and made an effort to unite and organize his people. In 1936 he even gave sanctuary to a few who advocated the "united front", when the phrase was enough to land you in jail in Nanking. He was in his thinking quite a lot like Sung Cheh-yuan, the Governor of Hopei. He found he needed popular support in order to resist pressure from both Nanking and the Japanese, and he balanced himself between the two forces as long as possible.

When Japan finally invaded North China, Yen had to make his decision, and he acted as General Sung did: without much success, but with loyalty to China and with courage. The Japanese easily rolled back his ill-equipped, poorly trained and poorly led Shansi army, and his semi-feudal administration quickly collapsed, many of the officials fleeing with his troops. More than half of Shansi, "the strategic key to North China", was occupied in a month. General Yen did not know how to conduct mobile warfare, and the unorganized people had no local governments capable of leading guerrilla resistance. Magistrates had never sought the co-operation of the people, who were untrained militarily and uninstructed politically.

Clutching at straws to save his beloved Shansi, old Yen was in a mood to listen to the younger and more radical men who had invaded his inner circle, and who had so often urged him to reform the administration and mobilize the masses. Now they advised Yen to make a friendly liaison with the Communist troops whom the Generalissimo had ordered in to help defend the province—to learn their fighting tactics and organizational methods, and to adopt those methods, in belated efforts to prepare the people for protracted resistance. And that is just what General Yen did, with the result

that Shansi was transformed into the strongest hold of China's defence system.

The Eighth Route Army entered Shansi, therefore, with General Yen's welcome and under his orders, for he was in supreme command of the Second War Area, which included the provinces of Shansi, Chahar and Suiyuan. Already the northern part of Shansi had fallen to Japan, and as the Communist troops marched north they met the bulk of the provincial army in demoralized flight towards the Yellow River. With Yen's consent the Reds began at once, along the route they followed, the work of training the people and building mass organizations to support the army and to strengthen civilian morale. They detached political workers to rally and reorganize some of the Shansi troops for mobile warfare and loaned commanders to start schools—all this in the midst of the Japanese offensive!—to train leaders for a new Shansi army. Moving outside the flanks of the Japanese lines, the main forces of the Eighth Route gradually worked their way back into North Shansi and Hopei into the positions they hold today.

That great bodies of Chinese troops could exist in the Japanese rear when thus supported by an organized people, and that large areas of Chinese territory could remain under their administration without either side being able to exterminate the other, was a discovery for General Yen as well as for many old-type militarists. And this is of course the most peculiar characteristic of what Evans Carlson calls the "unorthodox war". Topographically, the phenomenon is possible in North China because of splendid natural obstacles, such as wide rivers, deep forests and inaccessible mountain ranges, behind which big armies can find shelter in relative security against surprise attack. Since such obstacles usually correspond with provincial boundaries, the control of the latter is of utmost importance, no conquest can be said to be complete until all the "Border Regions" are subjugated.

In one of the most strategic of these "joints" in the anatomy of the North, where Shansi meets Hopei and Chahar among the rugged peaks of the Taihang Mountains, the second Border Region Government is located, in territory recovered from the Japanese by the Eighth Route Army. Soon after their arrival in North-east Shansi, these veterans of partisan warfare succeeded in dissolving most of the local puppet regimes set up in the *hsien* cities to carry out Japanese orders. The latter can now exist, in fact, only under the direct protection of strong Japanese garrisons, but as the Japanese lack sufficient forces to occupy more than the most important walled towns, they can assert their "control" in the hinterland only by sending in periodical punitive expeditions which raid and plunder the countryside.

In place of the puppet regimes the Shansi political workers taught the people how to form their own political and military organizations everywhere, and encouraged them to elect their own village, district and county governments. All these were unified when the Shansi-Hopei-Chahar Border Government was formed in

January, 1938, following a representative Conference summoned at Wu T'ai Shan, with the consent of the Generalissimo. While mainly defended by the Communist troops and the self-defence units which they have armed and trained, the Government includes representatives of the local Kuomintang as well as the many people's organizations which now embrace millions of Chinese in the guerrilla districts. The extent of its authority naturally varied according to the military situation. In July, 1940, the Government held direct control of about seventy counties in North-east Shansi, Central Hopei, and Southern Chahar, covering an area roughly the size of Italy.

Once this Shansi-Hopei-Chahar Government had organized secure bases in the Taihang Mountains, the Eighth Route Army sent strong detachments through the Japanese lines far to the east, into Northern Shantung. Here a number of counties were recovered from Japanese domination and a third border region was established. Still other detachments filtered between the Japanese garrisons near Peking and Tientsin, and entered East Hopei, the scene of Japan's first attempt at puppet government south of the Great Wall. Later they penetrated into Jehol, the mountainous eastern extremity of Inner Mongolia, which Japan incorporated Manchukuo in 1933. They entered Suiyuan also, which lies above the Great Wall north of Shensi and Ninghsia.

The well-organized Border regime in Northern Shantung had organic connections with the Shansi-Hopei-Chahar Government, and in fact guerrilla overland communications were maintained from the suburbs of Tientsin, on the gulf of Chihli, clear back to Yen-an. In Jehol and East Hopei, however, the guerrillas had only primitive military bases, incapable of supporting a stabilized political regime at any point. But they nevertheless exercised a certain degree of administrative control through mass organizations which form the human bases of all anti-Japanese activity in the hinterland.

Very important militarily was another Border Region which included most of South Shansi, Northern Honan, and South-western Hopei. It spread over an area perhaps twice the size of the State of New York, with a population about the same as that under the Shansi-Hopei-Chahar regime—roughly 12 millions. The Shansi-Honan-Hopei Border Region is known in Chinese history as "Shan-tang" (not to be confused with the *province* of Shantung), and it has always been considered of great strategic importance, so that the Chinese in ancient times had a saying, "Who holds Shan-tang holds the world." The "world" was the great North-west; and it is still true today that Shan-tang commands the most feasible approaches to the Wei and the Han valleys. Until it is swept free of Chinese troops the Japanese cannot undertake a large-scale invasion west of the Yellow River.

More important even than its strategic assets, in modern times, are Shan-tang's rich undeveloped reserves of coal and iron—billions of tons—the lure of which was one of the primary reasons for the Nipponese invasion. Until resistance is completely broken, the

Japanese cannot exploit this prize with profit. Repeated punitive drives were hurled against the irregular strongholds in Shan-tang, but after three years of effort there were more Chinese troops in the region than when Japanese first entered it. The Japanese held the main cities and their connecting communications, but from the fastness of the mountains an immense land area was dominated by over 250,000 Chinese troops—the strongest force boasted by any of the Border Regions.

Shan-tang's defenders were a mixed lot, composed in the main of two armies which were formerly bitter enemies. General Wei Li-huang, noted for his civil-war successes against the old Red Army, was in command, at the time of my last visit to the Northwest, of about 100,000 Central Army troops, based on Northern Honan and South-east Shansi. His nearest neighbours and co-defenders of South-east Shansi were three divisions of the Eighth Route Army, led by the redoubtable Chu Teh, and the famed guerrilla commander, Peng Teh-huai—with whose old First Front Red Army I travelled for a while during the civil war in Ninghsia. Then there were some 50,000 troops of the New Army of Shansi, consisting of local volunteers trained with considerable help from the Eighth Route Army, but supported by General Yen Hsi-shan. And in the south-west of Shansi province were the reorganized remnants of General Yen's own original forces, numbering some 60,000 men.

Shan-tang was not united under a single command, as were the Shansi-Hopei-Chahar and the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Governments, but was composed of nine different administrative districts, each of which reflected the character of the military forces stationed in it. Where the Eighth Route Army operated, the pattern of village mobilization resembled that of the other Border Regions, and the same thing was true in areas defended by the New Shansi Army. In the Central Army districts, and those under the re-organized Old Shansi Army, however, which still had bases inside Free China and consequently were less dependent on popular support, the regime was nearer the old Kuomintang pattern. Yet even in the latter case many peoples' societies flourished which in other areas were banned, and there was a better spirit of co-operation between the army and the civilians, and between different armies with different political ideas.

Generally speaking, the Border Regimes now provide the peasants with the ablest and the most democratic administration they have ever known, and to a considerable extent the gap between the people and the officials has been closed. Farther on I shall try to show in more detail how one of the more advanced Border Governments operates and how the people, from young children to old men and women, are mobilised so that each contributes his share of effort for the good of the community.

Yet in a larger sense one must despair of revealing all the subtleties of this mixed-up picture so that it assumes a shape of logic in Western eyes. The struggle behind Japanese lines is not

simply between invader and defender, but includes clashes of party, class, military, political and social interests and ideas inside Chinese society. What is going on often seems to the Westerner *involution* rather than revolution, and perhaps to see its full significance one must understand nothing less than the history of China, and I do not know any Occidental who really does. The events occur on a canvas so vast that only something in epic form can hope to reproduce them. What brave men and women are doing here will be the material of folklore and legend for a thousand years to come, but perhaps only Chinese will understand and remember its heroes and its villains, and cherish its principles and its truths, just as only Chinese can find exaltation in the pages of mingled fact and fiction in that strange classic, *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, which the present period in many ways so oddly resembles.

But digress. All this was to have been a mere introduction to an account of my return visit to Yenan. If, after the foregoing confession of my limitations as an interpreter, the reader is still willing to follow me to the strangest "capital" on earth, it is yet possible that we can learn something of value about the men and ideas behind one of the most valiant struggles history ever witnessed.

RAINY JOURNEY

*The road to Yen-an is for China's
youth the road to life.*

LU HSÜN.

WHEREVER I went after the war began young people would appear in the most unexpected places, with a copy of *Red Star Over China* (in the pirated Chinese edition) tucked under their arms, to ask me how they could enter one of the schools at Yen-an. In one city the commissioner of education came to me like a conspirator wanting me to "introduce" his son, so that he could enter the Yen-an Political and Military Academy. In Hongkong a prosperous banker astonished me by making the same request. Looking at the comfort which surrounded his offspring I said, "Your son would have to sleep on a mud *k'ang* up there and grow his own food and wash his own clothes."

"I know that," he replied, "if he stays where he is he will sooner or later have to wash the Japanese!" Perhaps he had a clearer view of the future than most of his treaty-port colleagues.

If I had set up a recruiting station in Shanghai or Hankow or Chungking I could have enlisted several battalions; and it might have been the best service one could render China, at that. Unfortunately I had no commission as a recruiting sergeant and my "inside connections" with Yen-an went no further than the scars left on my kidneys by its war diet. I could not help these would-be bachelors of guerrilla arts very much. As far as I knew, the easiest way to "get into" North Shensi was to walk in. And thousands of young people did walk—from distances of hundreds of miles. They were still coming in, from all over China, when I returned to Sianfu; but it now seemed to amount almost to a crime against the State, in the eyes of General Hu Tsung-nan, whose troops controlled most of the roads leading into the ex-Soviet districts, for a young man or woman to join the Eighth Route Army or study at Yen-an.

This little Anhui general was one of the ablest and most powerful of Chiang Kai-shek's Whampoa veterans and indeed had been Chiang's golden boy ever since the "Gissimo" trained him at Canton. He commands the First Group Army, best equipped and best drilled of all the Central troops—and Chiang Kai-shek's personal pride and joy. It had done practically no fighting since the war began, but had garrisoned the North-west, apparently as an insulation against the spread of Red influence there, and also as a training cadre for the development of new forces. Ironically enough, much of the military supplies from Russia went to General Hu's troops—which, if major civil war were resumed, would form the backbone of the anti-Communist drive.

An efficient officer and an attractive personality, General Hu Tsung-nan was the leader of the *Fu-Hsing Shé*, or "Regeneration Society," which was formed secretly during the Generalissimo's anti-Red campaigns. Composed mainly of Whampoa and Nanking cadets, impressed by the methods of the Nazis and no doubt encouraged by some of the German advisers, it was at one time frankly modelled closely after the Gestapo. In 1937 the organization accurately mirrored the political ideas of Chiang himself; and it was not till after Hitler's desertion of the Generalissimo's army, which the Fuehrer described¹ as "mentally incapable" (how he *mentally* wounded the intellectual pride of the Chinese!) of defeating Japan, that some of its pro-Nazism vanished. But it still stood for the principles: destroy the Reds, follow the Leader and support the authoritarian State. The first slogan was of course now carried out chiefly by political means. General Hu himself was credited with the organization of the Special Service Section and the political gendarmes of the Central Army, one of whose duties was to keep youth free from Marxist contamination. Probably Hu had more influence among younger officers than any junior general except his Whampoa classmate, Chen Cheng. Many considered him to be Chen Cheng's main rival in the line of succession to the Generalissimo.

Naturally it irked these "Regenerationists" more and more, as the war went on, to see many young people going into the "bandit lair" of the North, and they took what steps they could to prevent it. Inspection stations were set up along the roads, where special gendarmes stopped young travellers, scarched them, and often sent them back to General Hu Tsung-nan's reform school, which the Communists called a "concentration camp". That was maintained in connection with the General's political and military training school, which was modelled somewhat after the Yen-an Academy, and in fact turned out some quite capable young officers. But would-be Yen-anites were called "backward students", and not till they had renounced interest in Communism were they admitted to regular classes or sent home as unsuitable material.

These queer inter-army kidnappings even included Eighth Route men in uniform, who were seized from the army's own trucks—which were also confiscated now and then. One day an over-zealous anti-Red gendarme made the mistake of trying to detain an Eighth Route officer, however, and even told him that "Communist bandits" had no right to travel on buses or trucks. The officer, dressed in ordinary soldier's uniform, happened to be Peng Teh-huai, field commander of the Eighth Route Army. He promptly arrested the gendarme and personally took him to Central Army headquarters at T'ien-shui, after which the practice temporarily ceased. But a new annoyance, when I reached Sian, was the denial of its quota of gasoline to the Eighth Route Army. In fact, I considered myself quite lucky when I got a ride on an overloaded truck, for it was the first to leave for Yen-an in several weeks.

¹ In a speech recalling the German advisers, in 1938.

Piled high with luggage and supplies, the big Dodge was in addition festooned with fourteen passengers, including three women, as we lurched out on the dusty road to the north. By mid-afternoon we reached Sanyuan, where we stopped for the night at the *Balu Chün* (Eighth Route Army) communications depot. At dusk it began to rain and by dawn the road had become impassable. Shensi rains, once begun, tirelessly go on and on, sometimes for more than the biblical forty days. This one stopped after five days, but it was a week before we were back on the road. A week in Sanyuan is the dreariest prospect imaginable, yet I seemed to be the only one who resented the delay. My companions settled down to read back numbers of the political and military magazines and newspapers which were on file in the depot library. Time meant no more to them in war than in peace; and in this attitude, incidentally, lies one key to the understanding of China which no Westerner can quite grasp till he has experienced it. Whereas with us the hours of the clock seem real measurements of victory or defeat, it is the other way round with the Chinese. War and peace are themselves but units of time against the clock of their long history.

Our delay at least enabled me to get better acquainted with my fellow-passengers, with some of whom I played *poka p'ai*—poker—by the dim vegetable-oil lamp every night, and argued large questions of war and revolution. There was Mêng Yung-cheng, inspector of the guerrilla units of Chinese Industrial Co-operatives, on his way to a conference with the Yen-an depot. There was Mrs. Chen Chang-hao, the lily-footed wife of the Communist leader, taking her young son up to see his famous father, over whose head once hung a large reward. On the road she had a splendid spirit. Again and again she painfully scaled down the side of the truck on her bound feet, when the driver negotiated a bad stretch or we had to scatter for an air raid. Yet she never once complained, and gave the impression of having been bouncing on and off trucks all her life. The younger Chen reminded me so much of an old school-mate in spirit, devilment, and even in looks, that I christened him "Bert" at Sanyuan, and taught him to play a good hand at rummy. "Bert" had only recently discovered that his father was still living, and who his father was, for during the years of civil war his mother had kept her identity a closely guarded secret.

There was a young girl, the daughter of a Hunanese merchant, who had run away from home to join the New Fourth Army. After a year there, she was now on her way, clad in a captured Japanese greatcoat, to the Women's College at Yen-an. A pretty child, smiling and cheerful, but tough as leather, she was quite able to take care of herself and boasted a medal in marksmanship won with the New Fourth. Then there was another Hunanese, a young officer from the New Fourth, who had fought with Hsiao Keh and Han Ying for the old Southern Soviets. He also wore an olive drab greatcoat—"a present from the Emperor", he called it. He had put the bullet through the man who had owned it, and in the torn fabric he proudly displayed the record of his aim.

This little Huanese looked upon the present as a "period of prosperity" in contrast to the hard life he had led as a Red partisan. One day there was an argument about what was "bitter". One man said it was "to have nothing to eat but corn". Another said that the worst single diet was potatoes. Many Chinese, especially Southerners, regard neither corn nor potatoes as fit for human consumption. "But grass is still worse," said a third, "unless there are grasshoppers in it."

"No grass, no grasshoppers, only rats—that's all we had once," broke in the Hunanese, with his sly grin. "Now that's real bitterness," everyone agreed. But the faraway look of the epicure stole into the veteran's eyes as he slowly shook his head. "People should not speak harshly of rats," he observed. "They are really not bad, if you know to cook them." You have to know how to select and skin and clean them, how to cure them—honey-cured is best, but of course in a famine you have no honey, still—how to broil and fry them. "*Hên hsiang*," he ended dreamily. "When properly seasoned with red pepper they taste better than young pullets. Quite *de-licious*!"

Well, if a Frenchman can grow rapturous over fried toad and an Englishman grow atavistic over raw cow and an American over the slime of oysters, there may also be something in a tastily prepared rat. Personally, I remained unconvinced and thankful for my bowl of rice.

Speaking of food, and you speak of little else in these moments of stymie on the road, Mêng and I recruited a cook for Yen-an's new Foreign Guest Cave while we dawdled in Sanyuan. One day we were walking down a muddy street hunting for a bakery when I stopped to buy some hot chestnuts from a peddler with a basket on his arm. "What country are you from?" he asked me. I told him I was an American, and he said he had once cooked for an Englishman near Sianfu. Mêng became interested and asked him whether he would like a job as foreign-style cook at Yen-an.

Now, it happened that among the supplies on our truck there was, in fact, a complete foreign-cooking outfit—pots, pans, ladles, etcetera—and dishes, knives, spoons and forks. The officer in charge had purchased all these in Sian and then had gone hunting for a cook. He had been unable to find a single candidate willing to work for less than \$80 a month. At last he had come to the decision that all foreign-style cooks had been spoiled by the imperialists and that it would be a bad thing to set up a privileged class at Yen-an by hiring a chef at a wage many times greater than that paid to Mao Tse-tung himself. So he had set off with his dishes but without his cook, with the intention of calling a conference to discuss the matter when he reached Yen-an.

Mêng asked the young chestnut peddler enough questions about foreign food to satisfy himself that he was not lying. He then explained that his job would be to feed occasional foreign guests, and prepare banquets for visiting generals and other firemen. The peddler agreed to take \$15 a month, after Mêng described the attrac-

tions of life at Yen-an and told him he could get an education there. Next night the cook came round with his aged mother, however, and it was clear they had both begun to suspect the whole thing was a plot to kidnap the son for the army; he had been dodging conscription for some months, it seemed. The soldiers there kept me up half the night explaining to the old lady the difference between the Eighth Route and other armies, and why they did not want conscripts, but only convinced volunteers. At last she seemed satisfied, and next morning, when we left Sanyuan, the cook climbed aboard, where apparently the other passengers must have gone to work on him at once to convert him to the "cause". Anyway, a couple of days later I saw him wearing an Eighth Route Army cap.

"What's this, have you been conscripted after all?" I asked him.

"No," he grinned, "but neither am I selling chestnuts any more at a time like this."

My Chinese had grown very rusty, with long disuse, and these days on the road enabled me to brush up on it. One of the hardest tasks I assigned myself was to put a riddle to my companions, varying it a little from the version I had heard at Chunking.

"In the reign of Hsienfeng," I said, "the Prime Minister needed the wisest man in the Empire to become Viceroy of Canton, for the duties were very difficult. He therefore called all the best scholars to Peking and gave them the most severe examinations he could devise. Finally, he narrowed down his selection to three men who by all tests seemed of equal intelligence. He called these three men to the palace one day explained his difficulty in selecting any one of them, for the Emperor had threatened his head if he did not find the most brilliant man in the Empire. The Prime Minister then picked up from his desk five coloured discs, and three of them were blue and two were green. He said to the candidates, showing the five discs:

"I shall put one of these discs on the forehead of each of you, and then I shall put you together in a room in which there are no mirrors, and where you cannot speak or signal to each other. The man who first emerges from the room and tells me the colour of all three discs, and gives me a logical explanation for his answer, will become the Viceroy of Canton."

"The Prime Minister then carried out the operation and left the men in an adjoining room. After ten minutes, one man came out and announced that all three discs were blue. He was right; after he had given his explanation the Prime Minister made him Viceroy. What was his explanation, and why could none of the discs have been green?"

The truck was silent with thought for a long time. Just before we reached Yen-an, however, the little Hunanese who liked rats had the correct answer. Which was more than I could do with the riddle he then gave me.

REUNION IN YENAN

In Yen-an the Chinese Communist realized the command life dreamed of by the primitive Utopian Socialists of the Owen-Fourier era.

NYM WALKS.

THE Communists were all very proud of their new "capital" at Yen-an, and veterans from Pao An were always asking me what I thought of the improvements since my last visit. The question at first seemed pure irony. Nearly every building inside the walls was in ruin, and Yen-an was in fact the only example I have seen of complete demolition of a sizable town by air bombardment alone. Apparently the Japanese did not realize they had achieved their mission, however, as they still attacked the place nearly every day. Japan must have spent several million yen on this one pattern of lacework alone.

But reconstruction kept up with the intramural destruction. Outside the city walls a new metropolis was growing up. Hundreds of buildings were strung along the shadow of the cliffs or bloomed in little hollows between the endless waves of yellow loess, while tier upon tier of newly dug caves opened their yawning mouths along the mountain-side for miles. About 40,000 people, engaged in all the tasks of war-time life, burrowed in and out of the caverns all day long. Its ingenuity and courage were admirable, if also uncomfortably prophetic of housing that may yet become universal, as the bombing plane circumnavigates the earth.

But Communists had been dodging bombs for many years, and even demolished Yen-an was a big improvement on the past. Optimism is a permanent habit of these people; they wear it like an armour of the mind. "Yen-an is better than Pao An, isn't it so?" asked Mao Tse-tung. "We have made progress in every direction since you visited us in 1936. Give us time. If we keep on improving at the present rate we shall have something to show you in 1945."

And when you looked at things down their own particular funnel of experience, it had to be admitted that, despite their cave-dwelling capital, they were enjoying better days. Their army had trebled or quadrupled and now garrisoned thousands of miles of new territory. They were no longer completely blockaded from the rest of China. In North Shensi they had a compact little base where they could, except for the interruption of bombing, train thousands of new military and political leaders in peace and build up their own institutions.

Material conditions had improved. Mines and crude industries were developing. In Pao An days only the most adventurous merchants traded between the then Soviet districts and the "White" areas. Now several big private trading companies, operating their own trucking transport, were flourishing, Yen'an having abolished all merchant taxes to encourage business. North Shensi had an export surplus of cotton, wool, hides, vegetable oil and grain. Industrial production—mostly handicraft—had impressively increased. Industrial and producers' co-operatives were filling many of the needs of the civilian population and the army. Consumers' co-operatives had shelves well stocked with the simple necessities of the farming population. Government control kept prices down and they were generally from 30 to 40 per cent less than elsewhere.

Agricultural production had also expanded. Despite recruitment of large numbers of youths for the army, the Border Government had, in a campaign mobilizing all able-bodied people in the area to take part in planting and tilling, opened over one million *mu* (about 200,000 acres) of wasteland. Local guards and garrison troops took part in this work, as well as all students and "functionaries". Even bankers were not exempt. Calling at the Border Government Bank one morning I found the office closed for the day. The whole staff was out harvesting. As a result of the production drive, the former food scarcity in North Shensi had been overcome. The markets offered an abundance of grain and vegetables, and mutton was plentiful and cheap. In food, the region was self-sufficient.

Many new institutions were housed in the hills or in new administration buildings camouflaged in narrow defiles. Great strides had been made in education, and a new publishing house was turning out books, magazines and newspapers, for the front and the rear. Many foreign works had been translated and printed in a standard edition, and the Chinese were adding their own texts to the history and theory of revolution. Several of my Pao An friends had now become authors and presented me with autographed copies of their works. Selected writings of Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Lo Fu and other political and military leaders were offered in cheap editions. There were novels, reportage, essays, military and political books on the war and translations of works on natural science, art and literature. To my regret, however, I discovered that the collective history of the Long March, which was being compiled when I left Pao An in 1936, had been abandoned. It was considered "inconsistent with the united front."

Public health work had improved and sanitary arrangements seemed on the whole quite good. Though plague is endemic in this region, it was under control, and there had been no epidemic for two years. Yen'an had its own Medical Factory, which was turning out medicines in thirty-one standard formulas, besides quantities of dressings, gauze and apparatus. It had a staff of eighty, under the supervision of foreign-trained pharmacists. A Border Region Central Hospital, with 100 beds and an out-patient clinic handling about 200 persons daily, offered free treatment to

civilians and included an obstetric ward. In a nearby village also was the Branch International Peace Hospital of the Eighth Route Army, which had special facilities for surgical and orthopaedic work. Here such badly wounded soldiers as were lucky enough to get back to the rear received expert attention from a staff of medical men which included the Indian delegation of four, headed by the famous Dr. Aṭal, a surgeon in the British medical service in World War I.

Another innovation: among its eating-places the town boasted a modern restaurant, with little-booths set against the walls, and a kitchen that could turn out Northern or Southern food with equal expertness. Here I went soon after my arrival, to attend a welcoming tea for the "comfort corps" of Chinese writers and students who were touring the various fronts, under the wings of the veteran Kuomintang leader, General Chang Chi, and the Whampoa cadet, General Ho Tsung-han.¹

General Ho's presence made the occasion unique, for he was the first leader of the "Regeneration Society", the so-called fascist clique already mentioned, to visit Yen-an. It was said that he had at first opposed the comfort corps' visit to "rebel" Yen-an at all, then refused to go himself, but at the last moment unaccountably changed his mind. Rather surprised, the Yen-anites treated him with scrupulous courtesy and politeness and gave him every facility for investigation. One could not tell whether he was impressed. Stiff and unsmiling in his polished boots and well-tailored uniform, with his bright golden sword sparkling from his belt, he made an odd contrast with his cotton-clad hosts, who represented various cultural organizations of the place.

General Chang Chi, on the other hand, once a bitter enemy of the Reds, was now strong for party co-operation. I watched Ho fidget nervously as Chang Chi, a large grey-haired man, and something of a philosopher, made a genial speech praising the Eighth Route Army for its energy and patriotism. It seemed to me he was by implication offering a word of advice to his younger colleague, and the situation was intriguing.

"I am an old man of fifty-eight now," Chang Chi began, "and I have no more personal ambitions or party ambitions. Why should I not speak frankly to you young people who all love China? Well, I have been a revolutionary for forty-five years, and for thirty of those years I fought by the side of Sun Yat-sen. But though I have laboured long for my country, can it be said that I have made no mistakes? For example, I regret my error in 1924, when I opposed Sun Yat-sen's alliance with the Communists. I did not agree, then, with his interpretation that the *San Min Chu I* had no conflict with the Communists. My attitude was probably harmful to China. It is regrettable that Sun Yat-sen died. He alone had the genius and the wisdom to have avoided the tragedy of the years between 1927 and 1937."

¹ Not the same as General Hu Tsung-nan, commander of the First Army, mentioned before.

The silence was open-mouthed as he continued. It was the first time any Kuomintang delegate had spoken so humbly before this audience. Chang Chi touched on recent Kuomintang-Communist conflicts and assured his listeners that the older leaders of the Kuomintang really did believe in the united front and wanted no more civil war. It seemed to me that this old man talked from an honest heart as he offered this wisdom to China's youth: that unity of the nation was paramount to everything else, and that only under this belief could China survive. He sat down amidst thunderous applause.

It would of course take more than good intentions and unselfish patriots to heal the old wounds between these two rivals for leadership, even if they were not constantly reopened by new conflicts, but the Communists seemed anxious not to ignore any chance at reconciliation. When, a few days later, the troops of General Ho Chu-kuo retired through the Border District, after two years on the Shansi front, another huge entertainment was held to welcome this erstwhile battle enemy of the Reds and his officers and two Soviet Russian advisers.

Now this General Ho Chu-kuo was the last of the Tungpei (Manchurian) Army commanders who stopped fighting the Reds, after Chang Hsueh-liang's truce in 1936. In that year, in fact, when I was with the old Red Army in Kansu, it was General Ho Chu-kuo who was attacking. Some of Ho's captured horses—he led a cavalry division—provided the Reds with mounts for their first cavalry detachment. I had ridden on several of them myself. And so it gave me a queer feeling now to sit in an audience welcoming that man. There must have been 2,000 others packed into the new theatre—a large building in the suburbs—on the night of the *huan-yin*. Men and women cadets, students, soldiers, workers, farmers, youth and old age came drifting in on foot from all directions.

General Ho made a fiery anti-Japanese speech, full of quite-to-be-expected phrases. He was followed by one of the Russians, a blond young man with gay eyes and an extraordinarily attractive smile. Few people could understand a word he said, but his resonant voice rang with such confidence and his wide gestures were so fine in their defiant sweep that his listeners, than whom nobody better appreciated a good display of first-rate histrionics, rocked the hall with applause. For myself, I was convinced he must be promising no less than an armoured division or two to conclude the war. But his well-trained Chinese interpreter, copying his gestures perfectly, and as nearly as possible his voice, soon cleared up the matter. It seemed that the Russian had only told of the Soviet Union's sympathy for the oppressed peoples of all the earth, praised the brilliance of China's resistance, predicted the early collapse of Japan and the certainty of Chinese victory.

It was good to be young and whole in faith, and I wished I could share his optimism. In the midst of my reflections I was, to my dismay, requested to say a few words myself.

I never felt less like addressing anybody. I knew well enough

what those young people would like to hear. Nothing would cheer them more than a assurance that America was with them. But everybody there knew that the United States supplied Japan with metals used to destroy Yen-an and other cities, and with the materials of war that had killed thousands of their comrades. Could I in any way deny or extenuate the crime? But may be they would like to hear that it was the capitalists who were doing this business, against the will of the American people? Was it? In my heart I agreed with Eleanor Roosevelt, that "the responsibility for selling scrap iron and munitions to Japan rests squarely on the shoulders of the American people". The truth seemed to be that a few were making money out of it and the rest didn't give a damn. Yet would it cheer these lads to be told that American women would rather see them smeared about than give up silk stockings?

Suddenly I remembered what Rewi Alley's old man on the bus had said about the big-nosed foreigner and his handicap in aviation, and I realized it was true. Instead of a speech, I told them all this story.

So foreigners cannot see very well because of their big noses, my friends, and how, then, can we expect them to see across an ocean or two and understand your suffering, or why they should not help Japan to kill your brothers and your sisters? It is a short-sighted world we live in and a mad-dog world, and it is true nobody can see beyond his own nose. China cannot wait for other nations to be fitted with long-range spectacles. Your leader Mao Tse-tung has said that every man and woman must learn to "fight with his teeth, his hands and his feet", so that China can win alone. And he is right; depend on no one but yourselves. . . .

But by what right did I impose my gloomy platitudes upon these youths about to die? I mumbled out some optimistic hopes, another joke or two and found my seat again as quickly as with decency I could. And then the symphony began.

Yes, *symphony*, for here I first heard the work of Hsi Hsu-hai, the youth whose melodies and operas are now sung from the Yellow River to the Yellow Sea. Composer Hsi himself was there, leading his queer orchestra, Oz-like with its mass of Chinese tomtoms and *yang-chins* and flutes, its foreign strings, cellos and violins, and those odd inventions of his own, cut from Standard Oil tins strung with local gut. Leading it was Hsi himself, a mad-man or a genius I know not which. They say his European tutors were quite convinced it was the former.

But what I heard was good. It lived, it spoke, it held its audience entranced. Was he a thief? There was a bar from Beethoven, but not quite, there a phrase of almost-Bach, here some minors from the *Red Chamber Dream*, but now it was only a mountaineer's yodel, a boatman's toilsome chant, the roar of a river, a rattle of musketry. Hsi called the composition *Yellow River*, and it was epic in form, its vocal parts sung by a mixed chorus of sixty voices, telling of a nation's triumphs and defeats, and of a people's death and its regeneration. The singing was good, with no trace of

the horrible operatic falsetto. Here were rich natural voices, full and strong, in pleasing Mandarin. Yet despite its strong borrowing from abroad, it remained China—but China of tomorrow, with a door half open to the West.

What accident had brought Professor Hsi to far-off Shensi with his hybrid notions of harmony and orchestration? The answer, I discovered, was Yen-an's Lu Hsün Academy of Fine Arts. Here about 500 writers, artists, dramatists, composers and their students, including talent from many provinces and recruited from abroad, had built in a near-by village an artists' colony of their own, housed—of all places!—in a Catholic cathedral and its monastery. With this Academy, Yen-an was now as much a mecca for radicals in art as in politics, for here mass art was no crime against the State, and they could "raise the cultural level of the masses" to their hearts' content. A few days later I was the guest of some of these "cultural bandits", as they are known to China's cultural conservatives, and among them found old friends from Peking and Shanghai, who lectured me on their own theories of wartime art.

I filed out, after the performance of *Huang Ho*, beside Mao Tse-tung.

"How did you like it?" he asked.

"Excellent. It's the best chorus I've heard in China since Yen-ching sang the *Messiah*."

"Yes, it is a big change since our theatre in Pao An."

But changes having occurred in most other directions, what had happened to Mao Tse-tung himself since I last saw him in his cave at Pao An three years earlier? A foreign missionary, after visiting Yen-an, excitedly informed me that Mao now had a private motor-car, and hinted darkly at corruption. And when, soon after my arrival, Mao said he would "send the car to bring me over" for a visit, it did sound plutocratic. I looked forward curiously to this reunion.

COLLEGE OF AMAZONS

I like babies as an institution but don't want any myself. I have to keep fit for my work in the army.
KANG KE-CHING (MR. CHU TRE).

YENAN still lived in an intellectual world of its own values ; there was a different approach to all problems, and markedly so in education. No other comparable area showed such rapid educational progress as did the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Government during the past four years. The little town of Yen-an, which even most Chinese had never heard of six years ago, was now one of the nation's largest educational centres. Despite its wretched material conditions and almost daily visits from enemy bombers, it offered a wide variety of training and new cultural influences.

Old Hsu Teh-li, the former president of a normal school in Changsha, Hunan, and famous as the man who became a Communist when he was fifty, laid the foundations for the new educational system while he was Commissar of Education in Soviet days. Before his arrival in North Shensi there were only 120 schools scattered across the whole area, and they taught nothing but the Four Books. At the end of 1939 there were 773 primary schools, seventy-eight model primary schools and sixteen higher primary schools. Mass education was ahead of any district in Free China. There were over 700 character-study groups and 208 night schools for adults. Formerly Shensi's only schools of higher education were in Sian. Now Yen-an had four middle schools and three colleges, besides an art academy, the largest in China, a technical training academy, and an Industrial Co-operative Vocational Training School for Boys. The latter recruited its students from "little devils", mostly orphans, rewarded for their loyalty and intelligence in patriotic service.

The old Red Academy changed its name, after the end of the civil war, to the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University, but luckily this is usually cut down in conversation to *K'ang Ta*, the University of Resistance. Its classrooms, planted here and there in caves near Yen-an, held 2,000 students when I was there, while other branches in Shansi were attended by 8,000 more. Until 1939 the entire college was concentrated in North Shensi, but so many students were detained or imprisoned, while en route through the Kuomintang districts, that it was decided to move the larger part of the college behind the Japanese lines. Thus friction could be avoided with anti-Red groups, the Japanese evidently being considered a minor worry. Altogether, *K'ang Ta* graduated nearly 10,000 students a year from its military and political training courses. These

were essentially the same in content as the curriculum of the old Red Academy, except that technical and material equipment had improved. Political training, while Marxist, was chiefly devoted to explaining the united front and the *San Min Chu I* in relation to Communist programme and policy.

But an utter newcomer in Yen-an's institutions of learning, and I suppose unique in the world, was *Nü Tzu Ta Hsüeh*, the Women's University, a veritable College of Amazons. It girdled two mountains near Fushih and was made up of a series of some 200 caves connected by a neat highway and stairs circling down to the green valley below. On the flanks of other hills near by lay geometrical patterns of millet and vegetables, where students tilled their own crops every morning, rising at dawn to work two hours in the fields before attending classes. Here about 400 girls and women were engaged in the study of everything from spinning and the care of infants to the complexities of English and Russian grammar.

I rode over with a friend one morning to *Nü Ta* and spent a wide-eyed day there visiting the college classrooms and dormitories, and consuming a tasty vegetarian meal prepared in the students co-operative cafeteria. Pao An, the old Soviet capital, had boasted nothing like this. Communist women were improving in looks, I could not help incidentally observing when Wang Ming's pretty wife, Meng Chin-hsu, head of a department in the University, took me from cave to cave, accompanied by three other teachers. Faculty and students all wore cotton uniforms, cloth or straw shoes or sandals and army caps on their bobbed hair. No rouge. From a distance you could not tell them from boys. You did not, as in the case of *Ninotchka*, have to fall under a table to get a laugh out of them. They had the ready smile you see in working people everywhere in China, without which the country would be as intolerable to most foreigners as an eternally overcast sky.

This Women's University had girls of all ages from all over China, but what surprised me was the preponderance of Northerners among them. People used to say the Communists could never interest North China people in their ideas; it was believed Chinese "Communism" was indigenous to the South. But among these Chinese revolutionaries it was a maxim that "local leaders must be developed in every new region added to the revolution". They knew that leaders from the outside could be imposed on the villages only to a limited extent. Today everywhere the armies go they add new recruits and pick the best for further training in their schools in the rear.

Shantung, "conquered" by Japan in 1937, furnished more students for *Nü Ta* than any other province. Honan ranked next, and after that Hopei and Shansi. Kiangsu was fifth, and Szechuan, Shensi, Kwangtung, Hunan, Hupeh and the Manchurian provinces were about equally represented. There were two girls from remote Chinghai and Sikang. About 60 per cent of the students were nineteen or twenty years old; the rest were over twenty but under thirty, except for five over thirty. One student, a factory worker and

famous labour organizer, was forty-one. The majority were unmarried, but about one out of ten had a husband, in the party, at the front or in some kind of war work. A state university for women in this remote corner was surprising enough; to find it with women from nearly all provinces of China, in the midst of war, was astonishing. I wondered how they had got there, and upon inquiry discovered that most of the women from the occupied areas had come by dangerous guerrilla trails, from hundreds of miles behind the Japanese lines. Here was a real hunger for education. How many American girls would hike 500 miles through war zones to enter a college of caves where they had to grow their own patch of vegetables?

Most of the students were daughters of workers or peasants. The rest were from middle-class families, except for a dozen or so known as "the capitalists". Outstanding among the latter was the daughter of the Singapore-born Chinese millionaire, Hu Wen-hu, who made his fortune out of a panacea known as "Tiger Balm", celebrated to cure anything from warts to cancer. Forty-one of the students had attended university, and 129 had gone to middle school, but over 200 had been no farther than higher primary school. I wondered what kind of curriculum could be found to suit women with such varied class, provincial and educational back-grounds, and I questioned Kuo Chin, *Nü Ta's* efficient secretary.

"We have three classes of students," she explained. "Several could not read or write when they arrived. We put them, and others with only primary school education, in a Special Class, where they study the Chinese language, social problems, hygiene, political and military 'common sense', and a brief history of the Communist Party. After a year, some will be promoted to the Secondary Class. This has required courses in social history, political economy, problems of the Chinese Communist Party, the Three Peoples' Principles, military problems, elementary philosophy and problems in public health.

"There is a Higher Research Class. University education or its equivalent or completion of two years of training in our Special and Secondary classes are entrance requirements. Higher Research students take political economy, Marxism and Leninism, philosophy, history of the world revolution and one foreign language. Here we train leaders for special tasks in war work or in some existing institution, for political work in the occupied areas, teaching, medical work, propaganda, co-operative organization and so on. We offer optional courses in English, Russian and Japanese, in literature and music, and in bookkeeping, shorthand, journalism and weaving and spinning."

Attended jointly by all three classes were lectures on Chinese social problems and "the women's movement". Needless to say, this education differed radically from anything offered elsewhere in China. None of the courses corresponded in content to teaching in Kuomintang or Christian schools, which put little emphasis on vocational or military training, and naturally none at all on Marx-

ism or the Kungch'antang! In the Women's University all courses were salted with Marxist philosophy, including the Communists' own interpretation of the Three Principles.

The whole thing was war improvisation or "emergency education", as they called it. But it seemed intensely practical; they were adding nothing to the over-production of useless lawyers and Ph.D.'s. And of course it was nothing less than an earthquake in the lives of North Shensi people to have a school of any kind for women. Before the Reds entered this area they were still hired out as "labour", like donkeys and mares, while the males stayed home and collected their wages.

General entrance requirements for *Nü Ta* were simply sound health, a co-operative spirit and a readiness to fight in the national struggle for emancipation of women. Preference was shown to working-class women or women engaged in anti-Japanese work or students from some of the many improvised political and military training schools operated behind the Japanese lines. The majority of the students were not Communist Party members. After matriculating, women were assigned to study in one of the three classes through a series of examinations determining their qualifications. Applicants were far more than could be accommodated and capacity was to be expanded to 1,000 students.

The students had a good social life, with plenty of intervals for games and sports. They had their own theatre, constructed at the bottom of a mountain and beside a clear stream where they did their own washing. Here also were playgrounds and basket-ball courts. They had a drill-ground and a riding-circle. A wall surrounded the administration buildings and the co-operative buildings in the valley below, and the big gate was guarded by girl sentries with business-like bayonets. Visitors were admitted only on special occasions. Morals were probably a good deal better than in most girls' schools in America.

The majority of the graduates went into rural education work, with the second largest number returning to their homes in the guerrilla districts, to lead in mass organization. A few entered the Resistance University for further military training. Many of the students had already fought in partisan warfare. Female leadership in the fighting zone consists for the most part in mobilization work, education and the organization of peasant help for the fighting forces.

Occidental professors may find difficulty imagining a university in caves, but the *yao-fang* is not a damp gloomy hole, but really a "cave house", which makes a warm comfortable dwelling. Cave architecture had developed in my absence. Ceilings were higher and rooms were wider. Local cave-diggers had always maintained the loess walls would not hold plaster, but experiment produced a white plaster, now widely in use, which greatly improved interior lighting. When the floors are paved with bricks and the open facade covered with Chinese rice-paper windows—which admit ultraviolet rays, incidentally, that don't penetrate glass—you get a room

better than many a slum school, far cleaner than the average East Side tenement. An additional advantage of the cave is its virtual invulnerability to bombs, as it usually has a cover of 30 or 40 feet of soil. Interconnecting passage-ways in the rear of the rooms give adequate protection against bomb splinters and take care of concussion, in case of possible direct hits at the entrance.

Lodging, food, books and tuition at *Nü Ta* were all free, but students were required to furnish their own bedding and uniforms. Since they grew most of their own food, as did other colleges, in the hillside plots recovered from waste land—part of the Border Government's production campaign—this was a small item. It cost \$10,000 to excavate the classrooms and dormitories and supply the simple equipment for the school, an expense defrayed largely by public contributions and help from patriotic Overseas Chinese. Monthly overhead and operating costs, including salaries for faculty heads (\$5 each) and a staff of seventy teachers, amounted to less than \$3,000, Chinese.

The whole thing figured out at about \$7.50 per student per month, or roughly 40 cents, in American money.

THE RED PROPHET

*We cannot even speak of socialism
if we are robbed of a country in
which to practise it.*

MAO TSE-TUNG.

THE limousine which coughed tubercularly at the bottom of the path leading down from my cave looked like a Black Maria. When I got close enough I saw that it was an ambulance, and on its panelled door was neatly lettered :

Presented to the Heroic Defenders of China
By the Chinese Hand Laundrymen's Association
of New York City.

So this was Mao's extravagance that had shocked my missionary friend. A number of these laundrymen's gifts had accumulated in Yen-an, where sometimes they were used to carry civilian air-raid victims to near-by hospitals. But generally they remained idle ; there was no petrol to move them.

Motor ambulances were actually of little use on a guerrilla front ; the mobile character of the war, the roadless countryside, and lack of fuel and servicing facilities indicated a medical service of a special type. If overseas Chinese and foreign friends had sent to Yen-an the money they spent on costly ambulances and foreign drugs it would have had permanent value once invested in local production—in the expansion of drug factories and guerrilla industry. But it never seemed to occur to such people that the Chinese were quite capable of making their own necessities, if given capital to buy machinery, for a fraction of the cost of imported articles. The price of an ambulance, presented in cash to the Eighth Route Army, could really have saved hundreds of lives by financing the organization of practical army medical work and developing local war industry. As it was, the chief value of the ambulance lay in the horse-power of its engine when harnessed in a factory, and in its eventual knock-down value as scrap.

Yen-an, which many thought of as the "anti-capitalist" centre of China, needed *capital* and capital goods more than anything but guns.

The ambulance bounced its way a few *li* beyond the city wall and turned up a ravine, exactly like a hundred others, where it stopped to deposit us below a paved walk leading up to Mao's home. "Us" included Huang Hua, who had volunteered to accompany me ; he wanted to hear Mao's interpretation of the European situation. Huang Hua was an old friend whom I had first met during his

class at Yenching University—a brilliant idealistic youth with a natural talent for leadership. He was one of the first of many students who left the lovely Northern campus of America's finest missionary college to join the Reds.

Huang Hua had greatly matured and was now a man of quiet self-confidence, full of duties ; he was secretary of a youth salvation association, and dean of a school somewhere farther north. Like all the Christian-educated students I met in the Communist camp—and there were now scores of them—he somehow made me feel that he was more at peace with himself, psychologically, than Christian youths in other parts of China, who were seldom able to reconcile their religious background with the kind of society in which they lived. Perhaps it was that these Christian Communists, having dropped the supernaturalism of the faith, which is irreconcilable with Chinese rationalism, were really able to synthesize the social teachings of Christianity with their daily political catechism. Perhaps it was simply that the elemental and apostolic equalitarianism of life in this region gave them the illusion of doing so. Perhaps it was that kind of practical brotherhood of the place which attracted the late Father Vincent Lebbe, an elderly Belgian priest who took his Christian medical units to join the Eighth Route Army, and startled Catholic China when he said he felt no conflict between his principles and those practised by General Chu Teh.

I found Mao still living in a cave ; but a modern and improved version, a three-roomed place with a study, a bedroom and a guest room. The walls were of white plaster, the floor was lined with bricks and there were some touches of feminine decoration, added by Mrs. Mao. But here signs of affluence ended. I discovered that Mao still owned only a couple of uniforms and a single padded coat. He had no personal wealth at all.

I cannot add much, after my second visit with Mao, to impressions I have recorded previously. The years of war had changed him little. No longer on a starvation diet, he had put on some weight ; his hair was clipped short ; he was dressed as always in the uniform of an ordinary soldier. He was still the plain man of the people, the queer mixture of peasant and intellectual, the unusual combination of great political shrewdness and earthy common sense. His revolutionary optimism remained unshaken ; he was just as confident as ever that his Communist Party would eventually triumph in China, and he still worked all night towards that end. He was still the student of world events and the political analyst ; before he settled down to the night's tasks he read through a huge pile of the day's dispatches which were picked up by the near-by army wireless station—from the battle front in Shansi, from all over China, and from countries abroad.

Mao's political intelligence explains his command of the Communist Party, but not the real affection in which he is held by the men of the army and the country people. In speaking, he has a way of presenting a most complicated subject so that even the uneducated man can seem to understand it. He is full of homely

idioms and instances ; he never talks above the heads of his audience, but he never talks down to them either. There is a real flow of intimacy between him and the people ; he always seems to be in contact.

A revolutionary movement demands of a leader the ability to know a little ahead of anyone else what is going to happen ; and in this respect Mao has been so successful that his followers have come to repose immense confidence in his judgment. At the time Mao made some important political predictions to me, in 1936, they seemed to many people preposterous. Few men then believed the Communist Party could survive ; fewer still foresaw a united front between the Kuomintang and Kungch'antang in resistance to Japan. Only a handful of foreign experts doubted that Japan could compel China to submit within a few months. Among the Chinese, a few optimists believed that Japan would suffer an economic break-up shortly after the war began ; pessimists considered it certain China would collapse once Japan had blockaded the coast and seized the main cities.

However they may feel about the Communists and what they represent, most Chinese now admit—and in the admission one often detects a secret pride—that Mao Tse-tung accurately analysed the internal and international factors involved, and correctly depicted the general shape of events to come. Civil war did end, and the Communist Party and the Red Army not only survived but were strengthened in the national united front. His suggestion that at a certain stage in the war part of the Kuomintang would betray China and turn puppet for the Japanese was long resented ; but after the defection of Wang Ching-wei, deputy leader of the party, it could not be denied that he had correctly understood the forces inside the Government. Mao's prediction that the war would be long and difficult, if certain conditions were not realized, must be one of the few instances in history in which an advocate of armed struggle has not promised his followers a quick and easy triumph. But this candour disarmed in advance the kind of defeatism that preys upon shattered illusions. On the other hand, Mao helped to build up a more durable self-confidence in the nation by correctly estimating the immense staying power guaranteed by China's own resources, human and material, when mobilized in a revolutionary way.

"Many people", he said in July, 1936, "think it would be impossible for China to continue to fight Japan, once the latter had seized certain strategic points on the coast and enforced a blockade. This is nonsense . . . China is a very big nation and it cannot be said to be conquered until every inch of it is under the sword of the invader. If Japan should succeed in occupying even a large section of China, getting possession of an area with as many as one hundred or even two hundred million people, we would still be far from defeated. We would still have left a great force to fight against Japan's warlords, who would also have to fight a heavy and constant rear-guard action throughout the entire war."

Again, Mao indicated the kind of strategy necessary to win—and the one eventually adopted:

"The strategy should be that of a war of manoeuvre, over an extended, shifting, and indefinite front: a strategy depending for success on a high degree of mobility in difficult terrain, and featured by swift attack and withdrawal, swift concentration and dispersal. It will be a large-scale war of manoeuvre rather than the simple positional war of extensive trench-work, deep-massed lines and heavy fortifications. . . . Fortified warfare must be utilized, but it will be of auxiliary and secondary importance. . . . Japan's economy will crack under the strain of a long expensive occupation of China and the morale of her forces will break under a trial of innumerable but indecisive battles."

But the prophet is not yet fully vindicated; for Mao predicted an ultimate Chinese victory, based on complete internal mobilization—not yet achieved—and "important foreign help." If by "important" Mao meant *major*, that condition is also still to be realized.

Some of Mao's comments¹ during my return visit seemed about as dubious as had his earlier speculations; yet a number of them have already been upheld by history. It was mid-September of 1939 when I reached Yenan; and there was but scant news of the diplomatic and political upheaval of Europe. Many observers then believed that Russia had, by signing the non-aggression pact with Germany, become Hitler's war ally. Mao ridiculed the notion, and explained that the Soviet Union's antagonism with German imperialism remained as acute as with Anglo-French imperialism. He said Russia would drop her policy of neutrality only if directly attacked, or if revolutionary movements arose in Europe. He regarded the Soviet-German non-aggression pact primarily as a "strategic military necessity", claiming that it had no political implications, but merely safeguarded the Soviet Union against attempts by Chamberlain to make an anti-Soviet alliance with Hitler.

The latter contention then seemed unsupported by fact. The world had been led to believe that the Anglo-Russian "conversations" at Moscow had been making progress. Only a few weeks earlier British, Soviet Russian and Chinese diplomats had all assured me, quite sincerely, I believe, that the Anglo-Russian pact would definitely be signed. It did not seem possible that in such a critical moment Chamberlain had still been offering more appeasement and even an alliance to Berlin. I asked Mao for proof and he admitted he had none; it was merely his analysis of the objective situation. Some months later I read the British Blue Book, and Sir Nevile Henderson's own memoirs, *Failure of a Mission*, which revealed the persistence of the Chamberlain dream, up to the last five minutes.

At that time Mao also predicted that the Japanese would not enter the European war, but would attempt to compel the Western Powers to help force a decision on China. Only after Japan had wrung sufficient appeasement from Britain and America to weaken

¹ Interviews covering some of these questions were published in the *China Weekly Review*, Shanghai, Jan. 13, 20, 1940.

their own political and military position in the Far East, he believed, would she proceed to move on Indo-China, the Dutch Indies and finally the Philippines. Mao said that the British would seek to "stop the war in China", and once he said that Chamberlain considered it necessary to "sacrifice China in order to make an ally of Japan". He also anticipated that, in the event of a British or American attempt at a Far Eastern Munich, a Russo-Japanese non-aggression pact might follow—"on condition that it would not interfere with Soviet support for China".

Mao's views created a sensation in Chungking. They were in direct contradiction to the opinion of the Generalissimo, who had already made a speech declaring that the European war would not affect British policy in China, which would continue to uphold the Nine-Power Treaty and the Open Door pledges. Even some of the Communists believed Mao had gone too far; they expected Chamberlain to give concrete help to China, as a bastion of Britain's own security in the Far East. I must confess that Mao's expectations also appeared improbable to me, they seemed so obviously against British interests; and when in succeeding months Britain did little to hinder Chinese resistance, I concluded that he had miscalculated. July, 1940, however, found the British Tories making their last appeasement play to Japan by blockading China's remaining trade outlet through Burma, in violation of the Nine-Power Treaty and Britain's solemn pledge at Geneva to "refrain from taking action which might have the effect of weakening China's power of resistance."

During the war, all Communist troops, like Kuomintang soldiers, acknowledge Chiang Kai-shek as the supreme military leader. But they make no fetish of this obedience; they do not, for example, rise and come to attention every time Chiang's name is mentioned, as other troops are taught to do. "Lao Chiang" is respected as the generalissimo in the anti-Japanese struggle and the leader of the Kuomintang.

There are striking similarities and dissimilarities between Chiang and Mao. Both are men of strong will-power. Mao is probably capable of as much ruthlessness as Chiang, in his own cause; he is also a man of energy, initiative and decision, and he is an able political and military strategist. But whereas ethics and morality, based on traditional concepts of filial piety, are for Chiang the core of his philosophy, the words are to Mao probably no more than a cross-reference in the propaganda index of two sides of a social struggle. Mao is essentially a social revolutionary; Chiang is essentially a social conservative. Chiang is something of an introvert and his qualities of aloofness from the mob often seem consciously emphasized to preserve the old Chinese tradition of a power personality. There is little mystery about Mao. He does not claim infallibility. I have heard him admit mistakes, and he is not ashamed to change his mind.

Mao can rarely speak long without making a homely wisecrack or an epigram, and he seems to maintain his leadership by winning

all the arguments. He is very well read and an accomplished dialectician in debate. He has an interesting technique. He seldom makes a frontal attack against opposition. He delivers a blow here, another there, he outflanks his opponents' case, he breaks down its defences one by one, until gradually he has it completely encompassed and it falls apart before a last witticism, or a telling stroke of logic. He likes people and their laughter and is at home in any group. He has a lively imagination. I remember once seeing him laugh till he wept when somebody described to him a comedy he had seen in Shanghai. It was an American movie—Charlie Chaplin in *Modern Times*.

Although Mao is unquestionably the outstanding personality of the Communists, he is in no sense a dictator. He is a leader only by common consent, and all his decisions are the result of discussion and a collective judgment. There is no office in the Communist Party similar to the position of *Tsung-tsai* which Chiang Kai-shek holds in the Kuomintang. Mao's influence is exercised mainly through his position in the party Politburo and on the military committee. He holds no official posts in the Border Government. He is still known to everybody simply as the *Chu-Hsi*, or Chairman—a kind of honorary title which goes back to Kiangsi days, when he was elected head of the Soviet Government.

XIX

RED STAR OVER TURKISTAN?

The Soviet Union . . . ardently respects the sovereignty of the whole of China, including Sinkiang.

"IZVESTIA."

AFTER the Nazi invasion of Poland, and its division between Germany and Russia, many Chinese cast apprehensive eyes towards Sinkiang, seeing an analogy between that province and Poland. Some feared the Red Army might march in to "liberate the oppressed masses" in Sinkiang, as in the case of those east of Warsaw. The Japanese lost no time in broadcasting categorical reports of a Russian invasion, which were widely believed.

A long ear of China reaching into Central Asia, bordered on the east and north by Mongolia, on the west by Russian Turkistan and Afghanistan, and on the south by India and Tibet, strategic Sinkiang—the name means New Dominion—is China's largest province and would make two states the size of Texas, or four Californias. Chiefly desert, it is cut in half by the east-west Tien Shan or "Celestial Mountain" range, and by one of Asia's great rivers, the Tarim, which starts and ends wholly within the state. In the south the Kunlun Mountains raise a mighty barrier against India; in the North, the gold-bearing Altai range stands sentinel against Russia. Along these ranges are wooded hills and grazing lands and in the valleys of the Tarim and other rivers are fertile oases. Here the four million inhabitants, of fourteen different races—predominantly Turkish and Chinese Moslems, but with big Mongol, Tartar, Kazak, and other tribal minorities—live by herding, breeding camels and fine horses, farming, trading, and digging gold and jade from the ancient mines.

The oldest part of China, Sinkiang has long been to foreigners the least known, and remains today the most difficult of all to penetrate. Always a land of mystery and romance to the outer world, a few Western explorers such as Obruchev, von Lecoq, Aurel Stein and Richthofen first revealed some of its archæological treasures, to be followed by occasional hardy scientists and travellers, men like Sven Hedin and Owen Lattimore, in our time. For centuries under Chinese suzerainty, Sinkiang revolted often; in 1864 it became independent. But a famous Chinese soldier, Tso Tsung-tang, reconquered it in 1878. Sinkiang then became a Chinese province, but was actually ruled more like a colony until 1931, when rebellion once more broke out on a wide scale, and was suppressed by a new regime set up with the help of Soviet Russia.

As a strategic buffer state separating India from Russia, Sinkiang for many years was the scene of intrigues and counter-intrigues.

between Czarist Moscow and Delhi. Soviet Russia followed a non-interventionist policy until 1932, when it could not ignore the political menace of the Mohammedan uprising led by Ma Chungying.¹ The Nanking Government had no diplomatic relations with Russia and was anyway powerless to suppress General Ma's revolt. Japan had invaded Manchuria. When some Manchurian troops were driven into Soviet territory the Soviets decided to permit them to retreat to Sinkiang and to reinforce the beleaguered Chinese garrisons there. Partly to counter Japanese intrigue—active in supporting the Moslem insurrection—the Soviets backed General Sheng Shih-tsai, who took command of the situation, and with the help of the Manchurian troops managed to re-establish Chinese power. Some 50,000 White Russians, who had fled to Sinkiang following the bolshevik revolution, were also involved in the civil war—another reason for Soviet concern. Having helped to stabilize the new regime under General Sheng, however, Moscow withdrew all Soviet troops from Sinkiang, and made no attempt to establish an autonomous regime there such as now exists in Outer Mongolia.

Here it may be recalled that the Mongolian People's Republic was set up after the Mongols, armed by the Russian Reds, rose against the terror of the "Mad Baron", Ungern Sternberg,² who used the country as a base of White-Russian Allied attack on the bolsheviks. Sternberg was driven out and the Lama Government was overthrown. The new regime in Outer Mongolia, though controlled by the Mongolian Communist Party, calls its revolutionary programme "bourgeois democratic," not socialistic. It has a mutual defence pact with the U. S. S. R., but the latter still recognizes China's suzerainty over the country. In fact the Soviet-China treaty of 1924 provided for the eventual withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Outer Mongolia; but before negotiations were completed China broke off diplomatic relations with Moscow in 1927.

Later, when relations were resumed, Japan had already occupied Manchuria, and was threatening to invade Ulan Bator, the Mongol capital, which China was in no position to defend. Hence it was in China's strategic interest, as well as that of Russia—who was determined not to permit Japan to extend the ulcerous growth of Manchukuo far into her midriff in Central Asia—that the latter should assume responsibility for Mongolia's defence. After Soviet Russia had, in reply to a routine Chinese note concerning the meaning of the mutual defence pact, reiterated its recognition of China's suzerainty in Outer Mongolia, the matter was dropped by Nanking. China's claims in any case appear dubious, as they rest largely on the former allegiance of the now overthrown Mongol princes to the old Manchu Throne, the Chinese themselves never having effectively conquered the country.

¹ For an eyewitness account of the rebellion, see Sven Hedin's *Flight of the Big Horse*; for more recent developments, Owen Lattimore's *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, N.Y., 1940.

² See *America's Siberian Adventure*, by Major-General William S. Graves, N.Y., 1932, for a description of Sternberg's rule.

Some observers have compared the Mongolian People's Republic with Manchukuo, but there is obviously a vast difference between the one, as an autonomous republican protectorate of the U. S. S. R., and the other, a Japanese colony masquerading as a puppet empire. The point is, as Owen Lattimore, an expert on this region, has explained somewhere, that the Mongolian regime, being in fact based on a genuine people's revolution, would stand even if every Soviet soldier were withdrawn to-morrow, whereas the fiction of Manchukuo would immediately collapse once the Nipponese took to their heels. Intelligent Chinese diplomats privately admit as much, and now hope only that some day Mongolia may join in a loose union with an independent China. Mao Tse-tung expressed this expectation to me in 1936, saying that "When the people's revolution has been victorious in China the Outer Mongolian republic will automatically become a part of the Chinese federation, at their own will."

It seems probable that Outer Mongolia might even today enjoy a relationship with China and Russia comparable to that of Sinkiang, were it not occupying a position which, as part of the Soviet Far Eastern defence perimeter, clearly necessitates a strong Soviet garrison. For it must be admitted that if Russia were out simply to grab for the sake of grabbing she could have annexed Sinkiang with little difficulty. That she has refrained from doing so is another indication of the long-view considerations that determine Soviet political strategy in Asia.

This is particularly interesting, when one realizes that the economic life of Sinkiang is now much more closely related to Soviet Russia than to China. The province has a favourable commercial treaty with Russia, which loaned Sheng the money with which he set up the present regime. With the completion of the Trans-Turkistan railway to Alma Ata in 1930, skirting close to Sinkiang's Western border, the region was economically reoriented towards Russia. Some 1,600 miles of sand and mountains lie between Tihua, Sinkiang's capital, and the nearest Chinese railhead. Soviet trade organs opened offices in Sinkiang, Soviet machinery went in to exploit new mines, and Soviet tanks, airplanes and armoured cars were imported, along with Soviet instructors—in exchange for Sinkiang's exports of gold, jade, horses and wool.

After the Chinese Government's retreat to the Western provinces, Sinkiang acquired a new significance in China's future. Its vital importance as a focal point for Russian supplies has already been stressed. If anything should now happen to close this frontier the blow might be altogether fatal for China. Thus far there has been remarkable progress in communications and co-operation. Following the Sian Incident, the conclusion of the non-aggression pact of 1937, and a new Sino-Soviet commercial treaty, Chiang Kai-shek improved relations with General Sheng, and negotiations conducted in Moscow by Sun Fo further strengthened China's position on its farthest frontier.

The new Sinkiang-Kansu highway, over 1,500 miles long, was speedily completed with Soviet engineering assistance and road-

building equipment. In 1940 a Chungking-Tihua-Moscow air service was finally inaugurated. Nobody can go by air or highway without the approval of General Sheng—and possibly Sheng's advisers—but these restrictions have not prevented a number of young Chinese from migrating to Sinkiang to participate in the intensive efforts of the progressive new government there. Teachers, editors, scientists and doctors are welcomed by Governor Sheng, and readily find a role in his own "three-year plan."

General Sheng Shih-tsai is an energetic and capable man of fifty, a native of Machuria, who was educated in Japan and Canton. He participated in the Nationalist Revolution till 1926, when he was sent—apparently with Kuomintang and Soviet Russian agreement—to Sinkiang. There he remained in a minor position until the former Governor was assassinated, when in the suppression of the ensuing revolt he emerged as local strong man. But his mission was not to restore the old, but to remove the causes of the insurrection itself. He became the leader of what Sinkiang now calls the April Revolution, and the official beginning of "New Sinkiang". An honest, plain-living, democratic man, Sheng has proved an able administrator devoted to the interests of the people. The programme of the new Government stressed racial equality, religious freedom, road-building, industrialization, agricultural improvement, and the development of education and self-government. It adopted, in addition, two slogans: "anti-imperialism", and "friendship with the U. S. S. R."

Surprising everybody, Sheng's Government adhered to the announced programme so energetically that it is now not only the best administration old Turkistan ever had, but one of the most enlightened in China. Racial minorities for the first time receive equal treatment, freedom of worship is protected, and honesty in government has become proverbial after the summary execution of a number of offenders. Hundreds of miles of new roads have been built, Tihua and Hami are busy with new machine industries, and much has been done to improve agriculture, including the establishment of model State farms, experimental stations and agricultural colleges. There has as yet been no land revolution; but there have been reforms, including rent reductions, utilization of waste land, and heavy taxation of the landlords.

An interesting form of local self-government has been developed, in which all classes, races and religions are represented. District councils elect minor officials and also send delegates to a State congress convened annually, to which the Government is accountable for its expenditures, planning and policies. In education the advances are especially marked. There are twenty times more schools now than there were in 1933. Literacy has vastly increased. The former imperialist policy of "Sinicizing" the minorities has been abandoned and consequently there is a renaissance in tribal literature and culture. Mobile schools now even accompany the caravans, in the crusade for adult education, and teach the camel pullers to read and write their own language.

Here we are concerned more particularly with Sheng's two slogans, anti-imperialism and "friendly relations with the U.S.S.R.". These are fundamentals of policy elsewhere in China only in the Border districts ruled by Communists, to whose present policies the Sinkiang regime bears other striking similarities which cannot be entirely accidental. Yet Sheng is no Communist, and Sinkiang enthrones not Marx but Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the *San Min Chu I*. Sheng quite correctly points to the historical fact that every part of his programme is consistent with Sunyatsenism. The two slogans were indeed first advanced by Sun Yat-sen himself. While in practice abandoned when Chiang Kai-shek broke with Moscow in 1927, they were never formally renounced by the Kuomintang.

It was clear that in Sinkiang's policy anti-imperialism was bilateral, being directed against British as well as Japanese influence. Sheng himself cited as "the most characteristic case of imperialist intrigue" a recent allegedly British-backed uprising in Southern Sinkiang. As for friendship with Russia, he explained, "Under such complex surroundings, the pro-Soviet policy did not come into being incidentally. Everyone understands that to be friendly with Soviet Russia does not mean Communism. The Soviet Union has demonstrated that it does not seek territory or special privileges, but on the contrary really helps our construction."¹

Though there was no Communism in Sinkiang—the idea was ridiculous in a state almost devoid of industrial proletariat—and Marxism was not taught in the schools, there was no oppression of Communists. Contrary to practice under the Chiang Kai-shek Government, Communists were permitted to enter the army and take part in mass organizations. Quite a few Moscow-trained Korean and Chinese Communists became instructors in Sinkiang's military training. More prominent in educational and administrative work, however, were adherents of the National Salvationists, a body of Left-Wing Chinese intellectuals who early advocated Kuomintang-Communist reconciliation, and of younger Manchurians of the radical *Tungpei P'ai*, which backed Marshal Chang Hseuh-liang's "military persuasion" against the Generalissimo at Sian.

Beyond these circumstances, however, Chinese Communists benefited very little from the pro-Soviet voice in Sinkiang. The airplanes and military supplies consigned to China through Sinkiang went exclusively to Chiang Kai-shek, not the Chinese Reds, contrary to the claims of the Japanese. The latter were laughable to anyone who knows anything at all about the geography and the disposition of military forces in this part of the world, though some gullible people were taken in. The truth was that over 1,000 miles of desert separated Sinkiang from the nearest Communist troops, in North Shensi, and even camel-trails were everywhere held by hostile forces.

North of the Great Wall were Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Red generals, Fu Tso-yi, Kao Kuei-tze and others. To the west, in

¹ In an interview with Chen Chi-ying, of the *Ta Kung Pao*.

Ninghsia, were the Moslem troops of the three Ma generals, who in 1937 inflicted against the Chinese Red Army perhaps the worst single defeat in its history. Reinforcing the Moslems in Kansu and Shensi, and elsewhere surrounding the Chinese Reds, were the best-equipped of all the Chinese forces, the First Group Army of General Hu Tsung-nan, already mentioned. The only motor highway system connecting the North-west with Sinkiang was closely patrolled by Chungking's gendarmes, and the only roads leading into the Communist areas were likewise guarded continuously. If, in spite of these precautions, a caravan or two somehow found its way across Mongolian deserts into the Border Region it could carry munitions of but scant significance. The fact is that the Soviets were believed by all these competent to judge to have adhered faithfully to their agreement to deliver supplies to the Chungking Government alone.

Likewise disproved were Japanese canards of Russian military seizure of Sinkiang.¹ The friendly Sinkiang Government, plus control of Outer Mongolia, provided Stalin with adequate flank protection in Central Asia. Seizure of Sinkiang obviously might provide a basis of reconciliation between the Japanese and the anti-Communist, pro-peace element in Chungking, enabling Tokyo to create a Franco situation in all China. Moscow, as we have seen, definitely wished to avoid that.

Well, but what if Chungking were to make a compromise recognizing Japanese mastery of parts of China and Manchuria, or to join the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan? Or if a general anti-Red offensive were renewed as part of Chungking's "unification and reconstruction" campaign? Or if Britain were suddenly to alter her policy and intervene on the side of Chungking in such a manner as to make the Kuomintang confident that it could fight both the Reds and Japanese, with the result of intensified repressive measures against the former? What then? If the situation became grave Russia might counter by making a mutual defence pact with Sinkiang, and put it under Soviet protection. Conceivably, the Chinese Communists might seek to consolidate power in a region covering the entire North-west, and hold on there until a recovery could be staged throughout China as a whole.

In the event that part of Free China were turned into an anti-Soviet base, along lines suggested above, it might then at last become manifestly in the strategic interest of Soviet Russia to extend all aid to the Chinese Reds and their allies, including guns, planes, munitions, credits and the technical advice which have till now gone exclusively to Chiang Kai-shek as the head of the nationalist coalition. A new red-coloured state might then emerge across the whole North-west with a profound significance for the colonial and semi-colonial countries. Some kind of consolidation would probably occur between the North-western provinces, Chinese Turkistan, Outer Mongolia and Western Inner Mongolia. Such a federation of re-

¹ Sir Stafford Cripps, now British Ambassador to Moscow, was the first Englishman permitted to fly over the new Moscow-Chungking airline. He ridiculed the report in a statement made in April, 1940.

publics, vast in extent—some two-thirds the size of the United States—would probably not attempt to establish Socialism and might not enter the U. S. S. R. It would simply adhere to the “national democratic” programme such as is already being enforced in Sinkiang, Outer Mongolia and the Border Regions.

There is no danger of that kind of development as long as the Chungking Government continues to fight Japan and its anti-Communist groups fail to persuade the Generalissimo to renew the large-scale anti-Red offensive. But, as Mao Tse-tung recently warned those groups now most active in promoting sporadic armed attacks on the Red troops, their actions are the surest method of achieving eventual self-annihilation. Mao humorously suggested that people so much keener to suppress the internal political opposition than to fight Japan, should adopt a formal resolution, one article of which should be worded as follows:

Resolved, that in view of the fact that there are too few Communist Party members, and it is necessary to develop their numbers to the maximum extent; that in view of the fact that there are too few rifles and arms in the hands of the Eighth Route Army, and it is necessary to increase their rifles and arms to the maximum extent; therefore, we, the reactionary elements, take up ourselves the obligation of launching a punitive campaign against the Communists.¹

In fact the same thing might apply to European Powers, so fearful that Asia may go Red. In paraphrase, one might say this: Resolved, that, in order to increase the Communist influence in China to the greatest effectiveness, and in order to compel Soviet Russia to intervene in a revolutionary way, we must deny aid to China's struggle for independence, assist Japan in completing the blockade (e.g., the closure of the Yunnan railway, the Burma Road, etc.), and continue to supply Japan with all the war materials she needs to destroy Western interests.

Well, we shall now see what there is about these Border Districts that makes Mao's “reactionary elements” hate them more than the Japanese. But first let us have a look, by way of contrast, at a typical county, run by the gentry under the Kuomintang's *pao-chia* system, as seen through the eyes of the magistrate himself.

¹ From an address by Mao Tse-tung at Yen-an, March 6, 1940.

LESSONS FROM A MAGISTRATE

The district magistrate represents 10,000 abilities, in the eyes of the government; 10,000 evils, in the eyes of the people; 10,000 difficulties, in the eyes of the district magistrate.

CHINESE ADAGE.

DURING my recent travels in Western China I met many local officials, all running the country along the well-worn grooves, until I came upon a certain magistrate in whose *yamen* I spent some days as a guest. Frequently I dined with him and his gentle and courageous wife; and above the chaos which surrounded the *yamen* secretary who, sitting at the same table, demolished bowl after bowl of noodles with a din more terrible by far than anything I ever heard on a battlefield, I learned quite a lot about the anatomy of that *hsien*.

Now this magistrate had a reputation as the best district official in that part of Kuomintang China, perhaps because he had never been trained as a magistrate at all. It would be unforgivable if, out of mere interest in social science, I were to identify him in this interview so that perchance it became a boomerang and the certain *hsien* lost its model magistrate. I shall therefore simply call him "Mr. Chen", of the mythical district of "Ningfu".

Mr. Chen came from an Eastern province and he was a capable, well-educated man. The war found him in a responsible executive job, to which he clung until the Japanese took over his office. Then he went, like many in his profession, to offer his services to the Central Government. How he finally ended up as magistrate of Ningfu is his own story; suffice it to say that by a happy chain of circumstances he was put in his post without incurring the usual obligations.

Now for 95 per cent of the people "the Government" still means the district magistrate, appointed by the Son of Heaven in the past and by the party bureaucracy today. He is all-powerful as far as the people are concerned, but he is responsible to all the higher provincial officials and the central ones also. For the vast majority of the peasantry, however, the magistrate is the beginning and end of authority, a one-man government. Under him are districts of widely varying size, some less than 30 square miles in area, others as large as countries in Europe, the average roughly corresponding to an American county inside a provincial state. Obviously it is here in the fundamental governing unit that the people must win political power first, if ever the word "democracy" is to have meaning in their lives.

The *hsien* government organization is almost identical throughout the country, and Ningfu, a county of some 300,000 souls, was no exception. As a rule the *hsien yamen* consists of six or seven sections, under the magistrate, such as civil affairs, public safety, finance, reconstruction, vital statistics and, during the war, conscription. Above the section chiefs there is a district secretary who ranks as a kind of assistant magistrate and is often the boss of local politics. The *hsien* is subdivided into a number of *ch'ü*, something like boroughs, each headed by a *ch'ü-chang*. Under the *ch'ü* is a group of villages known as a *hsiang*. Since the restoration of the *pao-chia* system the villages are organized into groups of 100 families known as a *pao*—which is further subdivided into *chia*. Each *chia* consists (nominally) of the ten households, and all the members are held mutually responsible for each other's conduct.

Much of the work of the magistrate is actually passed on to the various sub-district chiefs. Their duties consist in keeping the peace, suppressing non-Kuomintang political organizations, enforcing conscription, settling land disputes, arresting debtors and "rebels", collecting taxes, and recruiting and commanding the local militia. The sub-officials are appointed by the magistrate, and sometimes receive no salaries; often the posts are considered hereditary or honorary. In practice they get their compensation by pocketing a share of the taxes they can collect, or in the form of gifts from the landlords, in whose interest they usually work. This is understood by the magistrate, just as the latter's squeeze is understood by provincial officials. It all works out very well except for the unfortunate lad on whom all the orders descend, for the whole system provides for only one-way traffic, from the high bureaucracy down to the individual family. There has been no method by which the latter can turn the tables and remove any link in the long chain above him.

And now we go back to Magistrate Chen, and his "10,000 evils and 10,000 difficulties", to see how things worked inside one of the 1,905 cells that make up the huge political body of China.

"The first thing I have learned", said Magistrate Chen one day, "is that although China has had a revolution for thirty years it has not yet touched the *hsien* government. Economy has changed, society has changed, people have changed, but the *hsien* government remains the same."

"When I arrived," Magistrate Chen told me, "there were about fifty tax collectors in this *hsien*. None of them received salaries. They were all appointed by the gentry, and in many cases their families had been tax-collectors for generations. These men had their own secret records of land ownership and collected according to reckonings made out by the gentry. They paid over to the magistrate only as much as he could beat out of them."

"I beg your pardon?"

"It was customary to bring these collectors to the *yamen* and beat them," Chen repeated, "because only when they were beaten

would they begin to turn over the money due the *hsien*. Even so, they always managed to squeeze a big part of the taxes."

Magistrate Chen decided he did not like that system, so he sacked all those tax collectors and began a new land survey. He sent officers to the villages to advise each owner and tenant about the change and to invite them to come to the *hsien yamen* personally and pay the correct amount of taxes. Many honest farmers discovered that they had been paying taxes which should have been paid by the landlords. The gentry themselves were outraged when they learned that the "great ones" were expected to abide by the law. The *hsien* revenues began to increase.

"There has been a big change. Most people like the new system much better," according to Chen. "They pay promptly and go away with an official receipt, well satisfied. But the gentry always try to avoid payment, and I have to use my policemen to bring them into court."

The gentry also disliked Chen because he brought an end to the opium traffic, which had been largely in their hands. Opium was considered better than money, and landlords forced their tenants to grow it and then hoarded it and sold it at fat profits. The *hsien yamen* drew more than half its revenue for the province from the same source. But Chen enforced the opium prohibition law and suppressed the poppy, and some of the "local rascals" had to go to work.

"After the tax collectors were abolished," Chen said, "those gentry who controlled them combined and made formal charges against me to the provincial Governor, accusing me of embezzlement. But I had installed a modern bookkeeping system and was able to refute all their charges. On the contrary, I was able to show that many of these men had paid no taxes to the state for years."

He was very proud of his accounting system, which was balanced daily to record every cent received or spent by the *hsien*. One day he brought in a vast pile of accounts in which he soon had me buried to the ears. Out of it all I got the strong impression that it is next to impossible for a magistrate to be honest and balance his personal budget. Chen's salary, it appeared, was \$140 a month, and that of the district secretary and the section chiefs only \$56 each. While those were living wages in that region, they were not adequate to maintain the standard of entertainment and "face" expected of *yamen* officials.

In plain fact, according to Mr. Chen, it was customary for the section chiefs to sign receipts for their salaries, which were actually kept by the magistrate. In exchange for this courtesy the magistrate let them squeeze what they could out of the people in the form of miscellaneous taxes.

To the horror of all concerned, Chen remedied the situation by inducing his provincial superiors to permit him to raise his sub-chiefs' wages to \$70 each. Then he brought an end to petty embezzlement by making all accounts legally payable to the treasurer

alone. Most of the old chiefs resigned in protest against this "rebellion". Considering it good riddance, Chen appointed some able young college graduates, whose "radical" ideas about honesty in government concurred with his own. It was only because of his personal relationships with the new assistants, and their patriotism, Chen explained, that they were willing to live on such salaries. Though he increased everybody else's salary, Chen did not improve his own, and though he gave up the practice of expensive banquets and dropped some useless *yamen*-runners from his staff, he found himself owing the treasury \$88 at the end of the first year.

"When the war is over I will leave, and so will the honest men working with me. Our war service will be over. Things will then go on in the old way, as they were before we arrived."

"Then you think permanent reform is impossible?"

"This kind of reform at the top does not work. Now there are many honest officials, but what can they do against a system like this? The whole structure is wrong because political change can come only from above. Though I am a member of the Kuomintang, I say this, I don't think any dictatorship can save China. In my opinion only the whole people, working together as a democracy, from the village up, can bring about an improvement. The Kuomintang dictatorship is wrong at the top just as the *pao-chia* system is wrong at the bottom. To do away with the wrong methods at the top the *pao-chia* and *hsien yamen* must first be changed at the bottom.

"What is the *pao-chia* system? It is a very good method for the officials to keep the people under control, but what we need is a method for the people to control the officials. *Pao-chia* originated in the Ch'in Dynasty, when the empire was being subdued. By the time of the Sung and the T'ang Dynasties the people were satisfied under their Chinese rulers and *pao-chia* was unnecessary and was discontinued. Then the Mongols conquered China and they restored the *pao-chia* system to hold the people in subjection. Afterwards the Chinese recovered, and overthrew the Mongols and the Ming Dynasty was founded; the *pao-chia* system was again abolished. Who restored it? Once more it was a foreign conqueror—the Manchus. We finally abolished it after the revolution in 1911, as it was considered unfit for a free people.

"Yet now it appears once more. First the Japanese brought it back again in Manchuria, to terrorize the people. Then even Nanking adopted it, when it was found useful in fighting the Communists.¹ Today we no longer have civil war, yet this system still applies. Is it right that our Government should be unable to find any better method for winning public support than the same one the Japanese use in the occupied areas?

"Actually *pao-chia* is against all humanity. How can nine families be held responsible for a crime committed by a member of the

¹ It was restored by the Generalissimo in 1933 on the advice of General Yang Yung-tai, then leader of the Political Science Group, as a means of destroying the Soviet system in Kiangsi.

tenth family? How can you punish me for something you know I did not do? The head of the *pao* is nearly always a fellow selected by the gentry. If the gentry want a family accused, the *pao-chang* can write out an order against him. If they want a family excused from conscription, after the payment of a bribe, they can also get the head of the *pao-chia* to arrange it."

So much for *pao-chia*, and Ningfu and the observations of its model magistrate. Let us now examine one existing alternative to the system—the Border Districts formerly known as Soviet China.

EXPERIMENT IN DEMOCRACY

The Chinese Communists will become the bedrock of Chinese democracy.

LIN YUTANG.

SEMANTICS, as Stuart Chase has demonstrated, are one of the modern black arts, and the capacity of people to deceive themselves and each other with words is wonderful to behold. Why, for example, the decision of the Chinese Soviet Republic to exchange the imported word "Su-wei-ai", which in the original Russian "Soviet" simply means "council", in favour of the Chinese word "tsan-yi-hui", which also means "council", should have convinced many people that everything had completely changed, and that the Chinese had satisfactorily "betrayed Marxism", is not at once comprehensible.

Nevertheless, this renaming process had remarkable results. Even missionaries who formerly saw nothing but evil in the Reds now returned from brief visits to the ex-Soviets singing the praises of the "liberals" of Yenan, who had overnight "abandoned Communism in favour of democracy". The Communists had written and preached till they were black in the face to prove that the Chinese Soviet was *not* Communism, but a stage in the democratic revolution; as long as they clung to the word, however, few doubted that they were agents of the devil.

Life under the old Soviets in North-west China seemed to me to differ mainly in nomenclature from life under the Border Region Government. All the social reforms remained. The mass organizations were there under new names; and a representative form of government, formerly called "su-wei-ai", and now called "tsan-yi-hui", was essentially the same. Opium had been thoroughly suppressed; there were no beggars, gangsters or prostitutes. The land reform had been upheld; farmers who had shared in the equalization of land were confirmed in their ownership. But additional land redistribution was suspended, and in areas where landlords had not been fully expropriated they were allowed to retain possession, except in the case of absentees.

The decision to abolish the Soviets was made in the spring of 1937, after the cessation of civil war, by a congress of Soviet delegates before which the "needs of the united front" were debated. There followed a period of six months of intensive propaganda led by the Communist Party and the Red Army, in which members of all popular organizations, the Young Vanguards, the anti-Japanese societies, the co-operatives, school teachers, even the Children's Brigades, took part. Discussion and debate were held throughout the local Soviets before a common decision was secured, and a nomen-

clature was adopted to conform to the terms of the Red Army's agreement with the Generalissimo.

The new election law was based on certain enactments which had been adopted by Nanking years before, but never enforced, and the dormant "Outline for Reconstruction" of the National Government. These provided for local self-government to be established if any when provincial officials discovered that the people of the borough had demonstrated the ability to govern themselves.¹ However, no such discoveries were made, since the provincial bureaucracy invariably proved unwilling to eliminate itself. The Soviet Government was thus the first to concede that its villages had demonstrated the required self-governing ability.

Suffrage rights were modified in several respects. The legal age was raised from sixteen to twenty and suffrage was made universal and equal, in the new law, regardless of sex or class. Many landlords, who had fled during the civil war, now returned to their homes, where they received new land as tillers; and these men were accorded equal suffrage, including the right to hold office. Merchants and small capitalists were also permitted to take equal part in political life. In the Soviets the key to political initiative lay with the revolutionary committees in the village, borough and district. These were now superseded by election committees, which led the work of instruction and election preparation before the village met, *en masse*—the *pao-chia* system had of course been abolished—to elect delegates to the borough nominating congress.

In the Soviets the poor peasants and workers had larger representation than others, but under the new law an equality of voting power was established and the elections became wholly direct and popular. As in the Soviets, all the armed forces, regular troops, militiamen and police formed part of the electorate, though they were naturally ineligible for public office while on active duty. It was provided that a group of villages known as the *ch'ü* (which I have unsatisfactorily translated as "borough") should be entitled to elect one delegate-representative for every thirty inhabitants. This borough council then elected the *hsien* or district council, which had the power to elect its own direct executive council, headed by a popularly chosen magistrate. The *hsien* council consisted of one delegate for every 700 people. It had the right and obligation to elect delegate-representatives to the central or Border Region Council, one member for every 5,000 inhabitants. This Border Region Council elected the Border Region Executive Council, which itself formed the Border Region Government.

The law provided for semi-annual election of the borough councils and annual election of the *hsien* and Border Region councils. Elections for borough and *hsien* councils first took place in October and November, 1937, when the self-governing executive committees

¹ Cf. N. C. Shen, "The Local Government of China", in *The Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, Vol. XX, No. 2, for a discussion of the legal foundations for initiating self-government, prior to the Chungking period.

replaced the Soviets. It was claimed that 80 per cent of the voting population went to the polls—a high percentage compared even with advanced democratic countries. Soon afterwards delegates were elected to the Border Region Council, but because of delays in some *hsien* it was not possible to convene the Council for several months. Then it was discovered that half the elected representatives had already gone to the front! A second election was held and the vacant posts filled. Early in January, 1939, the Border Region Council met at Yen-an and elected the First Executive Council, to which the former regime transferred the governing power.

From all I could gather during my trip, the elections were held without coercion, though they had of course been preceded by months of propaganda carried on by Communists or pro-Communist organizations. "Generally", says the official report of the First Executive Council,¹ "from 80 per cent to 90 per cent of the population participated in the election. Even small feet (women with bound feet) and old ladies felt that they must take part," and hobbled over long distances to cast their vote. The report indignantly takes note of suspicion that the voting privilege would not really be extended to the "remnant landlords". "It was said that this law was only nominal and a deceptive mask, while the so-called democratic system was in reality a worker-peasant dictatorship." There follows a table of electoral statistics to show that the landlord-merchant vote amounted to 6 per cent of the total poll, and thus about coincided with their actual numerical strength. Obviously it did them little good, however, for the same report states that 97 per cent of the delegates elected to the self-governing councils were workers and peasants. About half of them were Communist Party members.

The Border Region Executive Council consisted of thirteen members, and had as its first chairman the veteran revolutionary, Lin Pai-chu, an old comrade of Sun Yat-sen, and one of the founders of the Kuomintang. In the latter Lin Pai-chu held a number of high posts, and after Dr. Sun's death he was one of half a dozen elders in the inner circle of the party, until 1927, when he denounced the Generalissimo, and was expelled. He then fled to Kiangsi, where he joined the Red Army. When I first met him, in Shensi, in 1936, he had, at the age of fifty-two, just completed the Long March. A handsome white-haired old gentleman, erect and spry, with a pair of twinkling black eyes, Lin looked more like a supreme court justice than a bolshevik, and was a walking encyclopædia of Chinese political history, and seemed more widely venerated in the Red Utopia than anybody but Chu Teh. Recently he was reinstated as a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, so that he is now a member of both the Communist and Kuomintang parties!

Forty-two miscellaneous taxes collected under former regimes had been abolished, and the Border Government drew its main revenues from an export tax on salt and wool and hides, and from

¹ "The First Executive Council", *Chieh Fang*, April 4, 1939, Yen-an.

some State-owned industries. No land tax had been collected for three years. Instead, farmers were required to make a minimum contribution to what was called a National Salvation and Public Food Consumption assessment. From this all Government officials and employees received an allowance of a pound and a half of cereals daily. The rate of contribution actually amounted to about one-third of the former land tax. The whole quota was voluntarily brought in by the farmers within one month after the appeal, and in 1939 the contribution exceeded the minimum requested by over 50 per cent.

Almost unbelievably small were the sums required to maintain an administrative system of this kind, geared to the low money income of the country people and their simple needs. Executive officers in the *hsien* governments were paid only \$5 a month, plus their allowance for cereals and 4 cents daily for vegetables. This was, of course, in most cases augmented by food grown communally and by income from crop sales. Expenses incurred in travelling and on other special duties were either met by funds raised by the local government or were paid by the Border Council, depending on their nature.

It was a truism throughout China that nowhere had mobilization of fighting power and labour power been so effective as in the first Border Region. How was it attained? Chiefly, of course, through the unique system of self-governing councils and their mass organizations, seeking to embrace the whole population in the war effort. Response was no doubt stimulated by the imminence of direct invasion, for the Japanese were just across the Yellow River. Frequently they made sorties into Northern Shensi, and every *hsien* city in the region had been bombed, so that the free farmers now readily understood the necessity for sacrifices if they and their families were not to lose their newly won rights.

Basic mass organizations were the Self-Defence Armies, the Young Vanguard and the Cultivation Corps. Self-Defence Armies, successors to the Red Guards, existed in every village and included many able-bodied (and able-footed!) women as well as men. Nearly all youths from eleven to seventeen were in the Young Vanguard, where they received military training from regular army commanders and were given semi-military tasks to perform. Most of them volunteered for the regular army on attaining the age of eighteen, while many of their leaders entered the training-schools for political and military commanders. In the Yen-an garrison area alone, with a population of a little more than 1,000,000, Self-Defence units and Young Vanguard had a combined membership of more than 250,000.

Then there were several different *yun-tung*, or movements, in which farmers and farming families participated. Thousands of youths had been drawn from production for enlistment in the front armies, and all available labour had to be mobilized to maintain and to increase production. To meet the emergency an Autumn Harvest and Spring Planting Movement was organized all through the Border Region, growing to some extent out of the former Saturday Brigades and the Red Army Land Tillers. All students, teachers, public

officials, political workers and garrisoned soldiers took part in this cultivation and harvesting work. Some public institutions, such as the military and political academies, grew all their own grain, and so lightened as much as possible the labour burden placed on the farmers.

Co-operative cultivation emphasized the working of land owned by families who sent sons to the war. Under the direction of village and borough councils all farmers were mobilized, farm women and children included, in brigades which collectively tilled and harvested crops on farms suffering from a labour shortage. Thousands of refugees from Shansi and Honan, many of them *Balu Chün Chia* or Eighth Route Army Families, entering the Border Region, were given plots from the former Red Army Land, and with the help of the cultivation corps were put at once into production work. There were no depressing refugee concentration camps in the Border Region, but land and work for every able-bodied person. Through these intensive efforts not only was former production maintained, but thousands of acres of wasteland were reclaimed, much of it high up on hillsides formerly never cultivated.

One of the most striking achievements of the Border Region was the intimate connection established between the people and the fighting forces. The people were constantly reminded of their debt to the defenders, and families with sons or daughters at the front received many little courtesies which are so much prized in village life. Besides being helped by cultivation brigades, soldiers' families were exempted from all grain contributions and were privileged to buy supplies from the co-operatives at cost price. In the theatres and at meetings they were entitled to the best seats such as elsewhere are reserved for the gentry. Disabled veterans themselves were given a small cash honorarium and allotted a piece of land by the Executive Council.

"Small feet" and young girls, organized in knitting groups, made comforts for the village boys at the front; in 1939, for example, they sent over 100,000 pairs of gloves and woollen socks to the Eighth Route Army. Young Vanguards devised ways and means of raising contributions, and many stories were told of the ingenious methods adopted by different families to scrape together a few cents for the purpose. One lass climbed every day high up into the mountains to gather firewood to sell for a few coppers. In another place the poorest man in the village dug up his savings, a couple of hundred copper coins, and gave them to the cause. A coal peddler volunteered to work an hour or two overtime every day to earn a few *cash* for the boys at the front. School children saved their water-melon seeds (considered a great delicacy by the Chinese for some reason obscure to all foreigners) to be distributed as comforts. And so on. In six rather poor *hsien* over \$850 was raised in one year for comforts for the soldiers and their families.

Of course all this must sound elementary to people used to civilian co-operation with the military in advanced countries; but it is something new in the Chinese tradition. The idea that the civilian

owes anything to his armed defenders, and especially to any "useless fellow" who crawls back from the front with an arm or a leg missing, is quite recent except among the Reds, who early recognized the importance of enforcing respect and honour for the revolutionary fighter, I suppose because they soon learned its value in strengthening their only "base"—the poor. Mme. Sun Yat-sen, who has done so much to awaken the nation to this responsibility, expressed what was to many a new conception, in declaring, "When a man has spent his life in the service of his country and returns crippled it is the obligation of the State to care for him."

Even today this truism is taken far too lightly in most places, and the Government itself is backward in this duty. Looking over the report of the National Relief Commission for 1939, for example, I was quite astounded to note that out of a total of \$1,485,000 popularly contributed for various projects only \$1,807 was raised for the comfort of wounded soldiers. Much has been done on a local scale and by different refugee organizations, and particularly by the Red Cross, with and without Government aid ; but it was not till 1940, when Mmes. Chiang and Sun founded the Friends of the Wounded Soldiers, that a movement was launched throughout the country to elevate the dignity of the disabled man to that of a hero deserving lasting honour and the gratitude of his countrymen.

Another reason why people in the Border Region gave more freely seemed to be because of public confidence that their money was honestly spent. Certainly they did not have to worry about its being used for self-enrichment by crafty officials, or for speculation on the foreign exchange market, or to buy new concubines. There were no millionaires to make graft out of the munitions racket or gentry to exploit the labour of refugees and crippled soldiers in the local war industries, as was the case elsewhere. These organized farmers knew how much money was paid into their local government, and their delegates could demand audited accounts from their councilmen. Embezzlement was not unknown, of course ; but scamps who made money out of the toil of honest folk were not honoured. Indeed, after exposure, several of them lost their heads as traitors, by popular request.

Under such conditions, one could think of several distinguished gentry who would not find life healthy in the ancient hills and the "bandit lair" of upper Shensi.

GUERRILLA INDUSTRY

The outcome of the war will be decided more by economic than by military strength.

GENERAL PAI TSUNG-HSI.

THE money Americans spend on butter every year would equip and maintain all the armies of China. If only one out of ten Chinese drank as much coffee as the average American consumes, the cost of that import alone might bankrupt China in one year of war.

But here the guns-or-butter dilemma signified very little. If you offered the average Chinese farmer or worker his choice of a rifle or a hundreds pounds of butter, he would unhesitatingly take the rifle and conclude that you were simple-minded. Nor could you tempt him away from the rifle with value equivalents in coffee, milk, cream, cheese, chocolate, beer, beefsteaks or other items the total lack of which suggests extreme hardship or even the conditions of mass revolt to Western political economists. These things meant nothing in the lives of the majority of the Chinese, who had never acquired a taste for them. And in fact they are not as "essential" even in Western diet as is widely supposed, as I discovered when perforce I had to live without them for months myself.

China's economic strength at war lay in two things: this simplicity of her consumer demands and the country's relatively high potential self-sufficiency in meeting them. Preserving the economic basis of resistance meant maintaining agricultural production to feed the armies and civilians; and secondly it meant (in addition, of course, to adequate munitions) the maintenance of industry sufficient to supply the population with the few manufactured articles considered really indispensable.

It was this second problem, the support of the rural market, which presented a major economic difficulty to the Border Regions, just as it had to the Soviets during the civil war. Lack of native industries in the backward hinterland impoverished the market, opened it up to Japanese economic exploitation and threatened the basis of the morale of guerrilla war. Japan's military offensives could be repulsed; her economic offensives were more subtle and hard to combat. If Japan continued to flood the villages with her goods, and to extract raw materials from them in exchange, this economic immobilization would, most guerrilla leaders admitted, eventually be followed by military immobilization.

Large quantities of raw materials were moving from behind Chinese lines into urban markets controlled by Japan—materials such as cotton, wool, vegetable oil, iron and coal. Filtering back from the cities came cheap Japanese manufactures. It was true not only

in all the front-line provinces held by the Central Army, where many officials openly engaged in the smuggling trade, but even in certain guerrilla areas defended by Communist troops, who found it extremely difficult, in practice, to enforce a complete trade embargo against the occupied cities. The Reds knew from experience that a Chinese farmer will go on making sacrifices as long as he can buy, in exchange for his labour production, necessities such as cloth, shoes, tobacco, medicine, fuel, towels, soap, vegetable oil and agricultural implements. But when the market is empty of these for long periods, his morale breaks, he concludes resistance is futile, he loses hope and the revolutionary army loses its only "base".

Not long ago Mêng Yung-cheng, inspector of front-line units of Chinese Industrial Co-operatives, wrote to me from beyond the Yellow River, in Shan-tang:

South-east Shansi is one of the most vital war areas in all China and the tremendous concentration of troops here has put a terrible strain on local resources. It is our job to relieve the strain and help materially in fighting the war. If we can support the armies in their everyday needs for cloth, shoes, paper, ink, candles, flour, uniforms,¹ blankets and so on, we shall not only be helping them and replacing Japanese trade that has grown to quite serious proportions, but shall also be helping the stricken peasants of the province, whose standard of living has been sadly affected by the shortage of these commodities and the rise in prices.

If resistance were to give out in the guerrilla areas there is no doubt China would lose the war. It is clear that C.I.C.'s task in these areas is not merely to set up co-operatives but to combat Japanese economic penetration and to help the army and guerrilla forces to attain economic self-sufficiency. One of the characteristics of Japanese "mopping up" movements in Shansi since last July (1939) is that wherever they go they try systematically to destroy every kind of means of production, even the most primitive, such as spinning wheels. At the same time they try to dump certain kinds of goods and blockade the importation of others. They seek to undermine resistance from the bottom; they want to break our strength and morale through economic methods. And for want of any alternative source of goods, Japan's economic offensive in Shansi is showing good signs of success.

Red leaders pointed to another fact little understood abroad, and generally ignored in China: that the largest numbers of refugees and unemployed were not in the rear or in West China, but in the villages of the occupied areas, near cities held by the Japanese. In 1939 a new phenomenon developed. A steady stream of migrants began pouring back into the region of their former homes. The great floods in Hopei, Shantung, and Shansi inundated hundreds of villages and placed on the guerrilla regimes a tremendous burden of tens of thousands of destitute men and women. The situation required heroic efforts to restore production in the advance war areas, in order to provide a livelihood for the huge surplus labour power which otherwise inevitably drifted towards the cities to seek work in Japanese-held factories, or was pressed into puppet armies.

Meanwhile, all through the Border Regions valuable natural resources lay idle, such as anthracite and coking coal, iron, sulphur,

¹ Before Indusco entered the North-west, many of the Chinese armies were forced to buy Japanese cloth, made from Chinese cotton and wool, for their own uniforms!

salt and soda. Millions of bales of cotton were drawn into Japanese markets because of the collapse of local Chinese demand and difficulties of transportation to the rear, and in the case of the short-staple cotton of Hopei and Hupeh this was a material of military value to the enemy. Some of this crop could and would be suppressed by the new people's Border Governments; but farmers needed a subsidy to make crop changes, and army and civilian industry was needed to absorb all local raw materials and maintain a market in the free villages.

To control and manage crops, to create industry and jobs, required capital—in guerrilla areas, as anywhere else. And capital was just what these guerrilla bases did not have. Local capital had fled to the treaty ports or to the rear, and Government and banking capital had retreated with the Kuomintang to the far West. Perhaps I have not anywhere sufficiently emphasized the basic short-sightedness of Government war economic planning in this respect. Officially, there was much talk about the imminent counter-offensive and struggle for the occupied areas. But in practice Government economic measures, which give us the true judgment of intentions, extended virtually no aid in the re-financing of production in the guerrilla areas, where the armed forces and civilians were fighting against terrible odds in an effort to deny to the invader the economic control of his conquest.

Ten times more Government money was sunk in the one province of Szechuan (the most backward and reactionary, hence the most amenable to techniques of the bureaucracy) to finance agricultural and industrial production than in all the guerrilla bases combined. The Military Council went on making claims of "developing a new front in the enemy's rear". Economically they did little to make it possible; they wrote off these areas as lost. In 1940 the Government announced a plan to increase agricultural credit loans by a sum of \$400 million—of which not two per cent was made available to the front-line areas!

For the guerrilla-controlled parts of seven provinces, which were economically and militarily the focal point of the war, there was no banking capital available. Nowhere, therefore, was the Indusco movement given a warmer welcome than among guerrilla leaders, who daily saw the direct efforts of Japanese economic warfare, which in remote Szechuan either were but vaguely realized, or which, as one official put it to me, will "anyway keep the Reds from getting too strong!"

It was the Soviets who had first demonstrated the practicability of small-scale co-operative industry in war-time economy. In Kiangsi the Soviets operated their own spinning and weaving plants, machine-shops and other small co-operative industries, the first ever established in China. These produced sufficient manufactured goods to supply many simple needs, and were an important factor in maintaining economic solvency. After the main Red Army entered the North-west the same kind of economy was introduced. Consumer,

production, marketing and credit co-operatives were organized throughout the territory when I first visited here in 1936.

With the abolition of the Soviets, a co-operative congress was summoned in Yen-an, which adopted a new set of Administrative Principles. Existing co-operatives were reorganized to conform to Co-operative Laws and Regulations promulgated by the National Government, but with "consideration given to the special situation in the Border Region".¹ Credit and marketing co-operatives were consolidated. Producers' and consumers' co-ops became the two main types, and each was authorized to conduct virtually any kind of business—production, credit and retail and wholesale marketing and purchasing. Basic capital was supplied by the co-operative members, and the Border Region Bank was also entitled to membership. The co-ops were authorized to negotiate loans, through the Construction Bureau of the Border Government, "from the various great domestic banks". In practice, as remarked, the latter exhibited no enthusiasm for financing any industry in the guerrilla areas, and capital suppliers were confined to impoverished villagers of the North.

Despite the paucity of capital and capital goods, Border Region co-operatives were a true popular government, with a membership representing over 100,000 families. Producers' co-operatives alone had 28,326 members in 1939, or more than the combined membership of all existing C.I.C. units in China at that time. The extremely low cost of membership aimed not only to mobilize all possible free capital and labour productive power, but also to organize village life around the co-operative as a central economic force. Many of the producers' co-operatives represented the savings and the surplus labour power of one or more entire villages mobilized for production.

Of the producers' co-operatives, 114 were engaged in cotton-spinning. Many villages were so poor that they could jointly purchase only two or three spinning-wheels. These were passed from house to house, each part-owner working a certain number of hours at home. The greater part of the co-operatives' capital was invested in oil-pressing, salt-refining and weaving plants, and in flour-milling, charcoal, bean-curd and porcelain and pottery co-operatives.

Yen-an presented an urgent challenge to Chinese Industrial Co-operatives, which from the beginning recognized the development of war-area production as its major task. Here were thousands of people already organized and educated in co-operative production, lacking only capital and machinery with which to exploit local raw materials.

A start was made early in 1939, when an organizer went to Yen-an and established the first "front-line" Indusco depot, with a small initial loan from the Paochi headquarters. Political opposition to this extension to the Northern war areas developed at Chungking,

¹ Cf. "Development of Co-operatives in the Border Region", and "Administrative Principles of Co-operative Enterprise in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region", pamphlets published at Yen-an, 1939, for detailed description of co-operatives in the Border Regions.

however, and compelled the C.I.C. Administration to desert its Yen-an depot for some months. Every unit there would have collapsed had they not been "adopted" by the local co-operatives and the Border Government Bank. The latter, an amazing institution, whose capital consisted chiefly of savings and contributions of students, soldiers and the people, made the C.I.C. depot a loan (of about a fourth of its total assets!) to see it through its difficulties.

When I arrived in Yen-an the largest of the then fifteen Indusco factories was a clothing co-operative, which every month turned out 13,500 uniforms. There was a chemical co-operative making soap, tooth-powder, chalk, ink, medicines, alcohol and soda. Other units manufactured metalware, oil lamps, shoes and stockings, paper, agricultural tools, gauze, bandages, leather goods, fur coats and leggings. A spinning and weaving co-op had a monthly production of 14,740 yards of cotton cloth.¹

Here the industrial co-operatives were able to draw upon the technical help of a local Academy of Natural Sciences, established by the Border Government. Headed by Dr. Chen Kai-pai, a scientist trained in Germany, and formerly a research expert with the China Foundation, it included about eighty technicians. A fourth of the latter was engaged in survey and research work, while others were attached to schools, industries, co-operatives and various industrial organizations in the Border Regions—some behind the Japanese lines in Shansi and Hopei. Chao Yifeng, formerly with the National Economic Council and an industrial research worker, was loaned to Indusco as a technical director.

C.I.C. personnel in Yen-an voluntarily agreed to accept the same living scale as prevailed in other institutions under the Border Government. Staff members, regardless of their training, then received a maximum wage of \$5 a month, or considerably less than many skilled workers in the co-op industries themselves.

Efforts were made to introduce Chungking to permit the C.I.C. to back up its orphaned depot at Yen-an and to extend Indusco activity to the Shansi-Hopei-Chahar Border Region, far behind enemy lines. In 1939 the producers' co-operatives met at Yen-an and voted to abandon all the special features of their own constitution.¹ Then they adopted in its entirety the constitution of the Chinese Industrial Co-operatives, with whom they sought to merge. It was hoped, I was told, that this gesture would stimulate industrial co-operation throughout the country, serve to remove suspicions at Chungking and demonstrate the Communists' sincere welcome for any united-front organization. Results were disappointing; Chungking politicians continued to oppose the spread of C.I.C. to the guerrilla districts, despite its obvious value in attaining "economic unification" of the country.

Ironically enough, it was not at Chungking that the importance of maintaining Chinese production in the occupied areas was first recognized, but among patriotic overseas Chinese. Over Ch. \$400,000

¹ *Ibid.*

¹ *Ibid.*

was raised by Chinese in Java and the Philippines for the establishment of an International Centre for C.I.C. at Yen-an and in Shansi and Hopei. In fact, virtually the entire work of Indusco in guerrilla territories defended by the New Fourth Army in the South and the Eighth Route Army in the North was financed by special gifts and capital raised by overseas Chinese, and by Americans opposed to Japanese conquest of Eastern China.

Such sums were pitiful compared to actual military and civilian needs, but they were far from inconsequential. Elsewhere in China it was reckoned that seven American dollars would finance a worker in Indusco production; in the Border Regions half that sum was sufficient. Elsewhere the rate of capital turnover in C.I.C. light units, in terms of production value, ranged from twelve to fifteen times a year. In Shensi and Shansi, owing to unbelievably low overhead and marketing costs, and to other special factors, annual production value averaged considerably higher.¹

Even with the small capital available, the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region attained a certain degree of industrial self-sufficiency. In October, 1940, there were already over eighty industrial co-operatives in the area, in addition to the old producers' co-operatives, and these included iron- and coal-mines and an iron-works, machine-shops, drug factories, transport units, two small oil-wells and—a sporting-goods factory to supply the schools and the athletes of the Eighth Route Army. Yen-an had hopes of becoming the "guerrilla industrial base" for much of North China.

The pity of it was that a couple of million American dollars (say Ch. \$40 million) invested in machine-shops and "semi-mobile" industries throughout the Northern guerrilla areas might have effectively frustrated Japan's plans for economic exploitation of the Eastern hinterland. That industry, with an annual production of half a billion dollars' worth of commodity necessities, could have brought economic security, fortified civilian livelihood and morale, and made the defending armies virtually self-sufficient in secondary war supplies—explosives, rifles, grenades, bayonets and individual equipment.

Unfortunately the importance of this was not understood even among those few key officials, politicians and bankers whose patriotism might have overcome their political prejudices. Indusco was one organization whose leaders did understand it. They were consequently charged with "Communism" for urging the extension of industry to the guerrilla districts, and many technicians and organizers were thrown into jail by over-zealous nitwits. Meanwhile, Chungking's great minds apparently saw nothing wrong, for example, with the practice of shipping handgrenades from Szechuan across hundreds of miles to the iron and sulphur regions of Shansi, where they could be produced locally for a quarter of the transportation costs alone. They criticized the Eighth Route Army for poor

¹ Cf. Monthly Production Report, Yen-an Depot, C.I.C., Sept., 1939, which indicates a production value of 25.2 times invested capital!

demolition work, but would supply them with no high explosives—and were horrified when Yenian technicians wanted to buy a sulphuric-acid plant at Sian to make explosives of their own. Periodic blockades were imposed against the Border Regions, and exportation of machinery into them was frequently forbidden. It was often found less troublesome to raid Japanese-held towns just to get tools or machines than to buy them in the Kuomintang areas.

At last in 1940 the C.I.C. managed to secure limited Government sanction for extending its activity east of the Yellow River, and Indusco set up a new headquarters exclusively to develop production in the Northern guerrilla areas. Many units are now operating in Shansi and Hopei, and hundreds are planned or already organized, awaiting only the release of capital, still blocked by the Kuomintang.

XXIII

THE EIGHTH ROUTE ARMY

*Chu Teh¹ has the kindness of a
Robert E. Lee, the tenacity of a
Grant and the humility of a Lincoln.*

MAJOR EVANS F. CARLSON.

OTHER armies of China were better drilled, better fed and far better equipped than the Eighth Route. Miracles were expected only of the latter. Other armies might be defeated and destroyed without public morale and confidence being severely shaken. But if the Japanese were really to exterminate the Eighth Route Army, millions of Chinese might lose hope of final victory. Somehow it had become a heroic legend that symbolized, in the record of its ten thousand battles, those fighting qualities which every people at war must believe it possesses: endurance, ingenuity, courage, genius of command, tenacity and, perhaps above all, invincibility of spirit.

What were the secrets of this unique military organization?

The most important thing about it, more significant than its military tactics or the skill of its veteran leaders, undoubtedly lay in its very high degree of revolutionary consciousness. In this respect I found no fundamental difference between the Eighth Route Army of today and the Red Army of yesterday. When the old warriors took the red star from their caps, as part of the united-front agreement, they did not discard it. Many of them pinned it to their tunics, just inside their left breast pockets.

We have already seen, in the case of the New Fourth Army, something of the role of political indoctrination in the training of Communist troops, and its value in fortifying morale and discipline. Leaders said that 40 per cent of all instruction given in the Eighth Route Army was political in nature and only 60 per cent was military. From bottom to top, every unit had a political as well as a military leader, and the former began work where the latter left off. Command during combat was exclusively in the hands of the military leader, but in other matters the two functioned as a team.

Every unit, from the company to the division, had its elected soldiers' committees to co-operate with the political leaders and carry on the group's wide range of extra-military activity, such as character study (reading and writing), cultural clubs, games and songs, propaganda work among the civilian population and enforcement of the "eight disciplinary rules". The latter were, with some alterations in wording, the same in the *Balu Chün* (the Eighth Route Army) as they had been in the Red Army, and aimed chiefly to

¹ Commander of all the Communist troops, and C.-in-C. of the former Red Army. For an American military observer's estimate of, Major E. F. Carlson, *Twin Stars of China*, N.Y., 1940.

establish friendly relations with the people. Red soldiers sing them on the march :

- (1) Secure the owner's permission before entering a house and see that all is well, before you leave it;
- (2) Keep the house clean;
- (3) Be courteous and helpful to the people;
- (4) Return all borrowed articles;
- (5) Replace all damaged goods;
- (6) Be honest, pay for everything you buy, at market price;
- (7) Be sanitary—dig latrines a safe distance from people's homes;
- (8) Do not kill or rob the captives.

In this army the recruit's education began when he enlisted, and never stopped. I suppose no army in the world was so keen on self-improvement. It was a fact, too, that the lowliest "coolie" could become a commander if he demonstrated ability and intelligence. Hundreds were regularly chosen, from the rank and file, to be trained in the political and military academies which turned out some 10,000 new officers annually. I personally met several men from the peasant and working class who had risen from the west rank to become regimental and brigade commanders.

The incentive to promotion was certainly not momentary compensation, however, since officers and men lived alike, and their truly beloved Commander-in-Chief, Chu Teh, himself drew the handsome wage of \$5 a month. Rather it lay in the desire to distinguish oneself in the common cause of a fellowship which, to such an unusual degree, this army provided. Many methods were adopted to stimulate the competitive spirit between individuals and groups, and men who showed progress were honoured in small but important ways. "Old boys" kept after the new recruits, striving to awaken their understanding, self-respect and sense of responsibility. For example, I once travelled for several weeks with a young officer in a transport brigade, who had joined the Reds as a "little devil", years earlier. Along the road or at night, I often overheard him lecturing one man after another about the necessity to improve his work and about the "opportunities for advancement". It struck me as odd, because this lad was obviously no better off, materially, than any of his listeners, but they seemed to attach no importance to the fact. I never heard one of them even mention it.

The high political élan was very necessary, for several practical reasons. First, the army was made up entirely of volunteers ; with the New Fourth it was, as far as I know, the only army in the country which did not have conscripts or impressed men in service. Secondly, it was almost entirely dependent on popular support for survival, and this support was conditioned by the treatment it gave the people. Thirdly the Eighth Route troops were the most poorly paid in the country. When men die for nothing per month they must be convinced of a very great mission and have implicit faith and confidence in their leaders.

Elsewhere "mobilization of the people" was confined to conscription and other compulsory measures imposed from above—which may be quite all right in a democratic country but are another matter in an autocracy against which the masses have but recently been in

revolt. In the Northern guerrilla districts, where the Japanese were forever seeking a political foothold, it was necessary to secure *total* mobilization by arousing voluntary enthusiasm and vigilance in all quarters. Everywhere the peasants and workers, led by the political corps, were organized into militant unions; among all elements of the population anti-Japanese societies were formed. From these organizations local leaders emerged; and with their help every village set up its own mobilization committee, its self-defence corps and its partisan detachment. These many peripheral and semi-military groups were the protective screen behind which the Eighth Route Army operated, and from which it constantly renewed its strength, drawing in eager and patriotic youths as they reached the standard required.

All the political propaganda would have been meaningless for the canny Chinese peasants, of course, had the Eighth Route not lived up to its promises, and had its arrival not brought an improvement in the lot of the people. By 1940 self-government had already become a reality throughout most of the villages in the Shansi-Hopei-Chahar Border Region. Representative councils had been elected in the *ch'ü*, and district magistrates were elected by district peoples' councils. The Shansi-Hopei-Chahar Border Government itself was responsible to an elected advisory council, while over 80 per cent of the newly elected magistrates were non-party men and natives of the locality.

"Because the masses are interested only in the practical solution of their problems of livelihood," Peng Teh-huai, field commander of all the Communist troops once told me, "it is possible to develop partisan warfare only by the immediate satisfaction of their most urgent demands."

Economically, the new regime brought prompt relief to a peasantry almost bankrupted by excessive debt and taxes. Under the slogan of "equalization of the burden of resistance" a moratorium was declared on all pre-war debts and interest. Land rent was reduced from 25 to 50 per cent. Miscellaneous taxes were abolished, to be replaced by a single income tax, collected on a graduated scale, but in no case to exceed 35 per cent. Land of absentee landlords, who had fled to the occupied cities, was apportioned among landless peasants; but the ownership of landlords who remained (and some did, taking active part in the political and military life) was in no way disturbed.

Co-operatives were encouraged among both farmers and handicraft workers. Even before the C.I.C. entered the Border Regions, the local government had developed producers' co-operatives with the help of the war-economy corps of the Eighth Route Army. Prof. R. Lindsay, of Yenching University, who travelled through Hopei and Eastern Shansi late in 1939, told me there were 559 producers' co-operatives in that area, operating their shops mostly with hand power. The "scorched earth" policy has been improved. When under Japanese attack Chinese forces temporarily withdraw from a town, industry now goes with them. Organized in compact units,

the mobile guerrilla factories can all move their machines and workers to safety within a few hours.

Up in a Shansi town behind the Japanese lines there is a printing plant, lately converted into an industrial co-operative, with the help of loan funds raised abroad. Most of the 600 printers are young men who can shoot as well as set type. That plant prints, among other things, 30,000 copies of a daily newspaper which circulates among Eighth Route Army organizations. Recently the Japanese invaded the area on a "mopping-up" expedition. The whole plant (I got the story from Mêng Yungcheng, who was there) was moved by the workers in a single night—and the next day's paper came out on time!

As in Shensi, efforts were made to increase agricultural production, irrigation works were repaired and crop control was enforced, to prevent the Japanese from getting cotton and other products which they could sell for foreign exchange. In general, and as rapidly as people could be educated to support them, economic, social and political changes followed the pattern which inherited much from the old Soviets.

Thus, by the middle of 1940, millions of peasants in the North China countryside had been organized, indoctrinated with revolutionary ideas for the first time and had attained some measure of political and economic emancipation. They now constituted, for Chinese resistance, a human bulwark far more subtle and elastic than many miles of earthworks and trenches and one which neatly accommodated itself to tactical needs of the mobile Eighth Route Army. They were the healthy corpuscles that China had mobilized to fight off the malignant invasion of fascism. It was, incidentally, when a young Communist commander used that metaphor in talking to me that I first understood why the Chinese always preferred to speak of "resistance" against Japan, rather than of "war".

"As far as China is concerned," he said, "Japanese imperialism is a contagious disease, and our people mobilizing are just like good blood cells in a man's body resisting the invading germs, as intended by nature." Then he added, chuckling, "And the difference between us and the Kuomintang is that we think it is a *deadly* disease, and our blood cells need the help of scientific medicine, while the Kuomintang thinks our medicine is too revolutionary and worse than the disease!" Which, now that I think of it, is almost exactly the way Chen Li-fu put the case to me from the Kuomintang viewpoint.

In any event, the dosage of the medicine, whether scientific or otherwise, had greatly increased in potency since the Eighth Route Army first entered the blood stream of Shansi and Hopei, in 1937. Originally only about 55,000¹ Red Army veterans marched across the Yellow River. Today the Japanese command estimates the "Communist-bandits" in North China at 250,000 rifles, and foreign military observers put the figure as low as 100,000 and as high as

¹ 15,000 remained in Northern Shensi.

300,000. My own rough estimate, based on conversations with various Eighth Route Army staff commanders, on personal observation and on estimates made by the few observers qualified to give a judgment on the matter, is that the Eighth Route *regulars* numbered towards the end of 1940 approximately 260,000 men with a rifle-power of about 170,000.

No small achievement: a 350 per cent increase in rifle-power, in the midst of war, and without Government replenishment. How was it accomplished? The sources of the increased fire-power included rifles captured from Japanese and puppet troops, bandits disarmed and rifles contributed from the people or purchased from dealers. About 30,000 rifles were added to the Eighth Route strength through the acquisition of arms left in the Taiyuan arsenal when Yen Hsi-shan retreated. These were broken out and given to self-defence corps and the Shansi Youth Salvation Association, which later became the Shansi New Army and is now incorporated under the Eighth Route command. Some 40,000 new rifles were acquired through the re-training and enlistment of deserters, stragglers and remnants of defeated provincial troops, independent guerrilla bands and local defence forces. In the three-year period the Eighth Route's own losses of rifles were only about 30,000, this being due chiefly to the Army's fighting tactics and its practice of two rifles for three men—so that often a third of the force deployed is engaged in recovering arms from warriors wounded or killed in battle. •

Besides rifles and side-arms the Eighth Route's equipment consisted of machine-gun and artillery armament and large quantities of miscellaneous military supplies captured from the enemy. The estimate mentioned excludes the various weapons—mostly antiquated rifles, hand grenades, swords and spears (!)—of approximately half a million men (and some women) in the local self-defence armies, which form the reserves of the main forces. It also excludes the fire power of various "friendly armies" in North China which co-operate with the Eighth Route militarily and to some extent politically. Nor does it include the arms of the Manchurian Volunteers, who are being re-trained and re-organized under Eighth Route Army leadership, in response to a request from their high commander, the redoubtable General Li Tu.

During its first three years of fighting, the Eighth Route Army received from the Military Council only \$600,000 a month (now about U. S. \$30,000), or the standard pay allowance for three divisions. Other armies were issued new weapons and new equipment for their replacements; the Eighth Route received only a meagre allowance of ammunition. By 1939 the monthly pay cheque was insufficient even to feed the army in the field. It could not have existed had it not become organically inseparable from the mass organizations whose freedom it defended. Chungking furnished these warriors no blankets, no winter uniforms, no shoes or socks, no doctors, nurses or medicines. In the bitter sub-zero weather many attacks were carried out by men who tramped barefoot across the frozen hills and streams leaving crimson stains behind them on the

icy paths ; wounded youths shivered in thin blood-clotted jackets of cotton cloth ; hundreds lost toes, fingers and ears from frostbite.

And yet back in the security of the distant rear I sometimes heard some well-clad official say, waving a fat hand : "The Eighth Route Army? They do not fight. They only play hide-and-seek. They do not worry the Japanese. The Government should stop paying them. They use all the money for propaganda, not for resistance."

They conveniently ignored one questions. How had the non-fighting Eighth Route Army managed to hold its North China bases for three years, while the main Chinese Army was retreating far into the West? Let us try to find an answer for it.

GUERRILLA COMBAT EFFICIENCY

The greatest lesson we have learned is that a people can fight victoriously with what resources it happens to have.

GENERAL CHU TEH.

THROUGH many years of dearly bought experience on the battlefield, involving the sacrifice of over 300,000 Communist Party members, the Red Army and later the Eighth Route Army developed guerrilla warfare from a minor adjunct of military tactics, where Colonel Lawrence left off, into a major strategic concept known as *total-mass protracted resistance*.¹ Thus far it is the only method which has succeeded in denying a totalitarian invader the full fruits of his conquest. Who can say that it may not be the road along which the colonial subjects of European and Asiatic imperialism, who now number nearly half the men and women of the earth, shall travel to attain their freedom? Or that it may not finally prove of wider significance in the political re-mapping of society than the theories of General Ludendorff?

Millions of words have been written by guerrilla leaders, in their military and political journals, on the tactics of total-mass warfare, and of course no summary can hope to reveal its rich variety or its full potential. But as I have attempted in previous chapters to suggest the social, political and economic organization of this unique pattern of resistance, so here I want to point out a few fundamentals in the military tactics of its armed defenders.

"Total-mass protracted resistance" is based on the widest use of China's numbers and space. The Japanese lacked the man-power to police even half of the roughly 300,000 villages in the territory they overran, and to attempt it would anyway have been financially ruinous. They therefore sought to immobilize resistance and consolidate their power, by seizing the strategic "inner lines", the walled cities, roads and railways, and "squeezing" the hinterland into submission. But the theory of total-mass resistance rests on the possibility of converting Japan's strategic "inner lines" into defensive "outer lines" by *turning every village into a base of resistance and compelling the Japanese to rely solely on armed force and to immobilize each of these bases, one by one.*

In practice the Reds use three main types of operations and develop each by different tactical methods. These are: (1) guerrilla, (2) mobile and (3) manoeuvring warfare. The first two are conceived as exclusively offensive in character; and a speedy and disciplined dispersement, according to prearranged plan, is virtually the only

¹ A phrase first used I believe by General Peng Teh-huai,

defence precaution against combat reverses. Only in manoeuvring warfare do Red tactics include preparation for the defence of points and lines in depth. Even in the latter case, however, the positions are regarded as temporary, to be abandoned when they have served their function as a screen for short-attack operations or the withdrawal of moving forces. In no case will the Reds offer a prolonged defence of a basic position against a superior accumulation of fire-power. It is in this conception of combat almost exclusively in terms of offensive tactics and the constant initiative—based on extreme mobility and the speedy massing of superior numbers and fire-power—that the Communists differ from other sections of the Chinese Army.

General Peng Teh-huai gave me the simplest definition of all partisan tactics when he listed what he called six minimum essentials of a successful operation: "Fearlessness, swiftness, intelligent planning, mobility, secrecy in movement, and suddenness and determination in action." He went on: "Lacking any of these it is difficult for partisans to win victories. If in the beginning of a battle they lack quick decision, the battle will lengthen. They must be swift, otherwise the enemy will be reinforced. They must be mobile and elastic, otherwise they will lose their advantages of manoeuvre."

The Chinese equivalent of guerrilla is *yu-chi-tui* or literally "roving attack corps", and the difference between *yu-chi-chan* (guerrilla war) and *yun-tung-chan* (war of movement) is chiefly the distinction between small local bands of operating independently and larger units operatin in time and geographic co-ordination with the main irregular forces. There is a saying that "guerrillas *attack* to annihilate and *rove* to avoid annihilation". In other words, their main principle of preservation requires both constant attack and constant movement. A guerrilla band may be "based" on a single village, and its "reserves" consist of a single self-defence corps; or it may embrace several villages in a valley or on a mountain or a plain. Usually it numbers not fewer than fifty or not more than 1,000 men. It is in the maintenance of discipline in these small bands that political education plays such an important role; and it is the lack of such education, and the lack of revolutionary leadership, which explains most of the failures of old-type troops attempting guerrilla warfare. Without revolutionary education the guerrilla band becomes more of a liability than an asset in defence.

Often the local guerrillas wear plain clothes; sometimes they are farmers by day and soldiers by night. If conditions are unfavourable they may take no military action for days, but keep local spirit alive by various acts of sabotage: cutting enemy telephone and telegraph wires, digging up roads wherever possible, damaging bridges and culverts and organizing local opinion against traitors. Perhaps their most effective work is the immobilization, by these methods, of enemy political influence in the village. As long as local guerrillas are active, the gentry dare not co-operate with the enemy.

Militarily, the local guerrilla band acts as antenna for the mobile forces, collecting intelligence, eliminating spies and keeping headquarters informed of changes in enemy dispositions. Under favourable circumstances, when enemy patrols are reduced or bad weather handicaps the movement of reinforcements, the local guerrillas combine under district leaders and carry out a series of short assaults and rapid raids. They may even attempt fairly lengthy attack operations. But they always quickly fade back into the countryside.

In storming fortified positions the guerrillas invariably attack at night, depending on surprise, superior offensive spirit and knowledge of the terrain, to give them victory. In pouncing upon enemy troops in movement they attempt to separate the column by a variety of diversionist tactics, by allurement and decoy. Then they attack the weakest point in the divided echelon from a position well prepared in advance. They constantly waylay small groups of Japanese and capture and disarm stragglers. Generally they make the country-side as inhospitable as possible to moving troops, seeking to keep their nerves always on edge, and robbing them of rest and sleep.

Posing as guides, local guerrillas sometimes lead enemy troops into an ambush: such "dare-to-dies" usually perish at once. Occasionally, learning of an enemy itinerary from spies in Japanese employ, a group of guerrillas evacuates all the civilians from a village where moving troops plan to rest. Taking over all the domestic functions of the village, they wait till the weary invaders, suspecting nothing, settle down for the night; then at a signal the peaceful villagers arise and annihilate the detachment.

Another example of "allurement" and one frequently used with success: A number of guerrillas, disguised in the bright attire of young women, are planted as peasants working in fields near some Japanese encampment. Pleasure bent, the Nipponese steal out into the fields to seize the women. The latter begin to run, keeping just far enough ahead to encourage a pursuit. Thus the would-be Romeos are led into a trap, where they are disarmed or destroyed by the peasant girls' confederates.

Ravenous hunger for meat also leads many an unlucky Japanese to disaster. Cows or sheep are ranged attractively on distant hill-sides, and the unwary new arrival who chases after them runs to his doom. Sometimes "Quaker cannon" are set up to mislead enemy reconnaissance planes. Sometimes regular roads are obliterated, and false detours are built, so that the Japanese, unfamiliar with the topography, march into a *cul de sac*. Hundreds of different devices are employed. As fast as the Japanese learn one trick the guerrillas invent another.

Second, "mobile war" consists of larger operations based on the concentrated fire-power of Red regulars, who provide the main attacking force in this kind of combat. The force may be anything from a regiment to a full brigade, supported by everything the Reds possess up to medium artillery and accompanied by cavalry. Speed, secrecy and careful preparation are of utmost importance

in "the war of movement". The development of maximum fire-power without impairment of mobility (on attack march the Reds average 30 miles, day or night) is its special genius. Battles of this nature are fought to achieve total annihilation of moving columns, to destroy vital strategic points, to cover major sabotage operations against railways, roads, blockhouses, and so on.

Japanese encirclement tactics against the main forces of the defenders are frustrated by skilful co-ordination of guerrilla and mobile-war operations. Mobile-war tactics are usually confined to carefully chosen combat zones and have objectives clearly limited in time, space and military purpose. An outstanding example, which German military journals described as "a classic of mobile warfare", was the battle of Pinghsing Pass, on the Great Wall. Here the Eighth Route Army administered to two crack Japanese divisions the most humiliating defeat the Imperial Army ever suffered at the hands of the despised Chinese. Through superior manœuvring the Reds lost but 300 men in a battle during which they inflicted over 6,400 casualties on the invaders.¹

The third type of tactics, called "manœuvring warfare", can be successfully carried out only after organizational effort among the people has reached an advanced stage. It involves the co-ordinated movement of two or more divisions of troops, operating from separate bases in Chinese-held territory behind enemy lines, and sometimes in co-operation with offensive action on the main fronts.

In North China the Eighth Route now has six principal strongholds (North-west Shansi, the Shansi-Chahar Border, South-east Shansi, Southern Hopei, Northern Anhui and Northern Shantung). Around each area extend waves of popular anti-Japanese organizations, which thin out gradually as they approach the Japanese garrisons. It is of course possible for the enemy to penetrate in force to the heart of the main irregular bases, one by one, and carry out brutal and demoralizing punitive measures. But they lack sufficient troops to encircle all of them simultaneously, and they lack men, money, supplies and communication facilities to support permanent step-by-step occupation. Hence when they launch an "annihilation" campaign against one base, the main forces from the others, not under siege, attack to immobilize the rear and flank of the Japanese columns engaged in the offensive.

This co-ordinated action, called manœuvring warfare by the Reds, requires a perfection of timing, staff work and proper radio, courier and other communication rarely attained by other Chinese armies operating from secure bases. It is not always successful—chiefly because it tends to reduce the mobility and opportunities for hand-to-hand combat on which the Reds depend so much in order to offset the enemy's superior fire power. Nevertheless, every encirclement campaign thus far attempted by the Japanese has been frustrated by mobile and manœuvring battle tactics. Though the invaders have several times reached the bases of the main mobile

¹ See Haldore Hanson, *Humane Endeavour*, N.Y., 1940, for a vivid account.

forces, they have done so only after being forced to fight as separate columns on the march, and before attaining the rendezvous which is the final act of the converging manoeuvre. With their offensive power already weakened, they find nothing in the broken net from which the big fish have escaped.

Manoeuvring warfare is, however, extremely costly and hazardous for lightly equipped troops like the Eighth Route, and its objectives can only partially be realized without co-ordinated help from the main fronts.

As long as China's main forces continued passive and did not bring into play the heavier fire-power which they alone possessed, the recapture of enemy positions and the annihilation of major enemy concentrations would be impossible. Red commanders believe that final victory can only be achieved by manoeuvring warfare carried out on a vast scale. But they admit that this could take place only if the high command, overcoming its anti-Communist prejudices in the search for broad political and military unity, extended major assistance to the mobile forces, and together with them planned a co-ordinated offensive over the widest and deepest fronts.

How, then, does the combat efficiency of this new type of Chinese army compare with the bulk of the forces? Figures published by the National Military Council¹ covering the first two years of the war indicated that the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies together accounted for a very sizable percentage of all enemy equipment immobilized by the combined Chinese forces. These two armies alone captured or destroyed about 6 per cent of all enemy artillery pieces lost, 15 per cent of all machine-guns, 28 per cent of all trucks and 34 per cent of all rifles. More than one-third of the enemy troops taken prisoner all over China were captured by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. Combat effectiveness increased as the armies enlarged; in 1939 they participated in nearly 25 per cent of all encounters recorded, local guerrilla combat excluded. This percentage rose still higher in 1940, when the Japanese halted their frontal advance and massed over half their troops against the guerrilla areas in an attempt to complete the pacification of the conquest.

Early in 1940 the Eighth Route commanders jointly made public a formal statement² to the Government asserting that "in the last two and a half years the casualties of the Eighth Route Army have aggregated about 100,000 (or almost twice the size of the original combat force in Shansi) while it has inflicted more than 200,000 casualties against the enemy". If this statement was correct, and observers were inclined to credit it because the Eighth Route published day-to-day reports covering over 6,000 different engagements during the period, its combat efficiency was roughly 400 per cent better than that attained on any other front. For elsewhere, accord-

¹ Quoted by Hsiao Hsiang-jung, "Two Years of Resistance", *Military and Political Magazine of the Eighth Route Army*, Yen-an, Aug., 1939.

² Feb. 15, 1940.

ing to General Pai Tsung-hsi, Deputy Chief of Staff, the ratio of Chinese losses was about two to one in favour of the Japanese, and in some regions averaged five to one, to the enemy's advantage.

"Of the enemy's forty divisions in China, seventeen are engaged in fighting the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies," the statement reminded the Military Council. "Thus we are 'occupying the attention of two-fifths of the total enemy forces.'" At the same time the Communist commanders reported that they were paid for only about one-fifth of their forces, so that each man and officer received an average of only \$2.72—or about 13 American cents—per month! They lodged other grave complaints of which it is necessary to speak in the next chapter—for upon reasonable solutions to the questions they raised the whole edifice of unity in China might stand or fall.

UNITY OR DESTRUCTION?

*We demand unity under the banner
of resistance, solidarity and progress.*

MAO TSE-TUNG.

THE Japanese strategy of conquest, like the strategy of Chinese resistance, may be divided broadly into three stages. These are: the Period of Great Offensives, in which Japanese troops occupy the key cities of China and seize control of the coast and the principal waterways and lines of communication and the main developed Chinese bases; the Period of Military Consolidation, in which the Japanese attempt to stabilize a frontier of conquest beyond which to confine the main Chinese forces to a passive and purely defensive role; and a Period of Pacification, in which Japan seeks to annihilate the mobile and guerrilla armies and their bases in the population, thereby winning a political decision through the extermination of the last but most determined opposition to her final economic, political and cultural subjugation of the conquest.

By 1940 the Japanese had completed the first stage in this strategy, had made considerable progress on the second and were devoting their main efforts to the third stage. It should be abundantly clear to the reader by now that only the guerrilla (and largely the Communist) troops stand between the Japanese and successful pacification of Northern and Eastern China. In so far as it is not directly connected with strengthening resistance in the occupied areas, what happens in "Free" China will not affect the outcome. If the Japanese were to succeed in their "mopping up" operations in the penetrated provinces (and if the war were decided between Japan and China alone), Chungking would become merely the capital of an economically backward country over near Tibet.

Since 1938 the Japanese have made many extermination drives against all the chief guerrilla bases, with most emphasis on the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, whose various organizations now fight in about four-fifths of all engagements in the occupied areas. Against North-east Shansi and South-east Shansi alone, for example, more than a dozen different "final annihilation campaigns" had been hurled one after another, by October, 1940, while six major expeditions had been sent against the New Fourth Army in Anhui and Kiangsu. In all these attempts the Japanese failed to achieve their objective, suffered heavy losses and were unable to prevent the continued increase of enemy fire-power. But they learned lessons from each failure, and it required all the ingenuity of the veteran Red commanders to develop new tactics and win.

The Japanese have changed their contemptuous and careless attitude towards Communist troops, which in early months cost

them some stinging defeats. They now carefully study and analyse all the methods of an enemy which General Itagaki is reported to have described as "the most obstinate and dangerous of our foes". The Japanese are making use of troops specially trained to conduct mobile and guerrilla operations and have learned to employ gas effectively in small engagements. An Eighth Route commander of North-western Shansi described to me a campaign in that region in which the Japanese used only small bands of fast guerrilla fighters disguised as peasants, who sought to surprise the Communist detachments in their village outposts.

But the weakness of ordinary Chinese troops attempting mobile and guerrilla warfare, without the support of an organized self-governing people behind them, becomes all the more pronounced in the case of the Japanese. Another major obstacle to effective guerrilla counter tactics is the lack of initiative on the part of the rank-and-file and non-commissioned officers of the Japanese army. Once cut off from their officers, they often become incapable of improvising a command, and are helpless to meet unexpected conditions. The Japanese dare not tamper with their feudal samurai tradition of discipline by encouraging the common soldier to believe that he has a brain, whereas this is absolutely basic in the training methods used by the Communists. Commanders not only explain every operation to their men before a battle begins, using maps and miniature battle sets, but they analyze every engagement after it has occurred, explaining their own mistakes and requiring every soldier to offer his own criticism and his own version of how he would have conducted the battle! Thus during an engagement every Red fighter is cerebrating from start to finish, and if a leader is killed the corporal or even the squad leader can pick up the command and carry on.

Japanese operations all pivot round their fortified cities and an attempt is now being made to enlarge these zones into a blockade system similar to that with which Chiang Kai-shek finally drove the Reds out of Kiangsi. But Chiang used over a million troops to surround only one Communist base and still could not prevent a break-through, while today the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies have a half dozen larger and stronger bases than Kiangsi ever was. Even by extensive use of puppet troops for garrison work, the Japanese lack sufficient attacking forces to encircle all these vast areas simultaneously. To enclose each with blockhouses would be enormously costly and in the end perhaps inconclusive, for the Japanese might still fail to achieve an annihilation.

On the whole the Japanese seem to make little headway against the Communist troops militarily, and more and more rely on terrorism and punitive measures against the civilian population. A missionary who recently travelled through Hopei and Shansi said that the Japanese had burned every third or fourth village and murdered thousands of civilians in their punitive operations in the areas he saw. All large Japanese anti-guerrilla expeditions are accompanied by hundreds of empty trucks in which they haul off

every conceivable article of value when they retreat back to the cities. Whole herds of buffalo have been driven off and slaughtered. It is said that about half the farm animals of Hopei and Shansi have been destroyed. In many villages you can no longer buy an egg, for not a single fowl has survived.

"It is a common practice", a Chinese professor from the guerrilla regions of Northern Shantung told me, "for the Japanese to seize all the produce for miles round a market town and leave the farmers empty-handed. They take the goods back to the town and keep what they want for their own use. Then they put the rest on the market and sell it back to the people they have robbed."

When the Japanese trucks do not contain the farmers' furniture or clothing or grain they are often filled with Chinese girls. These are taken to the cities and hired out to brothels run by the S.S.S. of the Japanese Army. Sometimes both boys and girls are kept for ransom if the Japanese suspect the parents have some money hidden away. Frequently whole villages are suddenly surrounded at night and machine-gunned as a "precautionary measures". Millions of farmers living within the range of Japanese guns have been forced to abandon their tiny plots of land which, though it never gave them more than subsistence living after the exactions of landlords and tax collectors, was the only home they knew.

The Japanese have now grasped what is, after all, the fundamental fact about this pattern of total-mass resistance: that it can be destroyed only by wholesale depopulation. In some areas on the fringes of the guerrilla bases this has been undertaken, both by outright extermination and by transportation. Thousands of farmers have been conscripted to labour for the army and to rebuild the blockhouses and city walls and roads torn up by the guerrillas. Thousands of able-bodied young men and women have been forcibly transported to become rice-labour for Japanese military or industrial schemes in North China and land schemes in Manchuria. Those who are not thus directly enslaved are by a hundred different methods harnessed to support the Japanese occupation. Wherever the Japanese can enforce their mandate, farmers are required to sell their rice, wheat, silk, cotton and wool to Japanese monopolies at prices far below market values and in exchange for often worthless puppet banknotes. Those who resist are beaten up or killed as "traitors". And so on. The sordid story has already been well told by plenty of reliable observers.¹

But these totalitarian practices have this compensation: they serve to strengthen the anti-Japanese determination of the people and to make it difficult for the enemy to find any shelter beyond their own rifles. The Chinese are not stupid. While there is murder and burning and rape going on at one end of a town, few of them can be impressed by Japanese posters stuck up on the opposite end, denouncing "the Communist-bandit Chiang Kai-shek", or showing kindly faced Japanese soldiers patting the heads of cherub-like Chinese

¹ Cf. especially the publications of the American Information Committee, Shanghai, which give vivid and documented reports of the methods employed.

children under the slogan "Asiatics unite". Instances of just such situations are so numerous that a reasonable doubt whether the Japanese possess any sense of the ridiculous seems justified.

Tactics of this kind do more to educate the peasants in patriotism than anything preached to them by the Communists. It teaches the importance of organization and co-operation with their own defending forces. Only in this way, they learn, can they make it impossible for the Japanese to exist outside their own fortifications. Only through mobilization—which means "to make mobile"—can the millions of villagers find protection, by identifying themselves with the armed forces organized to defend their lives and their freedom.

Nevertheless, the destructiveness of Japanese punitive forays is so terrible that only a superb morale, based on a revolutionary hope of ultimate victory, enables guerrilla forces and the people who support them to continue the struggle. I have pointed out the grave position of guerrilla economy and the absence of Government aid in strengthening guerrilla industry and agriculture. I have mentioned the inadequate payment of troops and the denial of essential arms, especially of high explosives necessary for effective demolition work. Despite these admitted weakness in their position, however, I never met a single man or woman in or from any guerrilla district who doubted that Japanese efforts to consolidate in the occupied provinces could be finally defeated. But I also met scarcely a single one who did not regard the anti-Communist activity of semi-official groups behind the *Chinese* lines as a far graver matter and one so serious that, if it enlarged, might lead to a Japanese triumph.

It was no secret in China that anti-Communist groups in the army and among Kuomintang and Government officials, working in collaboration with gentry and local militarists with dubious connections, were responsible for countless "incidents" in the guerrilla regions and their environs. I first began to hear hushed reports of these clashes in the last days of Hankow. Later they became almost daily occurrences known to everyone.

I have discussed the effort of the Kuomintang Right Wing to preserve the one-party dictatorship and to suppress other activity in the unpenetrated areas of China, and have told of the formation of a War Areas Party and Political Affairs Commission to eradicate the anti-Japanese movement led by the Communists behind the enemy's lines. Sponsors of these measures were frank enough in their avowals, though reports were kept out of the public press. In Chungking, General Chang Chün, Vice-Chairman of the Supreme War Council, told me that the local administrations elected by the people in guerrilla China were "illegal" and spoke of the determination of the War Areas Commission to abolish them. At Sianfu, General Chiang Ting-wen, commander of the Generalissimo's headquarters, left me with no doubt that he shared Chang Chün's views.

Factions in the Central Army and the Kuomintang, and of course prominent in the Government, sabotaged the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies in ways which elsewhere would be called Fifth Columnism. Such secret organizations as the Blueshirts under Tai Li,

the "Regenerationists" under General Hu Tsungnan, the Army Gendarmes, the Three Principles Youth Brigades, and other groups whose names would be meaningless without explanations for which there is no space here, all collaborated to carry out what was known as the "Procedure for Curbing the Activity of the Alien Parties".

Incidents multiplied rapidly, and in 1940 became so serious that progressive people everywhere half feared the Kuomintang might altogether abandon the effort against Japan and concentrate on what appeared to be its main interest: a renewed civil war against "the Reds". There were repeated instances of arrest, imprisonment and execution of men and officers of the Eighth Route. Cases included everything from the kidnapping of students bound for Yenan to armed attacks on Communist army garrisons. Neutral generals appealed to the Generalissimo to intervene but he seemed either powerless or uninterested. Finally General Pai Tsung-hsi, Deputy Chief of Staff, himself went to the Generalissimo and requested him to repudiate the instructions contained in the secret "Procedure for Curbing the Alien Parties". Chiang denied any knowledge of it. But the "incidents" continued.

For a long time the Communists seemed reluctant to air their grievances for fear of making the situation worse. Even after the entire staff in one of the New Fourth Army liaison depots was killed by a militarist in Kiangsi they only held a small memorial meeting in Chungking—to which they invited the militarist's representative! When units of the Central Army attacked the Shensi—Kansu—Ninghsia Border Region and lopped off five counties, they withdrew their forces and appealed to the Generalissimo to intervene. He stopped the hostilities but made the Central Army's occupation permanent. In desperation, the commanders of the Eighth Route Army divisions finally dispatched a dramatic open telegram¹ early in 1940 addressed to the Generalissimo, all members of the Government and commanders of the War Areas, in which they protested against the continued attacks on them and demanded an end to sabotage and discrimination. It read in part as follows:

In Hopei, Shansi, Suiyuan, Chahar and Shantung provinces the Eighth Route Army has recovered lost territory and established anti-Japanese bases which defend the vast central plains and all North-west China. Yet there are people who proclaim that the Eighth Route Army must be wiped out. Those very generals who but yesterday abandoned their territories and fled in the face of Japanese onslaught, now order their forces to attack the rear of the Eighth Route Army and call such action "recovery of lost territory" Special agents have been sent into the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region to create disturbances, while huge armies have been sent to surround it. One day they raid a city, another day they seize a country. Many of these unfortunate incidents have occurred. Yet our fighters stand firm on the anti-Japanese fronts and do not yield an inch. Thus the Eighth Route Army demonstrates its devotion to the whole nation.

The Sian-Yülin highway and the Lunghai Railway are communication lines of the Eighth Route Army. They are dotted with special agents, and members of the Three Principles Youth Corps intercept and kidnap travellers along them. "Reception houses" have been established for the purpose of "rectifying youths who blindly follow the Eighth Route Army". Students of

¹ Feb. 15, 1940.

our university have no right to travel freely. Once kidnapped, they disappear or are forced to sign "statements of repentance" and join the "training corps". Many innocent young people have been persecuted in this way . . .

The insolence and audacity of the special agents know no bounds. They have even established graduated rewards for captured Eighth Route Army men—\$200 to \$300 for first-class workers, \$150 to \$200 for secondclass, \$40 to \$100 for third-class. Thousands of dispatches circulating false and baseless rumours have been sent out. Tremendous sums have been wasted on disruptive activities . . . Does not this gathering storm warn us that there is danger of a repetition of the disastrous tragedy of ten years ago?

In the course of the nation-wide anti-Japanese war China has clearly shown progress in the military field but has failed to show relative progress politically. Corrupt officials and greedy local gentry are still freely running about and profiting from the national crisis. Such people thrive on internal dissension. Innumerable scandals are hidden behind veils; government officials shield each other, preventing true information from reaching the highest authorities. The situation has developed to such a point that our army, fighting under most difficult conditions, is threatened at the rear, subjected to derision and has its vital communication lines interrupted.

An ancient proverb says, "When high officials refrain from comment, minor officials must speak." We cannot remain indifferent to the protests of our men who are fighting the enemy, nor can we any longer suppress our own feelings. Continuation of the present abnormal conditions will be detrimental to the interests of national unity as well as those of the war of resistance.

After thorough deliberation, we respectfully request you to dispatch General Chen Cheng (Political Director of the National Military Council) to the front so that he may obtain a clear picture of the casualties suffered by the Eighth Route Army, the number of Japanese it has captured, the amount of territory it has recovered, the number of battles it has fought—and the number of times it has been attacked in the rear and had its communication lines cut.

General Chen Cheng ignored the invitation, but his Political Department replied by publishing a collection of tales which gave the impression that it was the Kuomintang which was everywhere being oppressed by the Reds, who were accused of themselves perpetrating the crimes against which they protested. The evidence was too well known for it to be obscured, the situation had become a national scandal and the Generalissimo was obliged to order an investigation. But negotiations dragged on for months without much visible result. It was not till the middle of 1940 that an improvement was finally promised by the Generalissimo.

Today, although the Communists are still excluded from participation in the political life of the "free provinces" (representatives in Chungking and elsewhere are recognized only as liaison members of the Eighth Route Army, the Communist Party being still officially banned), the Generalissimo has recognized certain front-line areas where Communist troops should have the same right as Kuomintang troops hold elsewhere. The Military Council now also pays three additional divisions of the Eighth Route and two additional divisions of the New Fourth. It is perhaps not without significance that this adjustment (which still leaves about half the Communist troops unpaid by the Central Government) was not granted until the closure of the Burma Road made the Kuomintang regime almost completely dependent on external aid from the Soviet Union.

But the big question in my mind, as I flew back from the North-

west in a Eurasia plane to Chungking, was whether this kind of improvisation could continue to hold the country together under the trial of far greater hardships hat in all certainty lay ahead. How long, I wondered, could a government continue to claim to be "national" and "united" which officially denied the political existence of a party whose withdrawal of support could at any time expose it to utter disaster?

XXVI

THE PROMISE OF FREE CHINA

*Against the full strength of a
resurgent China, any armies in the
world must break and fall.*

JAMES BERTRAM.

CAN the struggle of this economically backward, disadvantaged country have any lesson for us? Yes, it can; for the same universals are at stake here as everywhere else. We must learn them if we are to fight on the winning side ourselves.

I would put as point number one an item which may surprise the reader. It is this: China's war has proved that democracy can fight more effectively than dictatorship. China is not a true democracy, and this has accounted for much of its failure. But the vitality of such democracy as the people have developed during the war has saved the nation from decisive defeat. The contrast in qualitative results obtained by resistance as led in the guerilla areas, with that achieved elsewhere, underlines the point. Though the Government is not democratic, this has nevertheless been a people's war imposed on the rulers at the beginning against their will. Democratic sentiment, far greater than is reflected in any political bureau, has actually denied to the anti-democratic and defeatist forces the power to enforce a surrender.

Spain first demonstrated that a true democracy can be defeated only by an immense superiority of armament. The defeat of France, as we now know, was due not to this fact so much as it was to the betrayal of democracy from within, by anti-democratic political and military rulers. Challenged by the dynamic of fascism, democracy must be dynamic and ever-advancing or it collapses, as in France. Although China's democracy is primitive, it is relatively dynamic. While it remains so there is still hope of victory.

Secondly, democracy cannot fight a successful war based on the *levée en masse* without equalizing the burden among all classes. Total wars involve total populations. There is little distinction between the civilian and the front-line fighter, either as a target of enemy attack or as a factor in the mechanism of defence. Just as the mercenary army can no longer be relied upon to defend a modern state, neither can money profit remain the basis of civilian morale. Greed and exploitation must be replaced by an extension of the logic of democracy to the full range of economy. Economic democracy alone can unite a people in the same kind of brotherhood that must exist to hold an army together under fire.

Thirdly, self-reliance is the strongest bulwark of democracy and a necessary antidote to defeatism. "A people can fight with the resources it happens to have," says Chu Teh. The loafer and the

idler and the appeasement class must be thoroughly eliminated. Every citizen must be provided with productive work and responsibility, he must be given not only economic rights but economic duties and not only political rights but political duties. Defeatism begins with irresponsibility and the frustration of personality and ends in an escapism that blames external causes for internal failure.

Finally, the integration of human personality with a great movement of history requires a doctrine which can successfully identify individual salvation with social regeneration. Both fighters and civilians must be absolutely convinced that a great positive cause is at stake, the triumph of which can radically *improve* their lives and those of their descendants in every way. It must be a cause sufficiently universal to penetrate into the consciousness of the enemy and politically immobilize his forces.

The degree of China's failure to provide these conditions of victory accounts for her failure to bring Japan nearer to defeat, while the extent to which they are gradually being realized may yet give her victory. The development of political, economic and military democracy has been very uneven and the mobilization of self-reliance in the utilization of internal resources has consequently lagged far behind actual possibilities.

"China itself", General Falkenhausen once remarked, "does not know the strength of her own resources." That is perfectly true if by China one means the rulers of China ; but it may not indefinitely be true. If ever a Government discovers and acts upon the discovery of the immense latent energy lying unmobilized both in the millions of peasants and in the ground beneath their feet, China will indeed be, to quote Falkenhausen again, "unbeatable by any one nation".

One cannot be dogmatic about such a complex matter, but from what I have seen of China at war it seems to me conservative to state that not more than one-third of the country's visible war potential has been mobilized. This applies both to man-power and to resources. The key weakness has been the failure to integrate these two factors for the greatest productive efficiency. Back of that lie political and economic contradictions which cannot be solved until full recognition is given to the potentialities of the human energy at the nation's disposal.

Many people are so astounded that China has fought at all that they forget that China had a very good chance for victory. I suppose I was one of the few people who maintained this ; I had the melancholy satisfaction of predicting the year of the outbreak and more or less the course which the war would follow.¹ But I over-estimated the speed with which the catastrophe would force upon the State the changes necessary to bring about the efficient reorganization of Chinese society. It now seems quite possible that the opportunities may be altogether lost if political and economic changes are not greatly accelerated in the new stage which the battle for Asia entered

¹ In *The Saturday Evening Post*, June 6, 1936.

when it enlarged to become an organic part of the second World War.

China must in the near future complete the mobilization of her man-power and resources, or the initiative in this process will pass into other hands. The war has ripened the conditions for necessary changes and made them easier to realize ; but only the dynamic of revolutionary leadership can now carry out their implications.

Militarily, a dozen important things remain undone. The vast revolutionary energy of the peoples of Manchuria and Mongolia has hardly been tapped. The revolutionary fervour of the Koreans has not been mobilized. Little has been done to achieve the political immobilization of enemy troops stationed in China and Manchuria. Inside China Proper the organized defence power of the peasantry in the occupied provinces has been utilized better than elsewhere, yet it remains far below its potential, owing, as we have seen, to the lack of political and economic reinforcement from the main Government bases. Sabotage work against Japanese military establishments in the cities is extremely poor not only because of the reactionary labour policy of the Government before the war, but because of the political backwardness of the elements on which the Chinese command still relies to mobilize labour inside the enemy's bases.

Here is an illustration of other unrealized possibilities. I have already reported that, according to Chiang Ting-fu, Secretary of the Executive Yuan, there are no less than 2 million *min-t'uan* and pacification forces in the "free" provinces, in addition to the regular army. *Min-t'uan* are local armed guards in the pay of the landlord-gentry, necessary to collect rents, taxes, and interest on usurious loans, to throw debtors in jail and so on. (A large number of China's able-bodied men are actually in jail for debt!) Pacification forces work with the *min-t'uan* and the police ; they fight bandits and other lawless groups made up for the most part of dispossessed farmers.

If democratic mobilization were carried out all over China it would be possible to release for the use of front-line fighters at least a million rifles and other arms now needed by the mercenaries to enforce property privilege and money rights. A democratically mobilized people could—as is now the case in many guerrilla districts—adequately maintain peace by communal self-defence corps. And not only would the people be strengthened, but a million or more parasites could be converted to producers—perhaps mobilized, for example, through Industrial Co-operatives, to make military equipment for the new fighters, or settled on co-operative land reclaimed from the idle estates of absentee landlords.

One more illustration. General Chen Cheng says that he has about three million regular troops deployed behind the vast "font" against the Japanese. In many places no contact is maintained and there is a wide "neutral" zone between the two forces in which all roads and communications have been completely obliterated. Here any further enemy advance is not feasible without extensive and easily detected preparations. The Chinese forces holding such

"fronts" are therefore passive, static and even superfluous. Moreover, about half of all the Chinese troops are not deployed near any potential battle-line at all but are far behind the front, in garrison life.

In the North-west, for example, there are three times as many Central Army troops west of the Yellow River as there are east of it on the fighting line—which is itself often for weeks inactive. That these troops serve a purely political purpose is obvious when their disposition is compared to that of the Eighth Route Army. The latter retains in its rear defence zone in North Shensi and Kansu only 20,000 troops, mostly local volunteers—and this is less than one-tenth of its total combat forces east of the Yellow River behind enemy lines.

The Eighth Route depends upon the attacking power of its main forces behind the enemy to immobilize any invasion of its own rear in the Shensi—Kansu—Ningsia border area. Thus far it has successfully done so. Although the Japanese have three or four times crossed the Yellow River to invade North Shensi they have always been compelled to withdraw to meet counter-attacks in Shansi. And so from the beginning of the war the Japanese have never been able to get beyond Shansi province, though they have penetrated the one-dimensional positional defence everywhere else with little difficulty. However, though this disposition is capable of holding up Japanese military advances, the weak garrison force in the Border Region is not adequate to defend the area politically against pressure from other Chinese troops.

It is suggested that major Government concentrations are being kept behind the lines for the day of a "large-scale counter-offensive" when they are presumably to become the attacking force along the fixed front. *But it is now abundantly clear that China cannot accumulate the heavy fire-power necessary to engage in this kind of battle competition with Japan, unless a large part of the enemy's strength is diverted elsewhere.* Wherever that diversion is to appear, the strengthening of Chinese operations behind the enemy's line must in any case play an important role in it. In fact it seems to me that the main counter-offensive power must itself be developed from the "diversion", and that only when it has been sufficiently strengthened would it then become possible for a blow from the west to supply a climax.

The meaning of this is simply that about half the main Chinese forces in the "free" provinces are militarily "immobilized" because they are not performing a primary defence function at all. They merely serve to maintain a political balance of power for a Government which does not feel internally secure. This is one of the problems that only "democratic mobilization" could solve. And that raises the whole question of political and economic changes necessary to strengthen the Government, in order to release the maximum fighting power of the nation.

The measure of China's military weakness lies in the Government's failure to symbolize the political implications of a great

historic cause. China has such a cause, and it is not confined to breaking Japan. Its broad meaning is that it leads the vanguard in the emancipatory struggle of all Asia. As for China herself, there can be no question that if Japan is defeated no other force on earth could now restore the pre-war semi-colonial status of the country. But to be victorious, this tremendous cause, full of special meaning for half the men and women of the earth, must carry in it not only the distant promise of improvement in men's lives, but an immediate fulfilment by the realization of a better, democratic, society.

Machiavelli was quite right when he said "dictatorship for offence, democracy for defence". A defensive war of freedom can be won only by imposing heavy responsibility on the masses through the widest use of democracy—I have forgotten the Italian's exact words, but this is the essence—for whereas the aggressors have the incentive of plundering the wealth and power of others, the defence can find a dynamic only if the people really exercise the power at stake.

China urgently needs democracy in its truest sense, in which men possess not only economic and political rights, but economic and political duties. It is absolutely necessary to reconcile internal antagonisms and achieve complete mobilization. Here I mean a democracy which starts in the smallest village and passes right through to the Central Government, with the power to delegate authority through chosen representatives in the hands of the people from bottom to top. It is complete rubbish to maintain that the Chinese peasants and workers, some of whom are illiterate (and will continue to be until there is democracy), are because of that ignorant and incapable of responding to political responsibility. What democracy on earth would have been established if it had waited for mass literacy, and what country on earth can continue to be literate for long without democracy? The alleged incapacity for self-government of the Chinese masses is the greatest of all the myths fostered by China's own semi-feudal mandarin monopolists jointly with imperialism. I confess it once seemed plausible to me also, but now that I have seen it proved false I take this opportunity to deny it.

Such a democracy can come about in China, however, only if an economic foundation is laid for it, either by peaceful or violent means—for it is idle to pretend that anything less than revolutionary change can solve the contradictions—and in this respect the Government falls far short of responding to the implications of the cause which it must symbolize to win. For ten years preceding the invasion, the Kuomintang attempted to deny the necessity in civil war; and now under the dynamic of Japanese invasion it still seeks to avoid it. That is why two million property guards are needed to police "Free" China. That is also why the productive power of the nation cannot be fully mobilized.

A fundamental cause of the economic stagnation of China before the war, as all candid students of the question know, lay in its quasi-feudal rural economy, based on the concentration of land ownership

in a gentry class which for complex reasons could not lift itself out of the pre-capitalistic rut of usury, hoarding and commodity speculation. This weakness became all the more pronounced with the war. The Nanking Government never released any comprehensive figures on land ownership, but various estimates indicated that over half the peasantry owned no land at all, a good two-thirds of it fell in the class of tenant or half-tenant tillers, while from 10 to 15 per cent of the population owned well over half the total land. We have seen in the case of Szechuan that on the rich, densely populated Chengtu plain over 70 per cent of the land was owned by 7 per cent of the people. While this is doubtless higher than elsewhere, it is significant because this is the setting in which the Government now functions.

Currency inflation has deepened the peasants' distress. Prices on farm products lag far behind the rising cost of manufactured commodities. Usury is rampant and debt interest constantly mounts. In Szechuan the Government ruled that rents should be stabilized at pre-war rates, but here and elsewhere the gentry and the *tangpu* found many methods of evasion. Landlord tribute became more than ever non-productive in its economic uses, being employed chiefly for speculation in land and exchange, for hoarding and for profiteering in agricultural and manufactured commodities, and in smuggled enemy goods.

At the same time it is well known that a very different course was followed in the occupied areas wherever democracy has been established under guerrilla leadership. There the non-tilling and absentee landlord class could no longer collect feudal tribute, while the disadvantaged peasant was being enfranchised as a producer and land settler. Usury was abolished and land rent reduced from 25 to 50 per cent, in cases where the landlord stayed on his soil. A moratorium was declared on rural debt, and hoarding and speculation were drastically punished. Landlord power was being converted into State taxing power as the capital base of resistance. Despite the terrible destructiveness of constant war and the quarantine of the guerrilla districts from access to capital accumulations, the reorientation was effective enough to maintain a pattern of defence built on democratic economic foundations.

"What we aim to establish", said Chiang Kai-shek at last in 1940, "is a thoroughgoing democracy." We do not know just what the Generalissimo now has in mind, but it can only be hoped that he has come to realize the necessity for a thoroughgoing reconciliation with the peasantry, and to understand the maturity of the opportunity which now lies before the Government. The hegira of money-lenders and landlords from the occupied areas to the treaty ports, foreign concessions and Hongkong, the disturbing role of landlord tribute in speculation, the flight of landlord hoardings into foreign exchange, the currency inflation, and other factors all posed inescapably the need for a land reform to strengthen the Government and increase its revenues. This could now be relatively easily accomplished provided the will to lead a transition existed: by expropriation of

absentee landlords, by Government purchase in bonds or currency, by low-interest Government loans enabling the peasants to purchase, individually or co-operatively, the land they till.

It cannot be said that the Kuomintang entirely ignored this question. Laws were enacted providing for reclamation by refugees of public lands, waste land, and under certain conditions, the untilled land of absentee owners. Dr. Chen Hanseng has described¹ three ways in which the regulations empower the Government to reclaim untilled land from absentee owners: (1) by purchase at a minimum price; (2) by compelling the owner to sell to the reclamer; (3) by ordering the owner to lease rent free for from three to five years, to a tenant. In the first two alternatives the tenant can purchase the land on a reasonable instalment plan. Dr. Chen points out, however, that only about a half million refugees (there are 30 million) could benefit from such land reclamation organizations, while other Kuomintang reclamation schemes in no way alter the already existing landlord-tenant relationship. Even so, such measures "do represent an earnest attempt for a new economic development".

But it is regrettable that meanwhile, instead of sanctioning the progressive changes made under the Border Governments and recognizing the urgency of the situation elsewhere, the backward elements in the Kuomintang and its armies speak, as we have seen, of "recovering lost territory" from the "rebels", and wish to reimpose the old pattern in these regions. Moving in the opposite direction, the bureaucracy adopts economic measures which strengthen and restore the landlord-gentry semi-feudal basis of its power. I have mentioned the huge sums poured into the hands of the gentry in the form of "co-operative" credit and agricultural rehabilitation schemes.² It is hardly necessary to emphasize that much (by no means all) of these credits are converted by the gentry into money which reaches the peasant majority only in the form of usury and the tribute exacted in speculation, thus prolonging the degradation of Chinese economy at a pre-capitalistic stage.

If the Government were so willed it could, with little to lose and much to win, easily use its war-time underwriting of rural economy as a means of building the economic foundations for democracy, instead of perpetuating the present stagnation. I do not wish to exhaust the general reader with detail. It is perfectly evident that all the millions now used to re-prime the gentry class could quite as readily enforce a progressive economic transition by re-financing the peasant masses in such a manner as to enable them to recover control of the land, bring about an equalization of the burden, vastly strengthen the national economy, and establish the firm security of both the Government and the Kuomintang.

In this respect Industrial Co-operatives have proved beyond any doubt that both the peasants and workers are perfectly capable of assuming the responsibilities, with the privileges, of economic demo-

¹ "New Soul Comes to Old Soil", *T'ien Hsia*, Hongkong, April, 1940.

² 400 million in 1940, through the Government banks. About one-third of it was earmarked for Szechuan.

cracy. In this movement, indeed, one sees a true example of fulfilment of the promise of China's tomorrow. Upon the outcome of Indusco's present struggle to maintain its democratic character one may well form a judgment on the whole question of whether the Government is capable of leading the transition from feudalism to democracy. If the backward elements of the bureaucracy succeed in imposing on C.I.C. the same pattern of control already established over the rural credit co-operative apparatus, those who hope for a democratic China may have to look elsewhere for encouragement. If the Industrial Co-operatives, with all their special advantages, prove unable to resist subordination of the movement to gentry domination, then we may have to conclude that Kuomintang hegemony has indeed exhausted all its possibilities of leading a successful transition.

The programme of a co-operative State, based on a true rural co-operative movement closely integrated with a true co-operative industrialization, co-ordinated in State planning, seems to me now to offer the only chance of laying the economic foundation for a victorious democracy in China without renewed civil war. This is also, I suggest, the only kind of China in which the foreign powers would find any possibility of developing a market in the future, as I shall show a little later.

Meanwhile, it is urgently necessary for the Kuomintang to strengthen its present improvisation by admitting other parties into the Government and thereby narrowing the gulf between the bureaucracy and the people. It seems to many neutral observers to be sophistry to continue to maintain that the Communist Party does not represent as legitimate a voice of the people as does the Kuomintang, or to suggest that the Communist armies are any more "private", or any less "central", than the Kuomintang troops. Both symbolize legitimate interests in the national cause. These interests could be temporarily reconciled through a working coalition between the parties which have a national following. Until a democratic political system exists there is no other means of reconciliation, and without this preliminary stage it is hard to see how a democratic system can exist.

"Unification without representation" appears to be, after thirteen years of effort, impossible to attain. The Communist troops and the Border regions they defend, like all other troops and regions, can probably be "unified" only under a regime which reconciles itself to their political existence and gives them a genuine voice in national decision such as to safeguard them against extermination.

The Communists have at no time since the war began asked for more than legalization of their party and some steps in the direction of democracy. It would not seem desirable for the Communist Party to replace the Kuomintang if it is at all possible for the latter to carry out the necessities of the period. It is inconceivable that such a change could take place at present without a civil war that might benefit only Japan. Whoever "won", the nation as a whole might lose a great deal.

The Communists lack trained technicians and administrators and

would have to enlist many of the present bureaucrats to form a government. If they were not merely to impose a new name on an old bureaucracy they would be compelled, in order to complete the democratic revolution, to break the latter's counter-revolutionary alliance with the gentry with a ruthlessness and terror that would be widely misunderstood abroad. What industrial capital remains in the interior would speedily take flight. The capitalist Powers might take active steps to close China entirely as a capital market. The regime would have to rely solely on Soviet Russian aid, and Russia has not developed sufficiently to finance the modernization of China through the export of capital and capital goods on the scale required.

Nevertheless, the transition to a "thoroughgoing democracy" must be made, and speedily made, or the Kuomintang may lose its mandate under circumstances painful for the entire world. China must achieve a dynamic democracy now, during the war; China must quickly complete her mobilization, or she may be colonized by a dynamic feudal imperialism which might temporarily obliterate her from the pages of history. It is the reward of China's resistance that it is now easier for the country to climb over into a new world, and if the opportunity is realized no one can doubt that it was abundantly worthwhile. The costs of war have been enormous, but they are clearly small compared to the riches of a present and a future which China still retains, or to the long imprisonment in a darkness without hope which awaits the peoples who prefer slavery to struggle.

It would therefore be the most profound tragedy if a compromise "peace" were to be made while the full implications of China's cause remain unrealized. Once economic and political democracy has been won under any Chinese Government, however, only the cruellest combination of world events could then deny a great people's final victory.

In China three centuries of history are being telescoped into three decades, and into a struggle which, to succeed, must combine certain achievements of the French, American, and even the Russian revolutions. Time no longer marches on; politically it dashes. Men in power cannot continue to walk in a world on fire, but must jump while they can still make a safe landing. The longer democratic mobilization is rejected in China, the nearer Japan comes to success—for Japan might yet win.

JAPAN'S CHANCES

The war now goes on . . . as an attempt to insure the survival of Japan as a nation.

RODNEY GILBERT.

SCATTERED through this book the reader has encountered references to the errors of judgment, the miscalculations and the vulnerability of Japan in China. Japan's militarists are unable to redeem the cost of the conflict in terms which mean anything to the Japanese people but dubious glory and new entanglements.

Japan has now spent about ten times as much on the "China Incident" as on the two-year Russo-Japanese war, and her casualties have been four or perhaps five times as large. Her internal debt has about trebled; it has increased nearly 500 per cent since 1930, just before Japan began to exert a "civilizing influence" (the slogan in those days) in Manchuria. This debt actually is nearly three times the size of Japan's pre-war total national income. Service costs on war loans floated just since 1937 alone eat up about half the internal revenues of the Government. The entire nation seems fully mortgaged to war. Japan's economic relationship with the occupied territories appears to hold forth little promise of early liquidation of the enormous cost of the conquest.

Yet it would be a mistake to under-estimate the striking power Japan still has in reserve, or to conclude that she could not under any circumstances make good in China, or that her war economy is incapable of supporting the strain of further expansion. Few of the experts who predicted Japan's economic collapse after the occupation of Manchuria can today read their own essays with the same Adam Smithian complacency with which they wrote them. Looking back through the forecasts made by American and European economists concerning Japan's prospects in Manchuria in 1932 and 1933, I find only one or two that are not as worthless as similar cheerful predictions of "economic collapse" made about Nazi Germany.

In Manchuria the Japanese got an area twice the size of pre-Nazi Germany, which held such riches as 80 million acres of arable land, 400 million tons of iron ore, six billion tons of coal, 150 billion cubic feet of standing timber, and gold deposits estimated to be worth two billion American dollars. This does not begin to assess the extensive resources or the value of communications, industrial plant and other capital goods seized. Yet, as I read over the orthodox economists' analyses now, it is clear that they were singularly convinced that the more of Manchuria Japan acquired the more she would collapse. They never seemed realistic except in one sense (and

this was not the economists' sense): that the aggression was certain not long hence to compel Japan to go to war for all-or-nothing stakes—and she might lose.

Japan built in Manchuria the continental base which enabled her to invade China, and her success was possible because under the appeasement diplomacy of the European Powers and the Chinese Government she was able to take over the country with virtually no armed opposition. Today, Japan is engaged in extending that base into China itself, for the purpose of conquering Asia. If she has thus far failed it is not because of any barrier of static economic laws but because of the counter-dynamic of China's resistance.

It is not wise for the amateur to venture deeply into a field in which experts have so badly erred, and there is, anyway, no space here for so thankless a task. But it seems important to illuminate a few of the peculiarities of Japanese military fascist imperialism, so that we shall not underestimate the menace it constitutes for the world.

What is meant by "military fascist imperialism"? How does it differ from the familiar pattern of *laissez-faire* imperialism as practised before and after the first World War? The older imperialism apparently arose when a nation's exporters and capitalist groups accumulated "surplus" stocks of commodities and capital which they could not dispose of in the domestic market without increasing the income of the non-owning groups by greatly lowering their own profits. Such nations engaged in imperialist wars which served the function both of creating a profitable internal market, in the form of Government purchases of armament goods (which not only did not improve the real income of the non-owning groups but speeded up capital monopolization) and at the same time provided export markets in backward colonies from which capital could temporarily extract a pleasing tribute. Though much over-simplified, this explanation suggests the basic objective cause of imperialism. There are, of course, other objective and immanent factors—social, political, geographical and ideological.

Japanese imperialism certainly also possessed these characteristics, but it was further conditioned by Japan's own historical peculiarities. In other countries the development of modern empire arose gradually and "naturally" out of the contradictions of *laissez-faire* capitalism, and armed forces were created to serve the needs of the latter. In the case of Japan, there was a far greater degree of conscious planning from the first on the part of the ruling class, and a much greater urgency about it, due to the sharp limitations of an internal market clinging to a semi-feudal economy, and Japan's late arrival as a competing force in the capitalist world.

The modern Japanese army and navy grew out of the old feudal ruling clans, as we have seen, and when Japan adopted a Constitution they remained responsible to no one but the Emperor. Real state control was kept in the hands of the fighting forces, the bureaucracy, the great landowners and the Imperial circles. All of them subjectively planned for Japan to become a great empire. Objectively,

this could only begin by the militarization of semi-feudal landlord and mercantile capital, together with the imperial subsidy, as the basis of foreign conquest.

The first fruit of empire-planning was the Sino-Japanese war, in 1895, which marked the beginning of Japan as a capitalist Power. Japan acquired a large credit in the form of indemnity from China, which was loaned to the Manchu Empire by British banking interests, and her rulers also got some little wealth in territory, and special access to Korea. Further conscious planning by the armed forces and the state hierarchy, with financial help from foreign bankers, enabled Japan to defeat Czarist Russia in 1905-6, when she emerged as the youngest contender for world power.

During the Russo-Japanese war Japan spent ten times more than her highest previous budget. This money was raised by internal loans which were used to develop armament factories, communications, mining and light industry. No change was made in the archaic land system, however, which even now still retains its feudal character. The war also emancipated Japanese capital from foreign extra-territoriality, giving the Government complete customs autonomy and full taxing power, and enabling Japan to enter the external market. Her credit improved. By 1913 foreign investment in Japan and her conquests increased by ten times, most of the capital being furnished by British bankers, who really laid the foundation of Japanese capitalism. Through subsequent industrialization of Japan's resources, helped by high tariffs and generous State subsidies raised by heavier taxation of the peasants, capital expanded its foreign markets and enriched itself through the accumulation of high profits made at the expense of the world's cheapest labour.

This latter process was accelerated during the first World War, when Japanese industrial investment increased by 14 billion yen. For the first time, Japan became a creditor nation, to the extent of two billion yen. Heavy industry developed on a moderate scale. Mines, shipping communications and electrical industry made marked progress.

Throughout these years the driving force behind Japan's rapid development was war and empire. It had the political function of checking every rise in the anti-feudal and democratic forces in Japanese society, and the economic function of constantly renewing its own necessities for new external markets to exploit. Because Japanese expansion was never checked externally, democracy never became strong enough to control the fighting forces, the big capitalist families, the permanent bureaucracy which represented especially the landlord elements, or the Throne Circle. Despite many internal differences, these main political forces always united in times of crisis to co-operate in waging war as a means of averting the internal democratic revolution. Political and social as well as economic imperatives therefore decided the Japanese ruling oligarchy to seek a way out by war in Manchuria in 1931, when the sharp contraction of foreign markets was accompanied by the most critical internal conditions in Japan.

What caused the extension of invasion to China in 1937? Many complex factors contributed. Chinese industry had recovered and was again competing for its own domestic market as well as Japan's "own" foreign markets—which were also being monopolized more completely by rival imperial Powers. Manchuria did not solve the internal dilemma of Japanese monopoly capitalism. Democracy was raising its timid head again in the Diet and blocking increased military expenditure. The public was restlessly demanding "reforms". The fighting services could not force through the great appropriations they wanted for their secret huge rearmament programme without a Big Incident.

The nature of the economic development of Manchuria also must have had a decided influence on Japanese policy. Manchuria absorbed billions of yen in Japanese capital savings, but this was invested in production which had few outlets abroad and little internal market except in armaments. The forced capitalization of the Manchurian conquest was a strange and unorthodox thing. Apparently, little of the banking capital exported to the colony was used to purchase real property or existing equipment. Everything in Manchuria, all mines and other resources, developed communications, railways and industries were in effect confiscated. Such genuine Japanese capital as was brought in was used mostly for operating resources and plant seized by the military and hence to develop projects chiefly of military value.

In Manchuria, Japan grabbed an enormously valuable accumulation of resources and raw materials, plus cheap labour, and needed only operating capital to make it genuinely productive. All her mounting debt was really an expression of a kind of synthetic capitalization of new internal assets. The development should have been "sound" except for one thing. Most of it was focused on the army as a market. The driving force behind it was the army itself, which was interested in Manchuria primarily as a military base.

The queer feature of Japanese imperialism is that the Emperor, or Imperial treasury, nominally symbolizing the people but in reality the controlling group in state capital, has a half share in many capitalist projects and gets a half interest in the new assets seized by conquest. Japanese monopoly capital takes over the other half, partly subsidized by the state.

Now, through its physical possession of the huge spoils on the continent, the army increased its partnership with State and private capital. In reality it controlled the economic development of Manchuria, and through it deepened its voice in economy at home. It naturally arranged for the "militarization" of most of the capital that came to Manchuria, which became to a great extent dependent on the army as purchaser both at home and colonially.

To keep this market expanding, and to increase its own power, the fighting services planned bigger and bigger uneconomical projects and forced more and more debt on Japan. In order to win people's approval for still heavier taxation to support this mounting capital debt, which produced little of value to the people, the army soon

needed a "national emergency", and so did heavy industry. The fighting service had to find, in the form of war, an export market for the surplus commodities they owned, to maintain and increase production.

I do not suggest that this explanation should satisfy everybody. It merely seems interesting as one of the main factors which made the invasion economically inevitable.

Japan thus seems to have departed fundamentally, in Manchuria, from the *laissez-faire* type of imperialism. It became military fascist as the army gradually established control of capital security which enabled it to dictate the nature of investment, when it became itself a major customer of business, and when it took over what amounts to virtual monopoly of capital resources and many kinds of state revenues. This monstrosity could only perpetuate itself by continuing to expand its main enterprise of military operations.

Of course, that was merely the objective situation. Subjectively, the army's invasion of China was dressed up for the Japanese people as a "liberation of the Chinese from Communistic oppression", as the building of a "New Order in East Asia", and later as the "elimination of foreign imperialist exploitation". To carry out the Divine Mission the fighting services appealed to the deepest mysticism and superstition in the Japanese soul by restoring, with considerable internal violence, the teachings of the former feudal state.

The complicated connection of the Japanese army and navy with State and monopoly capital partly explains their extremely predatory conduct in China. As organizations drawing their recruits from the Japanese poor they must try to keep down the burden on producers at home by seizing as much existing wealth as possible abroad. The army especially, as part owners of the production system, so much of which they have diverted to the manufacture of armaments, must continue to expand their own markets. As business men with personal stakes in many of the enterprises seized, the military leaders also wish to fill their own pockets as quickly as possible.

Japanese military imperialism seems to need to capitalize itself ever more speedily by skipping the intermediary stage of amassing profits through trade and uses the simple expedient of expropriating the investment and accumulation of others. In China it aims to seize capital not only in money but by total expropriation of all existing wealth, resources and means of production, including a monopoly of labour power, which can be harnessed to the military machine while the same process is completed at home. Japan must, in the end, eliminate all capital-holders in China, first the Chinese and finally the foreigners. No attempt to balance the books of Japanese imperialism can be realistic if it ignores this basic aim of expropriation of capital.

Early in the war the Japanese got control of most of the Chinese revenues on which foreign loans were secured. They have plundered China of millions in gold and silver which appear on no customs return. Most of the silver has been purchased at a good price by

Washington. They are gradually acquiring the main economic bases of the currency. No trade statistics reveal the amount of foreign exchange the Japanese have accumulated by totally assimilating the goods market and imposing their manufactures in return for Chinese Government banknotes convertible to gold. From the official trade returns we get no true idea either of Japanese imports or exports, since the army and the capitalist families working with the army, in practice often treat China as an internal market. They therefore bring in and take out vast quantities of commodity and capital goods which never pass through customs at all.

Possibly the Japanese already dispose of more revenue than the Nanking Government ever did. Although their taxing power does not extend far into the hinterland, they have complete control of the customs, salt and railway revenues, which were the bases of foreign loans. China formerly paid out 30 per cent of her customs revenues alone in tribute to foreign capital, but Japan has virtually cancelled customs as well as salt and railway loans and now pays no tribute on them whatever. Thus she has in effect *already* expropriated foreign capital investments amounting to three-quarters of a billion American dollars.

The Japanese have not only seized all Chinese Government property but have confiscated all the means of industrial production and established monopolies over all the distributive services. They have seized all the mineral resources of the country and much of its private fixed capital investment. The total of this wealth aggregates billions of dollars and is more than Japan could have hoped to *borrow* from Wall Street and the City for many years. She does not have to repay any part of it except in the form of further investment in armament and ultimately war. *If it could be held*, who can say that it might not eventually compensate for the cost of its seizure?

Meanwhile, the last step in this expropriation of a whole nation has yet to be taken. Internally, the Japanese are accumulating capital by eliminating the functions and wealth of the young Chinese merchant and capitalist classes; externally, they must eliminate the rights of foreign capital to direct access to the China market. In the end Japan must complete her capitalization of the conquest by taking over the physical assets of foreign business investment in China. This latter amounts to nearly two billion American dollars and represents a developed continental base of considerable war value—especially shipping, mining and industry. But Japan can get hold of it only by methods which must bring her at last into a head-on collision with Britain and America.

The question is whether Japan possesses the military might to attempt this. It would be a mistake to assume at once that she does not, because of apparent unstable economy. If we make a judgment of Japanese economy against a static peace-time pattern, or against its pre-war or even its present assets alone, or on the basis of production in relation to present mass purchasing power either in Japan or occupied China, we may go astray. The thing about Japanese economy is that since the Manchurian occupation it has

been constantly changing and enlarging and reconstructed within a framework in which the military becomes the main consumer, while the people "consume" only in proportion to their relationship with the military purposes. This economy does not envisage the restoration of a peaceful society in our lifetime. It is based frankly and inevitably upon continuous expansion and continuous war as the solution to all its own contradictions.

Although about three-fourths of the Japanese budget has been going to the army and navy, "it would probably be wrong", writes Guenther Stein, who is not inclined to over-estimate Japan, "to ascribe more than half of the Japanese military budget expenditures to the cost of the China war."¹ The other half, and since the Japanese army has become to some extent self-sufficient in China perhaps as much as two-thirds, of Japan's "war" expenditure has been devoted to preparation for final expropriation of the Western Powers in Asia.

Nobody knows exactly how much reserves of war materials Japan has accumulated, as no detailed reports on imports from abroad have been published since 1937. For years America alone sold considerably more war materials to Japan than the latter consumed in China, and lent Japan the technical aid and foreign exchange with which speedily to develop her war industries. Japan's purchases of Anglo-American war materials until recently exceeded those used in all British war industries.

Increases in Japanese heavy industries, based on foreign imports and loot from the continent, were given by the economist Guenther Stein² for the one year 1938, since when rapid growth has occurred, as follows: engineering and machine tool plants 20 per cent, metal industries 10 per cent, chemical industries 5 per cent. This excludes the industry seized or built on the continent during the same period. Japanese industry may prove less vulnerable to air bombing than is generally assumed. The greater part of the 112,000 factories in Japan are small plants employing an average of twenty-eight workers each, and thousands of them are located in villages away from the main centres of communication. Moreover, thousands of small machine- and metal-works have been voluntarily or compulsorily moved to the continent in recent years, where the army has built considerable heavy and munitions industry which should be able to assimilate larger amounts of iron and other raw materials than Japan now commands.

The islands are probably self-sufficient in food, from a war standpoint, unless Japan could be blockaded in her own narrow seas from access to Manchuria. Her reserves of war materials are estimated to be sufficient to support a war with a major power for about two years. Her full war potential is still small compared with either the British Empire or America. But if, in the process of a war, Japan seized the total resources of Greater East Asia she might become self-sufficient in a military economy, besides depriving the foreign powers of some vital war essentials now drawn from weakly

¹ *China Air Mail*, No. 6, Hongkong.

² *Ibid.*, No. 18, Hongkong.

defended colonies. It would only be on the gamble of successfully grabbing those colonies before exhausting her own reserves that Japan would go to war against Britain and America.

Japan's seizure of Manchuria and Mongolia was part of a major shift in the forces of decision in Asia from sea power to land power. Admirals may not all agree, but many now doubt whether sea power alone, even if it could be massed in superior weight on Japan's own sea frontiers, could quickly subdue Japan. As she has developed continental bases—which at this writing reach clear to the borders of Burma and give her access to the heart of the British colonial empire—she has become more secure against blockade by sea. In this respect she at present enjoys an advantage over the European colonial Powers in the East, who still hold their possessions fundamentally by sea power, which is itself inferior to Japan's.

Japan still has large reserves of men with which to invade South-eastern Asia. Her losses in China have been heavy, including perhaps 800,000 men disabled and killed. However, as 400,000 physically acceptable Japanese youths come of military age each year, losses in China have not much more than kept Japan's man-power stationary. Russian experts estimated at the beginning of the war that Japan could mobilize 6 million fighting men. That was before she had got access to huge reserves of Chinese labour to conscript for the production of food and equipment. The five-year army reorganization and replenishment programme begun in 1936 and since then enlarged with German assistance has further improved her military equipment and efficiency. It is believed that the present trained reserve now numbers about 3 million men, in addition to approximately 1,200,000 troops permanently garrisoned in the occupied areas or engaged on the China front.

The key weakness in Japan's scheme of conquest is perhaps neither economic nor military, but lies in her political tactics and strategy. Of course in a total war these three factors cannot really be separated. But perhaps we can say that in the inadequacy of Japanese political strategy we see most clearly manifested the deepest contradictions in Japan's whole position—and the point at which her armour is thin as paper.

The anachronisms of Japanese political strategy in China grow out of the feudal basis of her own imperialism, her inadequate resources, and the necessity to secure them quickly by seizure from every class which possesses even the tiniest stake. Beyond this there would seem to be also a certain amount of "natural" political ineptitude inherent in Japan's political inexperience which is further emphasized by her feudal methods of military training.

I have pointed out that the political strategy of Japan leaves no room for an alliance with any legitimate class interests in China. From the beginning Japan attacked both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, both the Kuomintang and the Communists. There were Japanese who saw the necessity for co-operating with the gentry, and some who even told me they intended to win over the peasantry—Matsumoto, for example, whose uncle, Prince Konoë, has now made

him one of the Permanent Board of Seven, charged with the task of converting Japan to a Corporate State. But the army chiefs were so short-sighted and so avaricious for loot that they indiscriminately attacked landlords and peasants, merchants, bankers, students and workers. Similarly they invaded North, Central and South China almost simultaneously, thereby sacrificing sectional antagonisms which might have been manipulated in their interest.

The lies of Japanese propaganda were not big enough and they were too big. I have mentioned the implausibility of disembowelling men in one end of a town while preaching pan-Asianism in another. In the same way the Japanese foolishly scattered anti-Chiang Kai-shek propaganda among Central Army troops and anti-Red propaganda among Communists, instead of vice versa. The doctrine of Emperor-worship and myths of racial divinity excluded any Chinese from even spiritual participation in their triumphs, whereas a doctrine of racial affinity—preached by a disciplined army—might have won useful allies. Many fascists in the Kuomintang camp sympathized with Japan's Anti-Comintern slogans; but the Japanese attacked them indiscriminately with the Reds. Similarly, they unnecessarily antagonized the Western Powers on all fronts, when with a little adroitness they might easily have lulled them into an even sounder sleep than they were enjoying. At least they could have isolated Britain from America by bringing into the full support of their schemes all the help of the Chamberlain-Halifax appeasement diplomacy, with which the misguided Sir Robert Craigie so exhaustively sought a basis of "understanding", until they were prepared for the final betrayal à la Hitler.

Even some of the gangsters and corrupt gentry hired by the Japanese to help exploit and "pacify" the countryside have been estranged. Scarcely do these mercenaries perform their duty when the Japanese impatiently rob or even murder them to recover their full share of the loot. The puppets live in fear more of the Japanese than the Chinese. Because everybody knows Wang Ching-wei is a complete prisoner of the Japanese he can be of little help in winning political authority for them.

All these tactics have been of wonderful educational value to the Chinese as a whole and have made many see the full reality of an oppression which, had Japan pursued a subtler political policy, they might not have realized was worse than they had previously endured. Japan's political strategy explains the determination and unity of China's resistance. It explains her inability thus far to bring about the cleavage necessary to win a political decision in China.

These weaknesses naturally reflect the reactionary density of the Japanese army's internal leadership. What this now amounts to, politically, is a resurrection of the old Shogunate, which ruled Japan before the restoration of the Emperor, seventy years ago. Under this system in pure feudal times the Shogun ruled for the Emperor (who was a powerless puppet like Henry P'u Yi in Manchukuo) through a series of alliances with different feudal chieftains known as daimyo.

Although there is as yet no Shogun, the dictatorship of the High Command resembles the Shogunate. It is dependent upon the support of various political leaders within the fighting forces and representatives of the bureaucracy, the great capitalist families, and the Throne Circle, who all correspond to the old daimyo. The feudal character is evident, for example, in the semi-autonomous nature of the five separate army headquarters on the continent. Each competes for its own regional monopoly of resources, rackets and special powers, all compete with the navy, and each seems not much more dictated to by, than dictating to, the home command.

It is as natural that military fascism in Japan should turn back to such a political form as the Shogunate as it is for it to revive all the feudal myths and superstitions which were being broken down by democracy, but which are now the "spiritual" basis of education in Japan's New Structure. It would seem logical to expect that ultimately the Emperor may be altogether interred as a factor in the political alliance which constitutes the Shogunate. He might be replaced by the present Premier, Prince Konoye. It may not be mere coincidence that the fighting services chose Prince Konoye to organize the "Corporate State", for he is a direct descendant of the ancient House of Fujiwara, which several times in history, when the Emperor was a puppet, held the real feudal power.

Many of the modern army daimyo have become very rich since the invasion of China, and their officers also share in the loot and exploitation. The poorly paid common soldiers are not entirely ignorant of that, and it is not surprising that the officers encourage them to do petty looting and robbery. The extensive slaughter of cattle and fowl by Japanese troops in China provides the soldier with beef, pork, chickens and eggs stolen from the peasants, whereas at home he is too poor to taste such luxuries except at weddings and on one or two sacred days a year. This is quite important to the miserably poor Japanese boys; I have read again and again, in their captured diaries, notations of great days featured by such feasts. Another form of compensation is for officers to permit their boys to rape the village girls, and to furnish them free beer and prostitutes in the cities.

Can you preserve a great army morale on such a basis in the modern world? Some of these political contradictions have become obvious to the Japanese troops as well as to the Chinese. There is considerable evidence that their fighting morale has steadily declined while that of the Chinese has definitely risen. Even at the beginning of the war the Japanese lacked the spirit of politically trained Chinese troops and were no match for them in hand-to-hand combat. Foreign experts who have made a close study of Japanese army tactics find the feudal characteristics of training and discipline behind nearly all its weaknesses: the lack of imagination in manoeuvre, the poor estimation of enemy fighting strength, the lack of physical endurance on campaign, the absence of initiative in lower officers, and the wasteful substitution of fire-power for attacking force.

Soviet Russian observers have pointed out to me personally, and

also often in print, that Japanese officers have no confidence in the offensive spirit of their infantry. They shell positions long after they have been effectively destroyed, before ordering an attack by the infantry, and then it is not launched until the tank corps has actually taken the position. On the few occasions when Japanese infantry has been compelled to attack while isolated from its superior firepower and tanks, it has been badly defeated by the Chinese—at Taiherchuang, for example, and more recently in Hunan. I do not think any military observer will quarrel with my statement that Japan's successes have been built solely on her immense technical and armament superiority rather than on the Japanese conscript.

But Japan's advance has most of all been facilitated by outside aid. The new military Shogunate is like fascism in Europe. In the beginning its worst enemies were at home and its best friends were abroad. It won too many easy triumphs with too much help from the Powers, so that its internal opposition was gradually immobilized. It has been unbelievably lucky. Even in 1937, when the last token election was held in Japan, impotent though its results, the people overwhelmingly repudiated the army's pro-war candidates—which was another reason for the invasion. Where are these anti-militarists today? Many of them are conscripts in the army and navy.

Eighty per cent of the Japanese troops are taken from peasant families whose living conditions have steadily worsened since the war, which has not yet solved any of the contradictions in Japan's own semi-feudal agrarian economy. One million landlord families collect a tribute from 70 per cent of the peasants, and 90 per cent of the entire agricultural return goes to landlords, usurers, taxes and the Government. In the industrial world one dozen princely families control over 90 per cent of all the nation's capital. Whatever the economic gains Japan has made in China they have all gone back, with more loot extracted from the Japanese people at home, into the Frankenstein that now rules them. One could make out a good case, based on sound evidence of deepening suffering and growing protest, to prove how low the morale of the people has fallen. But it would not prove that the Empire-builders are in imminent danger of overthrow from within. It would simply further reveal the deep congenital necessity for them to wage a continuous war which can be halted only by an application of superior force together with the skilful exploitation of their political weakness, in the rear and in the field.

But ineffective though Japan's political strategy has been thus far, and tenuous though her hold on conquest surely is, the situation can change. It can become different as Japan turns her armies into the colonial pastures of the European Powers, as she is now doing. For the political position of the Powers in those colonies is in some ways as backward as Japan's. If they are to defeat her they will need a defence based on a much higher concept of political strategy, one which offers the dynamic antithesis to Japanese imperialism, and one in which both the colonial peoples and the Japanese masses can share.
